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Abstract
Reported in this thesis are ten experiments involving a total of 2,426 participants, which 
investigated the lure o f choice. The lure of choice is demonstrated when an item is more 
likely to be chosen when it is presented in a choice set with other items than when it is 
presented in isolation. The lure of choice violates principles of rational decision making 
and can lead to sub-optimal decisions. In the early exploratory studies, participants 
made sequential selections between two target goods and one inferior lure item in lottery 
games and in decisions embedded in realistic scenarios. The first decision was between 
either a solitary target or a further decision between the second target and the lure. 
Participants were lured by choice, and took the same target more frequently when it was 
paired with a lure than when it was alone. Later studies were designed to test the 
argument that the lure of choice is a demonstration of an existing, well-documented 
context effect. Explanations of the asymmetric dominance effect failed to account for 
the lure of choice. The final set of studies was developed to demonstrate the 
applicability of the lure of choice in a range of domains, including replicating other 
relevant empirical studies. Results indicate that the lure of choice is a moderate but 
robust effect. Discussion focuses on attempts to resolve inconsistencies in the literature 
that on the one hand demonstrate that people crave choice, but on the other suggest in 
some situations too much choice can be demotivating or even harmful to the recipient. 
Conclusions suggest that the lure of choice is due to the overgeneralization of a 
preference for choice heuristic that has been very reliable in the natural world, but is less 
so in a world created by marketers geared towards maximising consumption. Other real 
world implications of the lure of choice are discussed.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
“There’s small choice in rotten apples.” William Shakespeare (1564-1616), 
Hortensio, in The Taming of the Shrew, act 1, sc. 1,1.134-5.
1.1. The inspiration for the research
The motivation for this research was twofold: an observation from the real 
world and a current academic, sociological and political debate that is gathering 
momentum. These two underlying themes are not mutually exclusive, with one 
occasionally driving the other, and at other times, vice versa. It is important to note 
that the theoretical knowledge base which relates to this subject has not been static 
during the time this thesis has been completed1. Where appropriate, developments in 
the field that occurred after particular aspects of this work were conducted, and 
which could have informed the early studies are discussed and indicated as post hoc 
in the literature review. In other cases where concurrent developments in the field 
have influenced and informed the course of this research programme, their 
discussion has been included in subsequent empirical chapters. This reflects the 
dynamic nature of the field and the inductive nature of this work.
The first motivation was our society’s seemingly unquenchable thirst for 
consumer choice. Rosenthal (2005) describes how choice has been extended to 
every comer of our lives, and traces the development of this aspect of modem society 
through philosophical, social theoretical and historical mechanisms:
“for the majority of us, having choice- and having to make choices -  has 
become and will continue to be the most important factor that influences both 
our personal lives and our prevailing culture” (Rosenthal, 2005, pp vix.).
At this point it is important to clarify the subtle differences in the use of the 
term “choice”. Choice can be used as a description of a state of the world (noun): “I
-1  -
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have a choice” means having an array of options from which to select, and it can also 
be used as a verb: “I have a choice” can refer to the ability to make a decision or 
exercise a self-determined action (even if the choice is simply between “to act” or 
“not to act”). Wherever possible in this thesis the specific use of the term has been 
clarified, but the two meanings are inevitably linked -  the latter would not be 
possible without the former, and both are important influences on human behaviour.
A predilection for choice (in the sense of an increased array) is evident when 
one takes a look at any UK high street that hosts numerous chain stores selling 
similar items (e.g. sportswear, cheap fashion clothing, or mobile phones and 
accessories) alongside pervasive fast food restaurants selling an array of generally 
low-grade, cheap food. Alternatively, a visit to any supermarket that offers not only 
thousands of different types of products (known as “macro-choice,” Rozin, Fischler, 
Shields & Masson, 2006), but also many aisles of different brands of the same 
products (“micro-choice”) demonstrates that our role as consumers has changed 
beyond recognition since our grandparents’ day. The trend for increasing the range 
of goods on offer is so strong that many supermarkets are now commonly referred to 
as hyper-markets.
On a daily basis, we are faced with increasingly copious decisions that force 
us to select from a range of possible options, especially for what Schwartz (2004) 
calls non-durable (i.e. quickly used, replaceable) goods. Some decisions have 
relatively minor implications: where to buy lunch (and whether to have a ham salad 
sandwich on wholemeal bread or a cheese mayonnaise sandwich on white bread), 
which movie cinema to visit (and which film to watch when we get there), whether 
to buy a pint of milk from the garage or to drive further to the farm shop to buy a pint 
of fresh, organic milk. Other decisions have far more important ramifications: where 1
1 This thesis was started on a part time basis in 1999.
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to attend university (and what course to study), which area to choose to live in (and 
which property to invest in), whether and how to look for a partner (and the person 
one eventually chooses), or which career to pursue (and which job to apply for). 
With the massive increase in information accessibility (predominately in the form of 
the internet), the range of choice available to consumers has exploded in recent 
decades. It is therefore more important than ever to understand at a behavioural and 
psychological level how humans react in the face of choice, and what happens when 
that choice is expanded.
So whilst it is undoubtedly true that the choice offered to the consumer is 
burgeoning, what is of interest for this thesis is the question of how we deal with the 
additional choice, and whether there may be deleterious consequences of increased 
choice. A personal anecdote illustrates the point: as a child I had my hair washed in 
a weekly Sunday night ritual, often with washing-up liquid. This was not because 
my parents were ill-informed or particularly poor, but in those days washing up 
liquid seemed like a sensible, multi-purpose household product. Hair conditioner 
was not yet widely available, and specialist children’s shampoo was unheard of. 
Now, around my bathroom are at least 6 different hair-washing products, not 
including hair styling products. If one visits a well know UK chemist retailer online 
you can choose from at least 288 shampoos, 213 conditioners and 37 shampoos with 
conditioners, ranging in price from £1.59 to £7.99 each (source: www.boots.co.uk, 
September 2006). Likewise, when I go to the high street shop itself, I often feel 
overwhelmed by the choice, and end up picking an item, not because I think it will 
be the best thing for my hair, but probably for some other reason, such as the fact that 
it has been advertised recently, because it is on special offer, or simply because it is 
the easiest to pick up in my haste to exit the shop. Yet, on a regular basis, I am still 
tempted to visit the shop, some distance from my home, with its bright fluorescent
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lights, piped “musak” and rows and rows of brightly coloured, sweetly perfumed 
bottles of toiletries. This is despite the fact that my local shop, about half a mile 
from my home, sells perfectly reasonable shampoo (and washing up liquid). Even 
though as Babin, Darden and Griffin (1994) point out, retail assortment can enhance 
the hedonic value of shopping, can the increased choice mean that the goods that we 
end up with are different from, sometimes worse than, what we might have chosen in 
the face of more limited choice? This anecdote illustrates the dilemma faced by 
millions of ordinary people every day in numerous contexts. What do we do in the 
face of choice, and is it always the most appropriate course of action?
Whether the consumer “demands” greater choice, or is simply forced to deal 
with it by zealous marketers is debatable, and a question that will be addressed in 
Chapter 2. Decades of marketing and psychological research does appear to support 
the commonly held assumption in our society, and the predominant view from 
economics, that the more choices we have, the better (McFadden, 1981). There is 
some evidence for this. In the field of marketing research, Oppewal and Koelemeijer 
(2005) found that consumers of cut flowers valued an increased range of products, 
regardless of the specific options and number of items within the choice set. 
Likewise, Hoch, Bradlow and Wansink (1999) found a significant positive 
correlation between perceived size of an assortment and satisfaction with the 
assortment. Other researchers have shown that there is a positive relationship 
between choice and intrinsic motivation, perceived control, task performance and life 
satisfaction (Deci, 1975, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Glass & Singer, 1972a, 1972b; 
Langer & Rodin, 1976; Rotter, 1966; Schulz & Hanusa, 1978; Taylor, 1989; Taylor 
& Brown, 1988; Zukerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith & Deci, 1978). There also appear 
to be positive outcomes associated with choice even when those choices are trivial or
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incidental (Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Dember, Galinksy & Warm, 1992; Swann & 
Pittman, 1977).
However, there has been something of an academic and philosophical 
backlash to the assumption that more choice is better, and this provides the second 
main motivation for this thesis. From an economic perspective, adding options to a 
choice set (without removing anything) means one can be as well off, or better than 
one was. However, this does not take into account the possibility of search costs or 
other transaction costs. Furthermore, it does not allow for the possibility that the 
benefit from an option depends on foregone options. It has been accepted for a 
while, at least in the behavioural decision making (BDM) literature, that people can 
find choosing from an increasingly large choice set difficult, confusing and time- 
consuming (Broder, 2003; Chu & Spires, 2003; Dhar, Nowlis & Sherman, 2000; 
Johnson, 1985; Luce, 1998; Malhotra, 1982; Payne, 1976; Payne, Bettman & 
Johnson, 1988; Tversky & Shafir, 1992a).
However, another set of writers have argued that the implications of too much 
choice are rather more sinister. Schwartz (2000, 2001, 2004), referred to the 
“tyranny of freedom” being the excessive individualistic ideology-led pressure to 
seek out self-determination, freedom and autonomy -  features that appear valued 
above all else in modem American society, and perhaps the same could be said, or 
will be said in the future, of any Western culture. He argued that extreme societal 
ideologies based on economics and rational-decision theory can lead citizens to be 
extremely dissatisfied with their lives, and indeed, may even cause people to become 
depressed and ill. From this perspective there is a need to both de-emphasise 
individual freedom, and to re-evaluate the cultural constraints that are necessary for 
people to live meaningful and satisfying lives. The paradox of choice is that 
although people want autonomy, they also want to simplify life. For example, while
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many people want autonomy at work, many also prefer to give themselves costly 
deadlines which reduce their choice of when to complete work (Ariely & 
Wertenbroch, 2002).
This debate is relevant and timely. While this thesis does not address the 
ideological motivations of consumer societies, in order to understand the important 
issues of self determination, control and intrinsic motivation we need to understand 
the basic psychological processes that lie at the heart of decision making. It may be 
that the behavioural responses to choice are simple, subconscious reactions (based on 
an inherited adaptive response to the decision situation). If these responses are 
subconscious, it may help explain why at one level people seem to want choice, yet 
at another level struggle to cope with it.
1.2. Aims and objectives
As mentioned above, whether increased choice is what we (as humans and 
consumers) actually want, or indeed need, are questions that have been addressed 
elsewhere (Desmeules, 2002; Fasolo, McClelland & Todd, in press; Kahn, 1998; 
Lehmann, 1998). The main aim of this research project is to go back to basics to 
investigate the most fundamental behavioural effects of increased choice, which 
might in turn influence our wants and needs. Grounded on a review of relevant 
literature from behavioural decision theory, consumer decision making research and 
investigations of preference for choice in animals, this research adopts an empirical 
experimental approach to investigate whether or not there are robust, predictable 
consequences of increasing choice for people.
Early on in the course of this work, a new decision context effect was 
identified, namely the lure o f choice (Bown, Read & Summers, 2003). The 
objectives of this thesis are to provide a detailed description of the lure of choice and
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provide a systematic evaluation of the causes, consequences and implications of the 
effect. Specific research questions are outlined below, and detailed hypotheses for 
individual experiments are presented in the relevant empirical chapters that follow. 
Through a rigorous series of empirical studies, the lure of choice was explored in a 
range of decision contexts including paper and pencil tasks conducted in a laboratory 
setting, scenario-based behavioural decisions with the general public and other 
consumer decisions. Some decision tasks used hypothetical gambles and other 
laboratory-based exercises, others reflected “real-life” decisions in a variety of 
situations and scenarios. By addressing the same issue in a variety of contexts, wider 
implications for many kinds of decision making can be drawn.
This work aims to add to our understanding of commonly-observed human 
behaviour and contribute to the scientific development of behavioural decision 
theory, as well as highlighting implications for all fields relevant to decision making, 
especially the consumer decision making field.
1.3. Introducing the central issue: The lure o f choice
Potentially, in a changing or uncertain environment, the most robust decisions 
will be those that keep our options open rather than those that ‘bum our bridges.’ 
This is the underlying rationale for the popular, but academically controversial, 
management practice of scenario-planning (Goodwin & Wright, 2001; Lindgren & 
Bandhold, 2003; Van de Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Caims & Wright, 2002). The 
potential superiority of this flexibility is also clear in many other aspects of life. For 
instance, if you want to buy a new refrigerator, but are not yet sure which particular 
model, all things being equal (including pricing, convenience, location and so on), it 
is better to go to an electrical warehouse with a wide range of stock rather than a 
small local retailer that carries only a limited range of appliances in order to
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maximise your potential options at the point you will decide. Suppose, however, that 
you have already done your homework, and the specific model you most like is only 
supplied by the small retailer. Should you go to the warehouse? Common sense 
suggests that you should not. Likewise, suppose that your favourite model is 
available at both outlets (at the same price), but the small retailer offers better 
aftercare services and fulfils your preference to support independent local shops. In 
this case, it again seems that you should go to the local shop to make your purchase. 
Is it possible, however, that you might nonetheless be attracted to the multiplicity of 
choice offered at the warehouse, even though the final outcome (in terms of the 
factors mentioned above such as after sales care) may be inferior to the one you 
could have had by shopping locally? If this occurs, you have been lured by choice.
A personal example illustrates how multiplicity of choice may be responsible 
for leading people astray. Leeds is a large, northern English city and its university 
one of the largest in the country with over 32,000 undergraduate and postgraduate 
students (source: ., September 2006). Students are initially attracted
to not only the extensive range of leisure and recreation facilities on offer in the city 
and university (shopping, nightlife, sports, Student Union activities, etc.) but also the 
range of academic opportunities available. For example, for entry in 2006 there are 
37 different fulltime undergraduate degree programmes available which include 
“management” as a substantial part of the programme (as single honours or joint 
honours combinations), ranging from single honours Management to joint honours 
Management and Russian Civilisation. This figure does not include the many 
individual module selections to be made within each programme. However, as an 
undergraduate personal tutor I see a significant number of students who come for 
advice because they are unhappy with their choice of programme and/or university. 
It is not unusual for these students to report initially having been attracted to the city
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with its numerous opportunities and the vastness of the University’s offerings, but 
now wishing to transfer to a different, possibly smaller institution with a more 
modest range of programmes which better suits their own personal needs. Although 
for some students this is because the University simply does not meet their 
expectations, others report feeling as if they had been “blinded by,” or lured by, 
choice.
The potential psychological causes of these interesting and common real-life 
observations are examined in this thesis. As mentioned above, the aim of the work is 
to address the question of whether the presence of choice can lead people into 
choosing in a way that they otherwise would not have. It explores whether the 
outcomes people end up with (having made decisions in the presence of great 
choice), are actually as good as those they would have achieved in the presence of 
less choice. More specifically, due to increased choice, can people be drawn into a 
particular course of action (before the point at which they are required to make a 
final decision) that prevents them from achieving the (objectively and/or 
subjectively) optimal outcome? That is, does the presence of choice qua choice 
fundamentally alter either the way decisions are made, and/or the outcome of those 
decisions?
There is no irrationality in selecting a path that offers more choice, as long as 
this does not lead to a worse outcome. However, an attraction to choice may not be 
entirely benign. The term lure o f choice refers to situations in which having a choice 
changes the likelihood that we will end up with a given option (Bown et aL, 2003). 
For example, imagine a decision between A, B and C. If the likelihood of choosing 
A when offered an initial decision between {A, B} and C is greater than when 
offered a choice between A and {B, C}, then the presence of choice has lured 
decision makers in the direction of A. So, in the earlier example, you might be more
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likely to end up buying a Smeg refrigerator if it is sold at the larger electrical retailer 
(which stocks Smeg, Electrolux, Whirlpool, Indesit and so on) than if it was the only 
model stocked at your local electrical store. Likewise, you might be more likely to 
end up studying BA Philosophy and Management at the University of Leeds rather 
than at your local Higher Education college.
If there is a lure of choice, it might work in the following way. Imagine that
the preference ordering between the three alternatives is A, B >- C (i.e., A and B are 
both preferred to C, although the relationship between A and B is unspecified). In a 
choice between A and {B, C} the fact that B is associated with choice makes (B, C} 
more attractive than B would be alone. Once (B, C} is chosen however, the only 
attractive option left is B, and so it is chosen. The term illusory choice refers to 
situations, like the {B, C} choice, where there is an apparent choice between options 
yet one of the options is almost always taken over the other, usually because it is 
dominant. This is the basic premise of the lure of choice and is examined in greater 
detail in Chapter 3.
1.4. Summary o f research questions o f the thesis
The thesis addresses the following fundamental research questions: when 
faced with a diverse range of options, does the presence of choice (specifically the 
way choice sets are grouped and presented) lead us to act in a way that we would not 
otherwise have done? Furthermore, are the strategies that we employ to decide on 
particular courses of action under conditions of choice always the most appropriate 
in that context? If the answers to these two key questions are affirmative the next 
step is to investigate and document the exact nature of the way we act differently 
under conditions of choice, and to examine the precise conditions that can lead us to
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act differently. Ultimately, the aim of the thesis is to address the question of why we 
might behave differently under conditions of choice.
Evidence from research in the animal world, behavioural decision research 
and work on consumer decision making is brought together and integrated to inform 
a series of studies designed to answer the following questions:
i. Does the presence of choice lead people to act in a way they would not 
otherwise have done?
ii. Are people attracted to choices that allow them the opportunity to choose 
from a number of options?
iii. If people are attracted to choice, is the effect strong enough to lead them to 
make sub-optimal decisions?
iv. If people are attracted to choice, are there particular kinds of choice that are 
more attractive than others?
v. If people are attracted to choice, is there a point at which too much choice is 
unattractive, and people are detracted from it?
vi. If people are attracted to choice, what are the possible underlying causes of 
this attraction?
vii. If people are attracted to choice, what are the implications of this?
1.5. Overview o f the thesis
The thesis is organised in the following way. Chapter 2 presents a review of 
the literature. The next three chapters present new empirical work. Chapter 3 
introduces some exploratory lottery studies. Four studies were conducted to 
investigate whether the lure of choice phenomena could be demonstrated in a 
consistent manner. These early studies were “bottom-up”, in that they were 
exploratory rather than designed to test a specific theoretical prediction, that is, they
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were phenomena-led. The studies reported in this chapter demonstrate a moderate, 
robust, predictable context effect.
Chapter 4 reports three studies that draw heavily on existing theoretical 
accounts of context effects, to evaluate similarities and differences between these and 
the lure of choice. Particular attention is paid to the well documented asymmetric 
dominance effect. These studies rule out the possibility that the lure of choice effect 
is simply a further illustration of the asymmetric dominance effect, that is, it is a new 
phenomenon in its own right.
Chapter 5 describes and evaluates three further studies that test the robustness 
of the lure of choice in more detail and in different contexts. One of these was a 
version of the well-known Monty Hall decision problem and the others were 
replications and developments of a recent judgment and decision making study 
which apparently contradicts the lure of choice. The lure of choice is demonstrated 
convincingly in all three studies. On the basis of these studies, evidence is presented 
to suggest that one of the mechanisms underlying the lure of choice is the motivation 
orientation of the decision maker.
Finally, Chapter 6 brings together the overall findings of the research 
programme. It highlights the main conclusions to be drawn from all ten studies, and 
details how the research programme and the underlying theory evolved over the 
course of the research programme, including addressing the individual studies’ 
potential limitations. The final chapter revisits the research questions outlined above, 
and assesses the extent to which the empirical studies and the extant literature on 
which they were based can answer them. This chapter also offers an evaluation of 
the practical implications of the lure of choice and in doing so, future directions for 
research are outlined. Overall, the final chapter summarises the contribution of this 
work to the field of judgment and decision making.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
“My mother's menu consisted of two choices: Take it or leave it.” Buddy Hackett 
(1924-2003)
2.1. Introduction
The overall aim of this chapter is to locate the current research within the 
judgment and decision making field, and to provide a theoretical foundation for both 
the programme of empirical studies reported in the following chapters and the 
theoretical discussions and conclusions that lead from them.
There are generally accepted to be three approaches to the study of judgment 
and decision making: How should we evaluate thinking and decision making? 
(normative question); How do we think or decide? (descriptive question); What can 
we do to improve our thinking and decision making, both as individuals and as a 
society? (prescriptive question). The relevant emphases on these continually shift as 
the field of judgment and decision making matures and develops. This thesis 
initially focused on the middle question and went on to addresses the latter. 
However, as the normative standard of rational decision making is nearly always 
used as a benchmark against which to evaluate the descriptive element of decision 
research, it is important to describe this approach as background material.
This chapter first provides a brief outline of normative decision theory and 
behavioural decision theory in order to place the current work in the historical 
context of the field. Brief consideration of decision under uncertainty includes an 
introduction to normative theories of decisions under uncertainty (expected utility 
theory) and a description of commonly observed behaviour, such as neglect of 
probability and preference reversals. Attention is then focussed on decision 
behaviour under conditions of certainty, in particular, the wide range of phenomena
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known as context effects, which consistently demonstrate violations of normative 
principles. As the practical implications of judgement and decision making research 
are fundamental, where appropriate each of these sections is illustrated by relevant 
research from the consumer decision making context. Following this, research that 
explicitly addresses when and why humans and other animals demonstrate a 
preference for choice or non-choice is addressed.
2.2. Normative theory o f decisions under uncertainty
Normative decision theory has its roots in the reasonable assumption that 
people decide by determining which option, or particular course of action, offers the 
most desirable payoff, be that maximum benefit or minimum loss, i.e. value 
maximisation. To put it another way, Baron (2000) described the “best” decision as 
one that most helps one achieve one’s goals. However, there is often conflict 
associated with the attractiveness of such a goal and the probability with which it 
might occur (that is, the most desirable outcomes can often be highly unlikely). One 
way in which such conflict might be unravelled is by considering the utility1 of the 
outcome (the extent to which an outcome goes some way towards achieving our 
goals). The normative model of decision making suggests that we should try to 
maximise our utility by selecting options that lead to the greatest utility, whilst taking 
account of the probability of that option leading to the highest utility outcome, if that 
outcome is uncertain. In its most general form, however, utility theory is incomplete; 
it assumes that we have all possible options at our fingertips, along with all the 2
2 Utility does not necessarily mean pleasure, happiness, money or satisfaction. It 
may be better expressed simply as “goodness” (Broome, 1991). Hsee (1999) 
suggested that people often do not select the option that would give them the best 
consumption utility because they are swayed by the option that has the greatest 
monetary value (“Hedonomics”). Happiness relies more on change in state than 
absolute value of wealth (Hsee, 2004; Hsee & Hastie, 2006).
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evidence we require in order to evaluate them. It does not address the fact that we 
may have to search out information so that we know everything we possibly can 
before making a choice.
2.2.1. Expected utility theory
Bernoulli (1738, reprinted 1954) laid out the foundations of utility theory in 
its modem form. Until the early 1950s it was essentially the domain of economists, 
but after von Neumann and Morgenstem’s (1947) book Theory o f Games and 
Economic Behavior, psychologists began to take an interest that was to persist until 
the present day. It is accepted by many psychologists that expected utility theory 
(EUT), while not necessarily descriptive (people do not consistently act as if 
adhering to the tenet of value maximisation) can be considered a valid normative 
theory of decision making, against which our “irrational” decision behaviour can be 
compared.
For choosing between simple monetary gambles, the tradeoffs between utility 
and probabilities are accounted for by the expected value of each option: for 
example, the expected value of a gamble can be calculated by multiplying the 
probability of a particular outcome by the payoff:
EV = £{ p i . vi
where EV stands for expected value; i represents all of the different outcomes; pi is 
the probability of the (h outcome; vi is the value of the f h outcome. The expected 
value of an option is therefore the sum of the products of the likelihood and value of 
all possible outcomes associated with that option, and the option with the highest EV 
ought to be chosen.
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Similarly, if a measure of utility3 can be apportioned to an outcome (on any 
scale that is used consistently) we can calculate the expected utility of an option:
EU = I,ip i. ui
In this case EU stands for expected utility; i represents all of the different outcomes; 
pi is the probability of the t h outcome; ui is the utility of the f h outcome.
As a normative, rather than prescriptive account, we do not calculate such 
utilities for everyday decisions, rather we often rely on “prescriptive rules of various 
sorts, including rules of personal behavior and rules of morality” (Baron, 2000, page 
231). The better the prescriptive rule, the closer the eventual decision to the outcome 
as would be determined by EUT.
There are a number of arguments that offer support for EUT as a normative 
theory from a principles (or axiomatic) perspective (de Finetti, 1937; Krantz, Luce, 
Suppes & Tversky, 1971; Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & 
Morgenstem, 1947). The four main principles articulated by Kahneman and Tversky 
(2000) to which EUT must comply if it is to claim normative status are:
Firstly, the sure thing principle or cancellation (Savage, 1954): this refers to 
the cancellation or elimination of any state of the world that yields the same outcome 
regardless of one’s decision. Thus, for example, if A is preferred to B then the 
prospect of winning A if the bonus ball in the National Lotto is an even number (and 
nothing if it is an odd number) should be preferred to winning B if an even number is 
drawn. The two prospects yield the same outcome (nothing) if an odd number is 
drawn, and hence this factor (consideration of the Lotto bonus ball) should be 
cancelled from the deliberations. In other words, in terms of the EUT formula, it is
3 As a slight aside, the utility of wealth is not the same as its monetary value -  it 
depends on how much an individual has. Bernoulli (1738, reprinted 1954) noted that
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logical to ignore the common term in both outcomes. However, this assumption has 
been challenged by many theorists (e.g. Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961), who have 
illustrated that decision makers often do not adhere to this axiom of rational decision 
theory.
Secondly, weak ordering effect: two (or more) things can always be 
compared in terms of “bettemess”, or utility, even if we would not ordinarily 
compare such things in real life: either you prefer A over B, B over A or are 
indifferent between them. This potential comparison is known as a reasonable 
idealisation. Furthermore, our preferences must be transitive, in that if we prefer X 
to Y, and Y to Z, we must prefer X to Z. The assumption of transitivity, which holds 
for both risky and riskless choice is necessary and sufficient for the representation of 
preference on an ordinal utility scale.
Thirdly, dominance: this principle of rational decision making posits that if 
one option is better than another in one state and at least as good in all other states 
(i.e. it dominates the other) it should be chosen.
Finally, invariance or extensionality (Arrow, 1982): put simply, this axiom 
states that different representations of the same problem should yield the same 
preferences. To this end, the preference between options should not depend on how 
they are described, so long as they are described accurately. According to Kahneman 
and Tversky (2000), if these four axioms are followed in a person’s decisions, it can 
be assumed that the person will follow EUT.
Closely related to theses principles, and essentially equivalent to the 
assumption that the decision maker has a complete preference order of all options, 
the rational property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) states that if
the value of winning or losing a small amount of money is less for a wealthy person 
than for a poor person..
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option A is chosen at least as often as B in a binary choice set, then A should also be 
chosen as least as often as B when a new option is added to form a triadic set. This 
principle is flouted by a number of context effects, to be discussed in Section 2.5. 
Tversky developed the Elimination by Aspects (EBA) model to explain this effect 
(Tversky, 1972a; 1972b). EBA means that a decision maker will identify the most 
important criterion for their decision (e.g. the picture resolution quality price of a 
new television), decide on an appropriate cut-off value and any alternative that falls 
below this cut-off will be eliminated from the choice set. The next most important 
criteria is then considered (e.g. screen size) and the process repeated until only one 
option remains.
A weak version of the principle of irrelevant alternatives, and one that applies 
to aggregate data rather than individual preferences, is the regularity condition of 
choice, according to which the market share of an option cannot be made larger by 
adding options to the choice set (Shafir, Simonson & Tversky, 1993; Tversky & 
Simonson, 1993). The regularity condition states that the proportion of times A is 
chosen from the choice set {A, B, C} cannot exceed the proportion of times it is 
chosen from the choice set {A, B}. As will be demonstrated, the lure of choice (as 
defined in Chapter 1) can lead to violations of the regularity condition of choice. 
Ultimately, from an economic or classic expected utility theory perspective, the 
greater the choice the better it is for the individual as consumer. This assumes the 
larger the assortment to choose from, the greater the probability that one will find the 
perfect match between the consumer’s preferences and the characteristics of the 
choice set (see Lancaster, 1990, for a review). The approach that is described next 
adopts a very different perspective.
- 19-
2.3. Descriptive theory o f decision making - Behavioural decision theory
In contrast to EUT, behavioural decision theory (BDT) has a rather short 
history. It builds on the order-imposing nature of normative theory, to study how 
people actually make decisions, rather that how they ought to. Rather than 
invalidating expected utility theory, these violations simply throw up interesting 
questions of how the model should be interpreted in particular situations.
In 1954, Ward Edwards introduced behavioural researchers to the work of 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), and since that time, much behavioural 
research has focussed on the subjective counterparts of “objective probability” and 
“objective value” called subjective probability and subjective value. Hence, when a 
person has only his or her subjective probabilities to rely on, and his or her utilities 
are in line with the objective values of the outcomes, Edwards identified the resultant 
computations as a subjective expected value (SEV) model. When a person relies on 
their own probability judgements and their values are not in line with the objective 
values, the computations constitute a subjective expected utility (SEU) model. The 
SEU model is a wholly psychological model (i.e. there are no observable objective 
measures), and hence of great interest to behavioural researchers.
The original driving agenda of behavioural decision theory was to examine 
the non-correspondence between actual unaided human decision-making and the 
prescriptions of normative theory. Systematic differences between what people 
should do and what they actually do were originally interpreted as reflections of 
people’s cognitive shortcuts and systematic processing errors. More recently, much 
greater emphasis has been placed on the functionality of systematic shortcuts in 
human decision processing (for example, “fast and frugal” heuristics, Gigerenzer, 
Todd & the ABC group, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). This functional view 
of decisional shortcuts will be examined in more detail in Section 2.7.
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2.4. Revealed versus constructed preferences
Some of the main differences in terms of underlying assumptions regarding 
human decision processes between expected utility theory and behavioural decision 
theory approaches can be broadly characterised by the revealed and constructed 
views of preference. When people are asked to report their preference for one item 
out of a set, or to record their general preference for any single item, a common view 
(generally favoured by economists studying normative decision theories, see 
McFadden, 1981; 1999), is that well-defined preferences exist for most items and the 
task of the researcher is to simply “revea/” those preferences. This viewpoint has 
been likened to an archaeological process; in other words, uncovering something that 
may be obscured, but is believed to exist nonetheless (Gregory, Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 1993). It is often assumed that people know their preferences and that they 
have the ability or skill to identify (or calculate) the option that maximises received 
value, and will choose accordingly. As described above, this belief underlies the 
expected utility theory approach.
However, an increasing number of researchers, particularly behavioural 
decision researchers and consumer decision researchers, believe that the assumption 
of well articulated preferences is only tenable in situations where the respondents are 
familiar and experienced with the object of evaluation. This alternative viewpoint 
argues that decisions are less a function of preconceived preferences than of an 
evolving state in which preferences are constructed. From this perspective, many 
opinions or evaluations are constructed (rather than revealed) at the point at which a 
judgement is requested (see for example Bettman, Luce & Payne, 1998; Fischhoff, 
1991; Griffin, Liu & Kahn, 2005; McFadden, 1999; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 
1992, 1993; Payne, Bettman & Schkade, 1999; Slovic, 1995). Gregory et al. (1993)
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compared this approach to a form of architecture, whereby the respondent builds a 
coherent and “defensible” set of values on the spot rather than retrieve those stored in 
memory.
According to Wells and Iyengar (2006) people are motivated to pursue 
internal consistency over time, which can lead to an illusion of preference 
consistency in which their beliefs in the stability of their preferences are sustained 
despite actual malleability in their revealed preferences. This is achieved by 
unconsciously distorting memories of previously stated preferences to match current 
preferences, and considered to be a cognitive coping mechanism related to reduced 
negative affect and increased desirable outcome measures.
Two major tenets of the constructed perspective of preferences can be 
articulated. First, expressions of preference are generally constructed at the time the 
valuation question is asked. Second, the construction process will be shaped by the 
interaction between the properties of the human information processing system and 
the properties of the decision task. More specifically, as a result of considerable 
work by behavioural decision researchers (discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter) there is strong evidence to suggest that:
a. Preference amongst options is context dependent. The evaluation of an item 
depends not only on its inherent and described characteristics, but also on the 
characteristics of the other options of the choice set within which it is 
presented. Section 2.5 considers a number of the most enduring and relevant 
context effects in more detail.
b. Preference amongst options depends on the way in which a valuation question 
is asked. In other words, depending on the item, preference reversals can 
occur due to response mode effects (Grether & Plott, 1979). For example, in 
one study, Slovic, Griffin and Tversky (1990) found a high degree of
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preference reversal for gambles when asking people to make a selection 
compared with asking them to assign a contingent weighting value, but far 
less of a preference reversal for goods.
c. Evaluations of options can systematically vary due to the way in which the 
choice set is presented or described to participants. When objectively 
identical items are presented to participants in different formats it can lead to 
preference reversals. For example, whether an item is evaluated on its own, or 
jointly with a competing alternative can affect people’s preferences (e.g. Hsee, 
1999; Hsee & Leclerc, 1998; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount & Bazerman, 1999). 
An example with consumer goods illustrates the point: Nowlis and Simonson 
(1997) found that easily comparable criteria such as price were weighted more 
heavily in decision (i.e. joint evaluation) situations, whereas less easily 
comparable “enriched” attributes (e.g. brand name) were weighted more 
heavily in separate evaluations. There are clear implications for the elements 
of the marketing mix such promotions and advertising: consumers are 
relatively more likely to purchase high (perceived) quality, high price brands 
when they are displayed separately, rather than next to their competing options 
and vice versa for low quality, low price brands.
d. The complexity of the task will affect the process used to make a decision (for 
example by greater reliance on decision heuristics as the complexity of the 
task increases). In most tasks, including consumer tasks, when faced with 
more complex (multiple-alternative) decision tasks, people tend to use non­
compensatory strategies, such as elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972a, 
1972b; Lussier & Olshavsky, 1979; see also Payne, 1976).
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In consumer decision making, the impact of the product assortment on 
individual decision processes has been shown to be moderated by the degree to 
which a consumer has articulated attribute preferences (Chemev, 2003b). In a series 
of experiments Chemev showed that individuals with an articulated preference were 
more likely to choose from larger assortments than those without readily available 
attribute combination. The explanation suggested is that as the size of the choice set 
increases, so does the complexity of the decision task; those without an articulated 
ideal are faced with the joint task of evaluating the alternatives, whilst at the same 
time forming the criteria to be used in that evaluation. It is argued that this increase 
in task complexity is likely to lead to people without an articulated attribute 
preference avoiding making selections from larger sets, and showing a preference for 
selecting from a smaller assortment.
In the language of the revealed versus constructed dichotomy, this thesis 
adopts a constructed preference approach, and is concerned primarily with the first of 
the propositions outlined above, i.e. context effects, although many of the reported 
findings are also conditioned by the other three propositions. The following section 
elaborates on a number of context effects which have been described in the 
judgement and decision making literature and which are relevant to the lure of 
choice.
2.5. Context effects
Inconsistencies in behaviour that result in observable preference reversals 
from ostensibly the same choice set under differing conditions are usually accepted 
as being influenced by features of the decision situation, and hence they are known 
as context-dependent preferences or context effects. This section introduces the most 
common context effects that reliably flout the rational principles of expected utility
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theory outlined above. Following this, theoretical explanations which are most 
relevant to the lure of choice are evaluated.
2.5.1. The similarity effect (or substitution effect) (see Figure 1)
Dimension l
Figure 1. The similarity effect.
If a new item (S) is added to a set that already contains two dissimilar items 
(A, B) and the new item is similar to one of the existing items (here, the target 
option, A), its introduction has been shown to reduce the probability of people 
choosing the similar option (Bettman, Johnson & Payne, 1991; Sjoberg, 1977; 
Tversky, 1972a, 1972b; Tversky & Sattath, 1979). The new item appears to steal 
market share from similar products and violates the proportionality principle, which 
assumes that new items takes from others in proportion to their original share (Luce; 
1959). The reversal of preference is shown when Pr[A | {A, B}] (the probability of 
choosing A from a set of A and B) > Pr[B | {A, B}] but Pr A | {A, B, S}] < Pr B | 
{A, B, S}], where S, the new item, is similar to A. A negative similarity effect has 
been called the substitution or classic detraction effect and states that the probability 
that an option will be chosen from a set decreases with increases in its similarity to
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other options (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1981; Tversky, 1972a, 1972b). The similarity 
effect violates the principle of independence from irrelevant alternatives.
2.5.2. The compromise effect (see Figure 2)
Figure 2. The compromise effect.
Imagine there are three equally attractive options: A, B and C, and A and B 
are extremely different from one another and C is a compromise that lies between the 
two extremes. The compromise effect is demonstrated when all three options are 
presented together, and the compromise item is chosen more frequently than either of 
the two extreme options (Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & 
Simonson, 1993; see also Dhar, Menon, & Maach, 2004; Kivetz, Netzer & 
Srinivasan, 2004a; Sheng, Parker & Nakamoto, 2005). This is found whether or not 
the trinary set is presented before the binary pairs or not. So, Pr[A | (A, B}] = Pr[A | 
{A, C}] = Pr[B | {B, C}] but Pr[C | {A, B, C}] > Pr[A | {A, B, C}] and Pr[C | {A, B, 
C}] > Pr[B | {A, B, C}]. The compromise effect is yet another violation of the 
principle of independence from irrelevant alternatives.
- 26 -
A good example of the compromise effect is the breadmaker once offered by 
manufacturer Williams-Sonoma, priced at $275, rather more expensive than the 
existing models on the market. Initially sales were satisfactory but not particularly 
remarkable. However, Williams-Sonoma later offered a second breadmaker that was 
much larger and much more expensive than the first. While the new model did not 
sell very well, adding it to the product line almost doubled the sales of the original 
one, which now seemed to be a bargain (Kardes, 2002). In terms of consumer goods, 
the likelihood of buying a higher price, higher quality item can be enhanced by 
introducing an even higher price, higher quality item to the subset that consumers 
consider4 (Simonson, 1999).
2.5.3. The asymmetric dominance effect (see Figure 3)
Figure 3. The asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect) (Dj and D2) and the 
inferior decoy effect (D3)
The asymmetric dominance effect (ADE), also known as the decoy effect or 
the attraction effect, first identified by Huber, Payne and Puto (1982, see also
4 Except under conditions of time pressure, when susceptibility to the compromise
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Ratneshwar, Shocker & Stewart, 1987; Simonson, 1989) is the relationship between 
adding an asymmetrically dominated alternative to a choice set (Dj or D2 in Figure 3) 
and increases in the attractiveness and selection probability of the dominating option 
(option A). The dominance is said to be asymmetric when there is another 
alternative in the choice set that does not dominate the added option, in this example, 
option B.
That is, [Pr A | {A, B}] < [Pr A | {A, B, Di}] where Di is a new item that is 
dominated by A, but not B. The asymmetric dominance effect violates the regularity 
principle, in that the addition of an option Di to an existing set of options A, B 
should either leave the probabilities of choosing A or B unchanged (if Di is never 
chosen), or it should decrease these probabilities (if Di is sometimes chosen). The 
introduction of Di to a set containing A and B should only decrease the probability of 
choosing A, not increase it. The same effect has also been demonstrated when 
relatively inferior alternatives (D3 in Figure 3) are added to the choice set (Huber & 
Puto, 1983).
The asymmetric dominance effect has been demonstrated in a number of 
tasks in a variety of contexts, such as evaluations of job candidates (Highhouse, 
1996; Slaughter & Highhouse, 2003; Slaughter, Sinar & Highhouse, 1999), group- 
based employee selection decisions (Slaughter, Bagger & Li, 2006), physician’s 
decisions about medication (Schwartz & Chapman, 1999) partner selection 
(Sedikides, Ariely & Olsen, 1999), policy decisions (Heme, 1996), consumer 
preferences (Heath & Chatterjee, 1995; Heath et al., 2000; Huber et al., 1982; Zhou, 
Kim & Laroche, 1996), business to business purchases (Dhar et al., 2004; Kivetz, 
Netzer & Srinivasan, 2004a, 2004b), strategic competition (DeSarbo, Grewal &
effect is reduced (Dhar et al., 2000).
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Wind, 2006) and in-store purchases (Doyle, O’Conner, Reynolds & Bottomley, 
1999).
2.5.4. Reference point effects (see Figure 4)
Figure 4. Reference point effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, study 1).
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Heme (1998) reported a number of 
studies designed to test the reference-dependence model of decision making which 
also demonstrated a clear example of context effects resulting in a preference 
reversal. Participants in one condition of the task were asked to imagine that they 
owned item E, and they were able to keep that item, or choose item A or B. Point E 
becomes their reference point, and in fact is rarely chosen by participants. Option B 
(small advantages over reference point E on dimension 1 and no difference on 
dimension 2) was strongly favoured over option A (large advantages over E on 
dimension 2 and large disadvantages on dimension 1). The preference reversal is 
demonstrated when option F was offered as the original endowed option -  
participants rarely chose to keep this, but the preference for option A was 
significantly greater than for option B. It appears that the marginal value of both 
losses and gains decreases with their distance from the reference point.
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2.5.5. Combined context effects
Huber and Puto (1983) argue that the substitution effect (negative similarity 
effect) and the attraction effect are not mutually exclusive and in conjunction can 
account for behaviour in different choice sets. In their 1982 paper, Huber et al. used 
a decoy option that was dominated by the target. The decoy itself was chosen less 
than 2% of the time. Hence, no substitution effects were demonstrated (i.e. simple 
attraction effects only). However, in this paper they asked what would happen if an 
attraction effect occurs in conjunction with a substitution effect, as would happen if 
the decoy was inferior, but also viable (inferior in an absolute sense, but without 
knowing the participants’ utility function). Based on the previous descriptions of the 
effects, one might predict that substitution would hurt similar alternatives, and 
attraction would help them, thereby suggesting a confounding of the effects, and 
perhaps outcomes would be approximated by proportionality (hence, on the surface, 
following rational principles). In two studies, selections were made between a target, 
a competitor and a decoy that varied on three dimensions, and in one study selections 
were made between four alternatives (decoy, target and 2 competitors) that varied on 
three dimensions. A number of interesting findings emerged, including: the market 
share of the competitor remained roughly equal regardless of the quality of the 
decoy; as the decoy becomes stronger, its share increases relative to that of the target 
(i.e. evidence of a strong, but local substitution effect); adding a new extreme item 
appears to draw preference in its direction (i.e. evidence of an attraction effect). 
These combined results suggested:
“a two-stage attraction-substitution process to account for choice in the face 
of changing market boundaries as new brands are added. The first stage 
involves an attraction effect, reflected in an increase in utilities near the new 
brand. The second stage entails a substitution effect, which takes share
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primarily from those items closest to the new item” (Huber & Puto, 1983, 
page 36).
In other words, this could describe a global attraction effect but a local 
substitution effect. This idea of sequential process is a theme that emerges in many 
aspects of decision making, and is returned to in later chapters.
2.5.6. Disjunction effect
Whilst investigating the process of reason-based choice (to be reviewed more 
fully shortly) Tversky and Shafir (1992a, 1992b) conducted a number of studies that 
showed that the disjunction of different reasons for a decision (“a or b”) is often less 
compelling than either definitive reason “a” or “b” alone. The actual scenario they 
used concerned whether or not participants said they would book a bargain holiday 
or defer the option for a couple of days. Those in the disjunctive condition would 
find out if they had passed an important exam until the following day (i.e. they had 
either passed or failed) and those in the definitive conditions had been told that they 
had already either passed or failed. Those that had already been told the outcome of 
the exam (regardless of whether they had passed or failed) were far more likely to 
book the holiday there and then than those who did not yet know, who were more 
likely (61%) to pay to be able defer the decision until they found out the result of the 
exam. In the event, the actual outcome of the exam had no substantive effect on their 
choice behaviour, but it appears that people were willing to pay for non-instrumental 
information, perhaps as it gave them a definitive reason for their decision.
2.5.7. Splitting effects
Another phenomenon possibly related to the lure of choice has been variously 
described as subadditivity or event-splitting effect (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein,
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1978; Humphrey, 2001a, 2001b; Read, Antonides, van den Ouden & Trienekens, 
2001; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Starmer & Sugden, 1993). In event-splitting, 
the weight of an attribute is increased if it is divided into parts and each part 
evaluated separately, compared with a single evaluation made of the whole. To 
illustrate, imagine an urn filled with 100 numbered balls. People will judge a 
prospect more attractive if it is described as two possible outcomes - a gain of £100 if 
one of the balls numbered 1 to 25 are drawn, and a gain of £100 if one of the balls 
numbered 26 to 50 are drawn, than if it is described as a single outcome -  a gain of 
£100 if one of the balls numbered 1 to 50 are drawn. Dividing the chances into two 
groups apparently makes them more salient. The similarities between splitting 
effects and the lure of choice will be discussed in later empirical chapters (notably 
Section 3.7.)
Other context effects are reported in the literature but this review has been 
restricted to those with the most relevance to an investigation of the influence of 
increased range of options on decision making behaviour. The next section considers 
some of the most influential theoretical accounts of the aforementioned context 
effects.
2.6. Theoretical accounts o f  context effects
A particular focus for theoretical accounts of context effects is explaining the 
asymmetric dominance effect. Range, frequency, and trade-off explanations have 
been offered as explanations of the asymmetric dominance effect and inferior decoy 
effects (for example, see Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Busemeyer, Barkan, Metha & 
Chaturvedi, in press; Heme, 1996, 1998; Huber et a l, 1982; Wedell, 1991; Wedell & 
Pettibone, 1996). Extremeness aversion is said to explain the compromise effect. 
The explanation that bears closest resemblance to the explanation offered in this
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thesis for the lure of choice is the emergent value explanation, whereby decision 
heuristics such as a dominance-seeking are employed (Heme, 1996).
2.6.1. Range-increasing account
A range-increasing mechanism has been offered as an explanation for the 
asymmetric dominance effect (Huber et al., 1992). An alternative such as Di in 
Figure 3 (Section 2.5.3) increases the range of the dimension on which the target is 
weakest (in this case, dimension 1) and can lead to a subjective value shift on this 
dimension (Parducci, 1974), therefore decreasing the psychological experience 
between the target (A) and the competitor (B) on this dimension. Wedell (1991) 
noted that this is in line with an additive difference model (Tversky, 1969), where an 
increase in the range of variation on a dimension is inversely related to the weight 
afforded it. The concept of loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) may underlie 
a range-increasing explanation of the asymmetric dominance effect. That is, as 
Simonson & Tversky (1992) explained, when an asymmetrically dominated 
alternative is introduced to the set it becomes an influential reference point and the 
target will be selected as it does not suffer as much loss as the competitor option. 
This loss aversion explanation has received empirical support from other researchers 
(Heme, 1998; Highhouse & Johnson, 1996). Increasing the range on the weaker 
dimension caused the strongest asymmetric dominance effect for Huber et al. (1982). 
However, their results did not demonstrate a relative increase in the strength of the 
effect with a more extended range, and furthermore, the same effect has been found 
when there is no stretching of range (Wedell, 1991).
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2.6.2. Frequency-increasing account
A different mechanism potentially underlying the asymmetric dominance 
effect suggested by Huber et al. (1982) is a frequency-increasing explanation (or 
weight change model, Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). The inclusion of a decoy such as 
D2 in Figure 2 (Section 2.5.2) adds an additional level between the target A and the 
competitor B on the dimension on which the target is stronger (dimension 2). This 
leads to an increase of the subjective weighting of this dimension, and hence would 
predict a preference for the target option. However, in general, this explanation has 
only weak empirical support (Huber et aL, 1982; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996).
2.6.3. Emergent value account
An alternative explanation to range or frequency accounts is offered by an 
emergent value approach (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). 
Participants may employ dimension-wise heuristics to make their selections, relying 
rather more on qualitative comparisons, such as the dominance of the target, because 
for example, it is easier to justify or explain on this basis. This is described as 
dominance-valuing by Wedell (1991). Pettibone and Wedell’s three studies on 
compromise decoys, inferior decoys and phantom decoys which actually dominate 
the target, but are not available for selection (Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992), suggested 
that models of decision process need to take into account aspects of the choice set 
that go beyond dimensional weights and values. The emergent value explanation 
was the only one in their set of studies that was able to predict significant decoy 
effects across all types of decoy. This explanation also bears some relation to a 
theory of dynamic choice reconstruction (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995). Based on the 
idea of dominance seeking, it is suggested that participants actively seek ways to 
simplify the task. Using subjectively dominated alternatives rather than objectively
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asymmetrically dominated ones, the authors suggested that the relationship between 
an inferior (but not dominated) alternative and the target affects not only the weights 
of the different dimensions but also the overall subjective values of the different 
options.
2.6.4. Reason-based choice and the pursuit o f useless information
Related to the idea that people take into consideration more than just the 
relative levels of particular dimensions is the well-established concept of reason- 
based choice (Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989; Tversky & Shafir, 1992a; see also 
Chemev, 2005; Park & Kim, 2005; Simonson, 2005). The holiday package (Tversky 
& Shafir, 1992b) used to illustrate the disjunction effect discussed in Section 2.5.6 is 
an example of reason-based choice - whether a person had passed or failed the exam 
had no differential consequences on decision making, but people were willing to pay 
for extra information that gave their selections “justifiability”. Closely related to the 
mechanisms underlying the emergent value account for context effects, reason-based 
choice can be described as:
“the hypothesis that people do not choose between equated alternatives at 
random. Instead they resolve the conflict by selecting the alternative that is 
superior on the more important dimension, which seems to provide a 
compelling reason for choice” (Shafir et al., 1993, page 32).
Shafir et al. compared triadic choice conditions in which the options included 
dominating items and conflicting options and found that participants’ tendency to 
search for additional options was greater when the choice among alternatives was 
harder to rationalise (i.e. conflicting), than when there was a compelling reason and 
the decision was easy (i.e. the target dominated another option). Such findings are 
inconsistent with the principle of value maximisation - people should search, if and
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only if, the expected (subjective) value of searching exceeds that of the best 
alternative currently available. The best alternative offered in the dominance 
condition was also available in the conflict condition, and therefore value 
maximisation implies that the percentage of participants who seek an additional 
alternative cannot be greater in the conflicted than in the dominance condition (the 
regularity condition) which, in fact runs contrary to the observed data.
To take this one step further, people will often pursue information that is non­
instrumental to a decision (and postpone deciding), and then come to treat it as 
instrumental (Bastardi & Shafir, 1998, 2000; Redelmeier, Shafir & Aujla, 2001). 
Bastardi and Shafir (1998) asked students whether they would register for a popular 
course, knowing that an unpopular professor was taking it rather than an excellent 
one. Most (82%) said yes. When it was not certain who would teach the course, half 
wanted to wait until they found out. On discovering it was the unpopular professor, 
fewer registered overall (71%). Even though the identity of the professor was of 
little consequence in the simple case, people chose to use that information in the 
more complex, two stage case. Similar results were found with a number of other 
scenarios, including approving mortgage applications and accepting college 
applicants. Waiting for “good news” compared to “bad news” seemed to have 
different effects: bad news tended to lead to accepting the status quo, good news led 
to a tendency to depart from it.
Bastardi and Shafir also contemplated the pursuit of information and the time 
course of decision, arguing that “the ultimate decision is typically made only after 
information is obtained, but preferences may be formed either before or after one 
opts to wait for the information *. This suggests that either preferences are 
constructed when the potential outcomes are contemplated (and not when the 
information is actually received), or people wait, not because they perceive the
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missing information to be instrumental, but for some other reason: e.g. to appear 
responsible or conserve cognitive effort by avoiding having to contemplate what 
their preference would be under each scenario. Their results supported the latter 
suggestion, in that people pursue information when it is not costly and seems 
relevant. Unfortunately, this also sometimes applies to information that is non­
instrumental.
Reason based choice can help explain violations of the principle of irrelevant 
alternatives. Put simply, as Simonson (1989) found, when participants were told 
they had to explain and justify their decisions, explicit dominance seemed to give 
targets “justifiability”.
2.6.5. Trade-off contrasts
Trade-off contrast effects occur when the tendency to prefer an alternative is 
enhanced or hindered depending on whether the trade-offs within the set under 
consideration are favourable or unfavourable to that alternative (Simonson & 
Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). The trade-off contrast explanation has 
been offered to account for the asymmetric dominance effect and the relatively- 
inferior decoy effect. It is based on the assumption that the well-established contrast 
effects that are known to affect perceptual judgements also apply to decision making. 
For example, an apple will look bigger when surrounded by smaller apples than 
when surrounded by big ones. By the same token, a trade-off seems better when 
surrounded by relatively poor trade-offs than when surrounded by good ones. 
Hence, in Figure 3 (Section 2.5.3), trade-offs between A and B alone on dimensions 
1 and 2 do not particularly favour either option (assuming both dimensions are 
equally important). However, when D3 (the relatively inferior decoy) is added to the 
mix, the trade-off looks more advantageous to A, because of the relatively poor B-D3
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trade-off: comparing a move from B to A or from B to D3 reveals that the latter is 
less attractive, because much more had to be given up on dimension 1 and only a 
little more is gained on dimension 2. The same explanation can be applied to the 
asymmetric dominance effect, in that a move from B to A is more attractive than a 
move from B to Di because in the former less is lost on dimension 1 (and the same 
amount is gained on dimension 2). The experimental support for the trade-off 
contrast explanation is rather ambiguous (Heme, 1996). For example, using the 
reasoning above, one might expect that as the contrast between the decoy and the 
competitor alternative increases, the less the inclusion of this decoy will favour the 
target. This predicted relationship was not found in the different decoys manipulated 
by Huber et a l (1982). A similar explanation for similarity effects was offered by 
Mellers, Chang, Bimbaum and Ordonez (1992) and Mellers and Biagini (1994).
2.6.6. Extremeness aversion
Simonson (1989) showed the introduction of an extreme option reduced the 
“market share” of other extreme options, but not options which were considered 
moderate by comparison. Simonson and Tversky (1992) suggested that extremeness 
aversion can explain the compromise effect. It is argued that within any offered set, 
options with extreme values are relatively less attractive than those with intermediate 
values, evaluated in terms of advantage and disadvantages relative to a neutral 
reference point, and assuming that losses loom larger than gains (the underlying 
tenets of prospect theory - Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
This part of the literature review has reviewed a number of context effects in 
decision making and located them within the behavioural decision making literature, 
relative to the normative/descriptive and revealed/constructed preference approaches.
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The studies presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis were designed to explicitly test 
whether the lure of choice (demonstrated in the exploratory studies reported in 
Chapter 3) is simply a demonstration of an asymmetric dominance effect. Although 
there are some similarities between the lure of choice and the asymmetric dominance 
effect, and the theoretical explanations reviewed above have some relevance to the 
current work, it becomes clear that something fundamentally different is going on. 
Studies 5 to 10 specifically explored whether people’s behaviour is influenced by 
choice per se, rather than by the dominance of the target alternative as the 
asymmetric dominance effect would predict. In terms of theoretical accounts, range 
and frequency explanations will be shown to be inadequate to account for or predict 
the lure of choice, but explanations in terms of an emergent value approach are more 
promising.
2.7. The use o f heuristics
As mentioned previously, we often rely on the use of decision heuristics or 
simplification strategies to make what we consider to be non-straightforward 
decisions. Even a simple decision like buying a jar of coffee can be overwhelming: 
for example, one online supermarket offers 98 different coffee products, ranging 
from instant coffee granules to espresso coffee beans. The customer must decide not 
only what kind of coffee to choose, but also decide on features such as the coffee’s 
strength, the size of the jar, its place of origin and whether to spend a little more on a 
“fair trade” product.
Despite this complexity, however, few consumers spend more than a moment 
or two when they decide which coffee to buy. Because this is not enough time for 
them to explicitly compute the importance of each option, they must be doing 
something else. When making complex decision, such as those with multiple
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altematives or numerous attributes, or when under time pressure, people simplify the 
task and ignore a lot of information. One kind of simplification is to switch from 
compensatory to non-compensatory decision strategies. That is, rather than 
evaluating all options of a choice set on all the appropriately-weighted criteria and 
allowing a high score on one criterion to compensate for a low score on another, 
people rely on strategies where a high score on one criterion cannot compensate for a 
low score on another. Non-compensatory strategies rely on the use of heuristics, 
which are cognitive rules of thumb that help simplify the decision.
One non-compensatory strategy is elimination-by-aspects (EBA, Tversky, 
1972a, 1972b). In this strategy, consumers consider options attribute by attribute, 
starting with the most important attribute, and eliminate options that do not do meet a 
standard. To illustrate, imagine that price is the most important attribute for a 
consumer and coffee strength the second most important. They might reject all 
coffees costing more than £2.00, and if more than one remains, then reject all coffees 
with a strength less than ‘3.’ Once that is done, if there are still more coffees in the 
running they will choose another attribute and continue the process until only one 
coffee remains. This process is cognitively simple because the decision maker only 
considers a subset of attributes and never has to make explicit tradeoffs among them. 
Of course, the process also neglects a lot of information and might make apparently 
arbitrary decisions, such as ruling out a coffee that costs £2.05 but which tastes ten 
times as good.
Although simplification strategies like these, where options are considered on 
an attribute by attribute basis, might be ideal when all the options are viewed 
simultaneously (as on a supermarket shelf, and sometimes on web pages), a different 
strategy might be required when options are presented sequentially or unpredictably 
and the choice set shrinks with delay, such as when looking for a new home. In this
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case, one way to simplify a complex decision is to satisfice (Simon, 1955), which 
means trying to find a good enough option rather than the best. For example, our 
coffee drinker may have set the aspiration level for the main attributes of his coffee 
as: (a) comes from Latin America, (b) is dark roast. The first coffee he comes across 
that satisfies these criteria is selected. It may not be the best coffee for the 
consumer’s needs, but it is satisfactory.
Whilst considering only a subset of information will always mean a risk of 
overlooking something important, decision heuristics (cognitive short cuts) such as 
satisficing and elimination by aspects allow a consumer to make a selection based on 
some (if not all) of their important criteria and hence generally reflect their subjective 
preference. In other words, they can be functional. Other heuristics, however, can 
cause them to violate the rules of rational decision making or chose something that 
does not reflect their true preferences. For example, buyer behaviour can be 
influenced by how easy it is to justify the decision being made (Shafir et al., 1993), 
discussed earlier this chapter (Section 2.6.4). This can lead to inconsistencies in 
decisions because the choice context determines what justifications are possible.
It has been common in the past for the literature to assume that the use of 
heuristics and other simplification strategies is non-rational (in terms of normative 
theories of decision making) or even dysfunctional (see Bown, in press). If judged 
by the standards of rationality and optimality, this may be the case, but other authors, 
notably Gigerenzer and his colleagues (Gigerenzer, Czerlinski & Martignon, 2002; 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999) have argued that these are not the only guiding concepts for 
assessing cognition. In particular, simplicity and frugality are also reasonable criteria 
for evaluating decision strategies, particularly in situations where information 
available is incomplete.
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“These fast and frugal models are justified by their psychological plausibility 
and adaptedness to natural environments. For example, the real world 
provides only scare information, the real world forces us to rush when 
gathering and processing information, the real world does not cut itself up 
into variables whose errors are conveniently independently normally 
distributed, as many optimal models assume” (Gigerenzer et al., 2002, page 
559).
In support of this argument, fast and frugal heuristics such as “take the best” 
(choosing on the basis of the cue with the highest validity that discriminates between 
options) have been shown to be just as good as standard linear models such as 
multiple regression at inferring the population of various cities (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996).
The next section of the literature review examines existing research that 
considers the extent to which choice per se has an impact on decision behaviour. 
Preference for choice or non-choice will be reviewed in three main bodies of 
research: in animals, in humans generally, and in consumer decision making 
specifically.
2.8. Preference for choice in animals
There have been few studies of whether other organisms are attracted to 
choice qua choice, and none of these have addressed the problem of whether choice 
can act as a lure. Those studies conducted on animals show that the presence of 
choice is attractive even if it does not alter the ultimate outcome (see Catania, 1980, 
for a review). In the first such study, Voss and Homzie (1970) investigated the 
behaviour of rats choosing between two paths that ultimately led to the same food 
reward. One path was a direct line to the food, whereas another led to a decision 
betw een subpaths that all led to the food. The majority of the rats took the choice 
route (59 compared with 41). Catania (1975) and Catania and Sagvolden (1980)
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replicated this preference pattern in pigeons. The pigeons first had to choose to peck 
one of two initial response keys: pecking one (no-choice) key led to a single key 
being lit, which they then pecked to receive a reward, while pecking the other 
(choice) led to two keys being lit, either of which could then be pecked for a reward. 
Although the reward was the same regardless of which initial key had been pecked, 
the pigeons were more likely to peck the choice key than the no-choice key. For 
example, in 44 out of the 45 times when a pigeon changed the pattern of its pecking, 
it was in the direction of a preference for free-choice (Catania, 1975). Ono (2000) 
found the same preference pattern for pigeons using an intermittent reinforcement 
schedule.
Suzuki (1999) observed a similar attraction to choice in primates, and found 
that the attractiveness of choice depended on what the options were. Monkeys chose 
between a no-choice (single option) and a three-choice alternative. In one group, 
two options in the three-choice alternative were identical to the no-choice option and 
one was worse, while in a second group one option was identical and two were 
worse. The three-choice alternative was preferred to the no-choice alternative in the 
first (two identical) condition, but not in the second (two worse) condition. Hence 
the monkeys appeared to like choice, but only when most of the options in that 
choice set were favourable5. Similar behaviour (demonstrating violation of the 
regularity condition) has also been demonstrated by jays and bees (Shafir, Waite & 
Smith, 2002; Waite, 2001a, 2001b).
One shared characteristic of the animal studies by Catania, Homzie, Ono, 
Suzuki and Voss is that at least one option in the multiple-choice set was identical to 
that in the no-choice set (and sometimes the set even contained a better alternative).
5 Suzuki (1997, 1999, 2000) found that humans were more likely to take a choice 
alternative when all options it led to were at least equal to the no-choice option.
- 4 3 -
By opting for the choice alternative, therefore, the participants were not drawn to 
take a different (and possibly suboptimal) alternative. These studies show that if an 
animal is offered a choice between A and {A, A} they were more likely to take {A, 
A}, and then, of course, select A. The only variation on this theme (Suzuki, 1997) 
was that in a decision between A and {A, A, B}, where A is preferred to B (A >- B), 
participants were more likely to take {A, A, B}. In every case, however, they were 
able to, and nearly always did, end up taking A, the preferred outcome. Ultimately, 
there is nothing disadvantageous about this course of action. The present 
investigation, amongst other things, seeks to answer the question of whether a choice 
between a single item A and a set of alternatives which does not include A, e.g. {B, 
C} influences people in the direction of choice, and away from their initially 
preferred option A. Raffa, Havill and Nordeheim (2002) offered evidence to suggest 
that gypsy moths can, to an extent, meaningfully compare alternatives of this kind. 
Results with two choice alternatives were statistically significant, but showed 
somewhat inconsistent differentiation with four choices, and failed to find 
differences with five choices.
Hutchinson (2005) offered a detailed review of choice preference in animals, 
specifically in terms of leks (an aggregation of males seeking female mates) and 
related it to both consumption and performance (in the sense that the selection made 
is the appropriate one). The male-buffet hypothesis (Wiley, 1991) suggests that 
females choose better mates through having more choice and being better able to 
compare potential mates. Hutchinson identified many reasons why this preference 
for choice may have evolved. For example, visiting a lek reduces travel time within 
a cluster of males (thus reducing energy expended or risk incurred in her endeavour); 
larger leks allow more males to be inspected in the same period of time, and hence it 
is more likely that at least one male will exceed a particular quality level (satisficing
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in the terminology of behavioural decision theory); larger leks allow the time saved 
travelling to be used to spend longer considering each male, hence their assessment 
is likely to be more accurate; alternatively, previously visited males may be revisited 
more easily within a lek; the qualities of each male need not be remembered for long 
periods of time, and indeed competing males may be compared side by side; as a 
wider sample of males can be inspected in a lek, a more accurate judgment of quality 
in the overall population can be made; if circumstances change (e.g. a particular 
animal disappears unexpectedly), visiting a larger lek means that finding a suitable 
alternative is more likely. According to Hutchinson, similar reasons can account for 
why cities develop concentrations of particular types of shop such as antiques 
dealers, estate agents, and restaurants has been proposed by economists (e.g. 
Chamberlin, 1933). Furthermore, geographers have also used similar explanations 
for why prostitutes cluster together within red-light districts (Ashworth, White & 
Winchester, 1988).
Interestingly, in contrast to the generally accepted male buffet hypothesis, 
after analysing data from black grouse leks Hutchinson (2005) suggested that 
ultimately, too much choice can lead to poorer performance (choosing a less-than- 
perfect mate, with which mating success is reduced). To take this to its logical 
conclusion, although the male buffet hypothesis suggests otherwise, it may not be 
adaptive for females to have an indiscriminate preference for larger leks, and there 
may be an optimum size lek that results in the best quality mate. However, the 
evidence for this conclusion is mixed. In fact, Hutchinson’s main conclusion was 
that there is surprisingly little clear-cut evidence whether or not choice is aversive in 
animals, and that more research is required to explicate the complex relationship 
between an individual’s preference for choice and the quality of the decision.
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2.9. Human preference for choice and non-choice
The studies into the lure of choice were designed to test the assumption that 
there is something inherently attractive about having choice. This section first 
reviews research that examines the extent to which people benefit from choice, or at 
least demonstrate preference for, and seek out increased choice amongst options. 
The next part of this section considers the literature that adopts the opposite stance: 
that there are in fact drawbacks and negative consequences associated with having 
too much choice, and people may try (consciously or unconsciously) to avoid or 
reduce choice.
2.9.1. Positive consequences o f choice and desire for choice
Decades of psychological theory research has repeatedly demonstrated, 
across domains that a link exists between the provision of choice and increases in 
intrinsic motivation, perceived control, task performance and life satisfaction. The 
typical experimental study compares performance and intrinsic motivation between 
conditions with a choice of a number of activities and one in which the participants 
are told by the experimenter which specific activity to undertake (e.g. Zuckerman, 
Porac, Lathin, Smith & Deci, 1978, see also Chua & Iyengar, 2006; Deci, 1975, 
1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Glass & Singer, 1972a, 1972b; Langer & Rodin, 1976; 
Lepper, Sethi, Dialdin & Drake, 1996; Rotter, 1966; Schulz & Hanusa, 1978; Taylor, 
1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Zukerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith & Deci, 1978). There 
appear to be positive outcomes associated with choice even when those choices are 
trivial or incidental (Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Dember et al., 1992; Swann & 
Pittman, 1977). Attribution Theory (Kelly, 1967, 1973), Dissonance Theory (Collins 
& Hoyt, 1972; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967) and Reactance 
Theory (Brehm, 1966) have all been offered as explanations of this relationship.
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Most of these approaches assume that even illusory perceptions of choice will have 
powerful positive effects on perception of control and self determination (Langer, 
1975; Lefcourt, 1973; Lewin, 1952). However, much of the research in this area 
extols the virtue of choice as some inherent (often poorly articulated and defined) 
attractiveness using anecdotal evidence (see the discussion of the use of terminology 
of choice, Section 1.1). Furthermore, it also nearly always adopts a westernised 
(particularly Americanised), ideological perspective. Empirical investigations into 
human desire for choice are fairly rare.
Some evidence from the field of consumer decision making does exist, 
mostly building on the economic assumption that more choice is inevitably better for 
the consumer (Bayus & Putsis, 1999; Kahn, 1998; Kotler, 1991). Developing the 
work of Broniarczyk, Hoyer and McAllister (1998) and Hoch et al. (1999), Oppewal 
and Koelemeijer (2005) examined the effects of assortment size and composition on 
assortment evaluation using a large panel of Dutch shoppers in the cut flower market. 
They found that an increased range of choice was regarded as better, regardless of 
similarity of items in the assortment and whether or not the assortment already 
contains a preferred alternative (Hoch et al.’s “favourite available” effect stated that 
if a favourite is present, a smaller assortment can be sufficient for satisfying 
consumers’ need for variety).
A further example of preference for choice was demonstrated by Kahn, 
Moore and Glazer (1987; see also Glazer, Kahn & Moore, 1991), who demonstrated 
what they called the lone-alternative effect. Participants in their studies preferred a 
store that offered two types of soda to a store that sold just one variety. In a set of 
recent studies, Szrek and Baron (2006; in press) showed that not only were people 
more likely to purchase an insurance plan when they were able to choose it from a 
pair which included an inferior alternative than when the same policy was presented
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Variety seeking in consumer behaviour is a concept closely related to 
preference for choice. Menon and Kahn (1995) suggested that variety seeking in 
consumer choice satisfies the desire for stimulation; consumers seek to maintain an 
optimal stimulation level (Howard & Sheth, 1969; McAlister & Pessemier, 1982; 
Raju, 1980; Venkatesan, 1973). Boredom or under-stimulation can lead to switching 
brands, despite no underlying change in preferences. They also found that an 
increase in positive affect increased the need for stimulation and was related to 
increased variety seeking. Ratner, Khan and Kahneman (1999) found that 
individuals choose to switch to less-preferred options even though they enjoyed those 
options less than they would have enjoyed repeating a more preferred option. 
Variety seeking can also be observed in one-off decisions -  there is a tendency for an 
individual to switch away from the item consumed on the last occasion (Read & 
Loewenstein, 1995; Read, Loewenstein & Kalyanaraman, 1999; Read et al., 2001; 
Simonson, 1990). The behavioural effects of increased choice in terms of 
consumption have also been examined: Kahn and Wansick (2004) found that 
assortment structure influenced perceived variety, and in their study of bulk candy 
stores, they found that the perception of variety, even when illusory, stimulated 
people to consume more.
Overall, despite an enduring assumption of a human preference for choice in 
terms of range of options (especially in consumer decision making), actual empirical 
evidence is limited and therefore provides another rationale for a systematic 
investigation of the issue.
as the only option, they were also willing to pay more for the same policy when
offered in a pair than when it was the only option available.
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2.9.2. Negative consequences o f choice and avoidance o f choice
This section deals first with the outcomes associated with increased choice 
for humans, including consumer decision making, and then describes the 
mechanisms that people adopt to cope with too much choice. The final part of this 
section addresses the two concepts known as choice overload and the paradox of 
choice.
There is much evidence to suggest that people have great difficulty with 
decisions as they become more complex (Tversky & Shafir, 1992a). When the size 
of the choice set increases, the demands on a person’s cognitive resources increase, 
as does the effort required to evaluate the attractiveness of alternatives, potentially 
leading to cognitive overload (Hauser & Wemerfelt, 1990; Huffman & Kahn, 1998; 
Jacoby, Speller & Kohn, 1974; Scammon, 1977; Shugan, 1980). It is not only the 
number of items to be compared within a choice set that lead a decision to be 
difficult, but also the number of attributes to be compared (see for example, Fader & 
Hardie, 1996; Fasolo et al., in press; Gourville & Soman, 2005; Malhotra, 1982). 
However, in the studies presented here, options are only ever described on a 
maximum of two dimensions, hence it is research considering the number of options 
available that is of most interest. It has also been suggested that increasing the size 
of the assortment might confuse people, leading to weaker preferences and decreased 
likelihood of choosing an option (Chemev 2003a; 2003b; Dhar, 1997; Greenleaf & 
Lehmann, 1995; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et a l, 2002).
In terms of decision quality, Hayes (1962) consistently found that mean 
performance on problem solving tasks was significantly higher for four-alternatives 
problem types as compared to eight-alternative problem types. Wright (1975) stated 
that a choice of six alternatives was expected to represent the maximum comfortable 
load, and ten options represented a definite cognitive overload. Likewise, it has been
suggested that for experts, less variety is generally preferred when the requirements 
are specific and a larger set is preferred for a general need (Johnson & Lehmann, 
1997; Van Herpen & Pieters, 2002).
Those studies which have direct relevance to the lure of choice require more 
detailed consideration. Many of the experiments used in the studies in this thesis 
required participants to select either a lone option or one contained in some kind of 
group. Some researchers argue that an item within a group is less likely to be 
selected than when it is on its own, regardless of its subjective utility, that is, 
individual options of a group get short shrift (e.g. Posavac, Sanbonmatsu & Ho, 
2002).
Brenner, Rottenstreich and Sood (1999) suggested that grouped options will 
induce intra-group comparisons, rather than inter-group comparisons (due in part to 
psychological distance between groups and clustering of items)6. Drawing on the 
concept of loss aversion, they argued that if there are both meaningful advantages 
and disadvantages of options within a group, disadvantages loom larger than 
advantages (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) and 
therefore the attractiveness of an option decreases the more it is compared with 
others. This line of reasoning suggests that grouping should hurt, and they present 
data to support this argument. In one study, items were systematically grouped, and 
people were asked whether they preferred a single item (for example, a Seafood 
restaurant) or their (unspecified) selection from three others (Mexican, Italian or Thai 
restaurant). The hypothesis was that an option is more likely to be chosen when 
alone than when part of a group. For each set of four items the sum of the 
preferences for each lone option should total 100%. In seven out of the nine groups
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6 Sood, Rottenstreich and Brenner (2004) call the fomter a derived decision and the
latter a direct decision.
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the sum of the lone option choice share was greater than 100% (ranging from 105- 
125%, mean 116%). This suggests that each option was more attractive as a lone 
option than when it was part of a group. As this “comparisons hurt” argument is in 
direct conflict with the proposed lure of choice effect, this study will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 5 where an experiment designed to replicate Brenner et al.’s 
findings is reported.
To turn to the consumer decision making literature, despite a predominant 
“more is better” ethos, some have argued that selections from a large group might be 
worse if too many items confuse the consumer. In the 1970s, Jacoby and colleagues 
claimed that consumers chose less well when offered too many brands (Jacoby, 
1975, see also Russo, 1974). Accuracy of decision was measured by the correlation 
of each participant’s preference ranking of options with the ranking predicted from 
an earlier questionnaire about what features mattered most to them. For brands of 
rice the decline in correlation occurred between 12 and 16 brands (Jacoby et al., 
1974) whereas for shirts it was between 14 and 21 or between 21 and 28, depending 
on the subject pool (Moreno, 1974).
It has been argued that stockouts (i.e. reducing choice because stock is not 
available) is positive for consumers with large choice sets, as it makes the decision 
easier (Fitzsimons, 2000). Boatwright and Nunes (2001) found that with online 
grocery stores, when product lines received dramatic cuts in the number of the stock 
keeping units (SKU), sales were increased by an average of 11%. Although there 
was a reduction in purchase probability (some consumers stopped purchasing or 
purchased less), the increases in the amount bought by the majority far outweighed 
this loss of sales. Other major manufacturers have streamlined the number of options 
they provide to customers, apparently in response to a modest consumer rebellion 
against excessive choice. Proctor and Gamble, for example, reduced the number of
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versions of its popular Head and Shoulders shampoo from a range of 26 varieties, to 
“only” 15, and then experienced a 10% increase in sales (Osnos, 1997). Similarly, 
the Aldi chain of shops (discount stores who offer a very restricted range of 
products) is very successful (Oppewal & Koelemeijer, 2005).
In order to cope with the decision complexity that accompanies increased 
choice (as discussed in Section 2.7), people may change the way they make 
decisions. For example, Bettman (1979) argued that consumers are likely to adopt 
simplifying strategies when the number of choice alternatives exceeds five (similar 
results were found by Olshavsky, 1979). Shugan (1980) suggested that people are 
motivated to avoid the effort associated with comparing and choosing from larger 
assortment arrays and adopt decision strategies that minimise the cost o f thinking. 
Timmermans (1993) and Gigerenzer et al. (1999) argued that changing the heuristic 
used as the number of options increase is an adaptive response to an increasingly 
complex situation.
When the features of a choice set become more cumbersome to compare or 
require difficult trade-offs, decision makers may avoid making a decision (Luce, 
1998; Tversky & Shafir, 1992a). In the real world, there is plenty of evidence that 
people delay or avoid difficult decisions. For example, executives try to postpone 
financial decisions longer the more difficult the decision becomes (Sawers, 2005). 
An alternative strategy that people may adopt in the face of difficult decisions is to 
choose an option that minimizes the need for further decisions. Dhar (1997) found 
that as the difficulty of decisions increases, participants were more likely to opt for a 
“no choice option, adopt the default option, defer a decision, or search for new 
alternatives (see the discussion of the pursuit of useless information in Section 2.6.4, 
Shafir et al., 1993, Shafir & Tversky, 1992).
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These observations from both experimentally manipulated and naturally 
occurring increases and decreases in the range of choice suggest that there are indeed 
some negative consequences associated with increased choice. The next sections 
examine two important developments in the study of this relationship.
2.9.2. i. Choice overload effect
Another potentially deleterious effect of increased choice is the demotivating 
effect it might have on behaviour in the future. In a widely-cited article, Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000; see also Iyengar, Jiang & Huberman, 2004) demonstrated that 
although people find larger choice sets more attractive than smaller ones in one 
sense, resultant purchase behaviour was less likely in the larger choice set. They 
found that when faced with either a limited choice (for example an array of six 
gourmet jams, chocolates or essay topics) or an extended array (of 24 or 30), people 
were attracted to the greater choice. For instance, in one study, members of the 
public were more likely to approach a stand where they could taste-test gourmet jams 
when there was a large range exhibited compared with a smaller array, in another 
they reported more enjoyment choosing from the larger number of chocolates than 
from a limited array. Ultimately, however, although shoppers were drawn to the 
large array of jams, they were less likely to return to it or buy something from it 
within a week period. Students were less likely to complete a voluntary essay from 
an extended list of topics than from a shorter list and those that did, produced work 
of a lower quality. Furthermore, participants reported finding selecting from an 
extended range of goods (30 different types of chocolate) more difficult than from a 
limited range (six types of chocolate). Iyengar and Lepper’s interesting results 
suggest that while initially attractive, the excess of choice had negative consequences
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in terms of intrinsic motivation and later satisfaction. They call this the “choice 
overload” effect.
To relate this effect to the lure of choice, it is possible to be drawn to a larger 
array and not be lured by choice. It is perhaps not surprising that more people are 
drawn to more options, since the more options there are, the more people’s different 
tastes can be accommodated by those options. It would be surprising, however (and 
show the lure of choice), if more people chose blueberry jam when it was part of a 
large array than if it was displayed alone.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Chemev (2003b) suggested 
that people may be put off by larger sets if they do not have an articulated preference 
set. Whilst most of us probably have relatively clearly articulated preference sets for 
the most common flavours of jam (e.g. raspberry, strawberry and blackcurrant), 
Iyengar and Lepper screened out the most popular jam flavours (to avoid ceiling 
effects). It is less likely that we would have readily articulated preferences between 
less common flavours that we may never have come across before such as 
gooseberry and rosehip jams. Hence, whilst being initially attracted to the large 
array, once participants’ articulated preferences were challenged and found 
inadequate, choice became less attractive and they were demotivated to follow it up.
2.9.2. ii. The paradox o f choice
The seeming contradiction that people prefer to choose among larger 
assortments, yet are often less confident about the decisions they have made has been 
noted elsewhere (see Chemev, 2006). The idea of the “tyranny of freedom” as 
described by Schwartz (2000) is gathering momentum, and refers to situations where 
freedom, autonomy, self-determination become excessive. Schwartz argued that that 
American society is unduly influenced by the ideology of economics and rational-
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decision making theory, resulting in an excess of freedom. This leads to life 
dissatisfaction, and he even goes as far as to say that this can lead to clinical 
depression. This idea is elaborated in “The paradox o f choice” (Schwartz, 2004), in 
which he described the paralysing feeling of facing too much choice in everyday 
decisions, regardless of how important these are. He suggested practical steps to 
reduce the number of choice to a “manageable” number (see Desmeules, 2002, for an 
application of this principle to marketing).
It may be that we are individually predisposed to feel this way. Schwartz et 
al. (2002) found that the desire to maximise (which is by definition related to the 
need to choose from a large as possible choice set) was positively correlated with 
depression, perfectionism and regret, whilst negatively correlated with happiness, 
optimism, self esteem and life happiness. In comparison with non-maximisers 
(satisficers, who accept the first option that meets their minimum requirements, and 
are hence likely to require a smaller choice set), maximisers are less satisfied with 
consumer decisions. This hypothesis was supported by Iyengar, Wells and Schwartz 
(2006) who found that college graduates who adopted a “maximiser” strategy in 
terms of finding a job did subjectively better (in terms of the salary of the job they 
ended up with) than their “satisficer” colleagues. However, they felt more negative 
about these outcomes, i.e. were less satisfied and felt more negative affect throughout 
the job search process. The authors argued that this is related to maximisers’ 
tendency focus on realised and unrealised options during their job searches.
2.9.3. Cultural differences in the desire for choice
Discussion of the paradox of choice is based on a wholly Westernised, 
particularly Americanised, view of choice in society. Iyengar (1999) reviewed a 
body of work by Markus, Kitayama, Triandis and colleagues (Markus & Kitayama,
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1991; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988, see also Iyengar & 
Lepper, 1999) which examined significant cultural differences between 
individualistic North America and Western Europe and the more collective Eastern 
culture in terms of the extent to which exercising personal discretion is valued (see 
also Schwartz, 2000). Iyengar’s early work asked American and Japanese factory 
employees to catalogue the decisions they had made during a normal work day, and 
to rate how important each decision had been to them. American employees reported 
having made nearly 50% more decisions than their Asian counterparts. In addition, 
the Americans gave significantly higher ratings of importance of their decisions than 
did the Asians. Moreover, these employees were asked to list occasions on which 
they would wish not to have a choice. Unlike the Asians, most of the Americans said 
that they could not imagine a single circumstance in which they would prefer not to 
have a choice.
More recently, Rozin et al. (2006) conducted a large scale telephone 
interview programme with adults in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the UK and 
USA, which asked about preference for choice in the food domain. One question 
asked whether respondents would prefer to go to an ice cream parlour that offered a 
range of 10 flavours, or one that offered a range of 50. The smaller choice set was 
preferred by a majority in all but the USA sample. Another question asked what 
respondents would expect the choice to be on the menu of an up-scale restaurant. A 
majority in each country expected a smaller choice, but this expectation was lowest 
for the UK and the USA sample. It appears that the USA and to some extent the UK, 
prioritise providing a range of choice that caters for individual preferences, whereas 
continental European countries are more concerned with communal eating values. 
Whether these expectations extend to other kinds of decisions is not clear, but there 
is obvious correspondence with the paradox of choice argument outlined above.
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Along similar lines, Herrmann and Heitmann (2006) reviewed literature in 
the domains of cultural psychology and marketing that consider cultural differences 
in consumers’ preference for variety. Overall, they concluded that consumers’ 
perceptions of variety differ from the actual variety provided by the manufacturer or 
retailer. In line with the research on decision overload discussed above, they found 
that independent consumers in individualistic cultures place a premium on choice, on 
variety seeking and on personal freedom. While they are attracted by large variety, 
current cultural theory suggests that they also encounter greater cognitive and 
emotional costs than individuals in collective cultures when ultimately choosing.
2.9.4. Decision attitude and self determination
Decision attitude encompasses both reactions to increased choice addressed 
above -  decision seeking and decision aversion (Beattie, Baron, Hershey & Spranca, 
1994). Decision aversion is described as a preference for receiving an option 
through fiat, rather having to make a decision oneself. Decision seeking is when 
choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best 
option. Decision attitude is considered to be a behavioural, context-specific concept, 
not a stable personality trait, and may be responsible for a number of behaviours that 
we observe in both individuals and societies. For example, decision attitude is likely 
to affect our responses to decision situations (decision aversion may make us 
unhappy and decision seeking make us happy in situations where we are expected to 
choose). Lastly, even if not totally avoided, decision aversion could lead us to 
decision inaction or omission and decision seeking could lead us to decide, even if 
not in our best interest (for example, ignoring the advice of experts).
Beattie et al. (2004) suggested that causes of decision avoidance are 
anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes and desire for equitable
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distributions, whereas causes for decision seeking (for self and decision avoidance 
when making decisions for others) are identified as the desire for self determination.
Self determination is the subjective experience that emerges during fully 
autonomous (as opposed to controlled) intentions (Deci, 1975, 1981). Previous 
research has suggested that exposure to flexible interpersonal environments and 
opportunities to choose among options generally facilitate the perception of choice, 
and hence self-determination and intrinsic motivation (Cordova & Lepper, 1996; 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2002). For instance, allowing people to choose which tasks to 
work on has been shown to be related to an intention to continue (Thompson & 
Wankel, 1980), autonomous functioning (Langer & Rodin, 1976; Williams, Grow, 
Freedman, Ryan & Deci, 1996) and intrinsic motivation (Dwyer, 1995; Zuckerman 
et al., 1978). To the extent that people experience self-determination as a perception 
of choice, any social condition that encourages perceived choice should therefore 
increase both perceived self-determination and intrinsic motivation.
Interestingly, however, in an educational setting Reeve, Nix and Hamm 
(2003) found that simply offering option choices (which from a number of puzzles 
did the participants wish to complete) did not have any relationship to internal 
volition or intrinsic motivation. However, a different kind of choice, referred to as 
“action choice” was positively related to self-determination and intrinsic motivation. 
In other words, when participants were allowed not only to choose their puzzle, but 
to decide how long they worked on it, the task supported autonomy and increased 
motivation.
Similar results were found by Cordova and Lepper (1996). School children 
were provided with a series of ongoing action choices as they engaged in a computer 
game, including not only choices among options but also decisions about their work 
methods, pace and effort (see also Thomas & Oldfather, 1997). Presented in this
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way, choice enhanced intrinsic motivation. This differentiation between action 
choice and option choice might help explain why the participants in Iyengar and 
Lepper’s (2000) study were not motivated to act by increased choice (i.e. motivated 
to buy the jam). In Reeve et al.’s (2003) terminology, the choice offered at the 
tasting stand was a straightforward option choice rather than an explicit action 
choice. The action that was monitored by Iyengar & Lepper was the purchase of the 
product, and although the increased choice did result in increased motivation to stop 
at the stand, this was not the action of interest to the experimenters. It seems that that 
psychological distance between the choice offered and the behaviour measured was 
too great for any relationship to be observed in this instance. This potential link 
between extent of choice and self-determined action forms a part of the discussion of 
the lure of choice in later chapters.
2.10. Implications o f the literature for this research
This chapter has examined in detail the different literatures relating to choice 
and preference thereof in the realms of animal and human judgment and decision 
making. From an economics perspective, the more choice a person is offered, the 
more likely it is that their preferences and needs can be met, and therefore increased 
choice should be considered a benefit. On the other hand, the literature on 
behavioural decision theory, consumer decision making and animal decision making 
is mixed in its evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
increased choice. Although some consistent themes emerge (such as people 
experience difficulty making tradeoffs as the complexity of a decision increases, and 
that many decisions involve sequential processes) the impression one is left with 
after reviewing the literature is that there is still ambiguity surrounding preference 
for, and reactions to, increased choice. The literature lacks a systematic investigation
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that examines a person’s behaviour in the context of increased choice in a number of 
contexts. This ambiguity and divergence of opinions provides both the inspiration 
and justification for this thesis.
Building on the research evidence amassed so far, the next three chapters 
describe ten new empirical studies that investigate the impact of increased choice on 
people’s behaviour.
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Chapter 3. The early studies: Demonstrations of a consistent lure of choice
“He who chooses the beginning of a road chooses the place it leads to. It is 
the means that determine the end.” Harry Emerson Fosdick, (1878-1969).
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter summarised and evaluated the current state of 
psychological, animal and consumer literature in terms of behavioural preference for, 
or avoidance of, choice. It was seen that there is contrary evidence — under some 
circumstances, too much choice is unappealing, and indeed can be considered 
detrimental or even harmful, yet in other situations it appears to be desired and can 
be beneficial. In addition, Chapter 1 offered some real life examples to illustrate 
how increased choice can attract people towards a certain course of action, that 
without choice they might otherwise not have taken. As such, these decisions can 
violate the principle of irrelevant alternatives and regularity condition (as discussed 
in Section 2.2.1). This potential effect was introduced as the lure of choice (Bown et 
a l, 2003, see Section 1.3).
The initial set of studies reported in this chapter (Studies 1 to 4) address 
research question i and ii: “Does the presence of choice lead people to act in a way 
they would not otherwise have done?” and “Are people attracted to options that 
allow them the opportunity to choose from a number of options?” To put it another 
way, is there is a lure of choice, and if so, does offering people choice in the future 
produce violations of regularity. As discussed in Chapter 1, these early exploratory 
studies were “phenomena-led,” in that they were developed to reflect real life 
observations of the kind described earlier (such as going to a particular shopping 
centre where a large range of options is available, despite the fact that not all of them
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might be viable alternatives for the individual concerned). This is especially true of 
Study 1, in which a believable, real-life scenario was described in terms of a two- 
stage decision problem. The format and design of Study 1 was created in order to 
investigate whether, like in the anecdotal examples, a potential choice of options at a 
later stage in proceedings can affect decision behaviour early on in scenarios with 
outcomes that are quantifiable and measurable. Studies 2 to 4 built on the 
observations of scenario-based Study 1, using more controlled materials, in order to 
test the robustness and parameters of the lure of choice and start to explore the 
possible theoretical underpinnings of it.
3.2. Overview and methodology o f Studies 1-4
The general experimental approach used for the first series of four studies 
used between-participant designs with volunteer student participants. Participants 
took part in one study only. The activities were paper and pencil tasks: some 
comprised realistic decision scenarios whereas others used abstract gambles.
In these studies, participants chose between a sure thing and a lottery. The 
lottery either led to a single lottery (no-choice condition) or to a choice between 
lotteries (choice) condition. The choice was illusory, however, because the lottery 
common to both conditions (called the target) either dominated, or was otherwise 
superior to its alternative (the lure), and therefore under no circumstances would it be 
rational to select the lure. Participants in Studies 1 to 4 were presented with choice 
tasks that had the general structure of the decision tree in Figure 5.
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T (target) payoff 
(EV= pqT)
0
L (lure) payoff 
(EV = prL)
0
No-choice
condition
| Choice 
I condition
Figure 5. General decision structure for Studies 1-4. Square boxes in the decision 
tree correspond to choice nodes, and the circles correspond to chance nodes. S = 
sure thing, T = target lottery, L = lure lottery and G = gamble (accept lottery). All 
probabilities (p, q, r) and payoffs were fully specified to participants.
There were two stages to the decisions in these studies. In Stage 1, 
participants chose between a sure thing (S) and a lottery/gamble (G). The lottery 
offered a chance (p) of getting through to Stage 2, or a chance (1-p) of finishing the 
game with nothing. At Stage 2, participants in the no-choice condition received the 
target lottery only (T), while participants in the choice condition were required to 
choose between the target lottery and an inferior lure (L). All choices and associated 
payoffs and probabilities were fully specified, and participants were encouraged to 
read the choice alternatives carefully before making any decision.
The payoffs and probabilities used in all conditions of Studies 1 to 4 are 
summarised in Table 1. The rationale for each of these conditions is explained more 
fully in the sections below that describe each study.
- 63 -
Study & lure 
condition(s)
Scenario
type
Sure
thin
g
P(G) Q(T) V (T) EV(T) r(L) V(L) EV(L)
1 (dominated) Realistic £20k .2 .75 £150k £22.5k .75 £50k 7.5k
2 (dominated) Lottery £20 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .75 £50 7.5
2 (conflicted) Lottery £20 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .9 £50 9
3 (dominated) Lottery £30 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .7 £120 16.8
3 (conflicted) Lottery £30 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .9 £100 18
4 (high contrast) Lottery £30 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .75 £50 7.5
4 (low contrast) Lottery £30 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .75 £140 21
4 (three-choice) Lottery £30 .2 .75 £150 22.5 .75.75
£50
£140
7.5
21
Table 1. Decision parameters for all conditions of Studies 1-4. G = gamble to get 
through to Stage 2, T = target lottery, L = lure lottery, V = payoff (value) and EV = 
expected value, p, q and r = probabilities.
The normative decision procedure for participants in a choice condition of
this kind is straightforward and intuitively obvious. They should begin at Stage 2 
and decide which of the two alternatives they would choose if they got to that point 
(usually the target lottery). If they prefer the target lottery, they should then choose 
between the sure thing and the lottery of receiving the target payoff with probability 
pq. If they prefer the lure, they should choose between the sure thing and the lure 
with probability pr. This procedure, called backward induction or rollback 
(Goodwin & Wright, 1998), involves pruning away or ignoring all never-to-be- 
chosen branches in the decision tree. The major question in this set of studies is 
whether participants do this pruning. That is, do those who prefer the target to the 
lure (expected to be the majority) recognise that the real choice is between the target 
and the sure thing (because the choice between the target and the lure is illusory).
The major dependent measures were (a) the proportion of participants 
continuing at Stage 1 rather than taking the sure thing and (b) the proportion of those 
continuing who choose the target at Stage 2. Statistical analysis is made more 
complicated by the possibility that people will occasionally choose the lure, and the
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consequent necessity to decide what they would have chosen if the lure was not 
available. There are three possible statistical tests that differ in their assumptions 
concerning this counterfactual choice. The conservative test compares the proportion 
choosing the target in the no-choice and choice conditions (i.e. the lure and sure 
thing choices are combined together). This test assumes that those who chose the 
lure would have chosen the sure thing if the lure had not been available (i.e. their 
preference order was lure >- sure thing >- target), thus it is biased against 
demonstrations of the lure of choice. Another liberal test compares the proportions 
choosing the lottery in the two conditions and assumes that those who chose the lure 
would have chosen the target if the lure had not been available (their preference 
being lure >- target >- sure thing). The liberal test is biased in favour of supporting the 
lure of choice. In these studies, an intermediate third way analysis was adopted, 
which includes only those who chose either the sure thing or the target. This test 
assumes that the population contains a roughly even mix of people with the two 
preference orders described above, and so is unlikely to bias the analysis in either 
direction.
3.3. Study 1
This exploratory study was designed to simply test whether the presence of 
choice at a later stage was sufficient to lead people to make early decisions that they 
would not have done had no later choice had been present. In this case, the choice at 
Stage 2 was illusory, in that the additional lure choice was dominated by the target
choice.
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Formally speaking, if the presence of illusory choice has no effect on 
behaviour, and assuming that people will not select the obviously sub-optimal lure 
option, the null hypothesis for this study:
H0i (null hypothesis): the proportion o f participants selecting the sure thing 
in the no choice condition will be equivalent to the proportion selecting the 
sure thing in the choice condition.
However, if, the presence of choice does affect people’s decision behaviour,
then:
Hu (effect o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants selecting the 
sure thing in the no-choice condition will be different to the proportion 
selecting the sure thing in the dominated-choice and conflicted-choice 
conditions.
Hu represents a weak prediction, in that the direction of any difference is not 
specified. If the lure of choice operates in the way suggested in Chapter 1, a stronger 
prediction is:
Hat (lure o f  choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants selecting the 
sure thing in the no- choice condition will be greater than the proportion 
selecting the sure thing in the choice condition.
In this study respondents were presented with a brief, realistic case scenario 
in a context with which they were familiar. During a class session, 127 
undergraduate management students (comprising 52% females, mean age 18.4 years) 
were presented with a business case in which they were asked to imagine they owned 
a small catering company that provided hospitality facilities for events such as
-66-
outdoor pop music festivals (see Appendix A for further details). The business case 
explained that in recent years the company had worked at a local festival that earned 
them a relatively modest, but guaranteed payment of £20,000 (the sure thing), but 
that in the coming season the company could forego this in favour of an attempt to 
win a contract to work at one of two V2000 concerts (part of a well-known series of 
UK music festivals). One of these venues, the target, had the potential to be far more 
lucrative for them (but was not guaranteed) and the other was less likely (the lure). 
The case explained that the selection of V2000 contractors was a two-stage process. 
In Stage 1 likely contractors who offered a tender were short listed. If the company 
chose to tender, there was only a 20% chance it would be short listed. The company 
would then be able to choose which V2000 concert the company wished to operate at 
Stage 2 (either the target venue or the lure venue). The timing of the events meant 
that company had to choose either the sure-thing option or the riskier tender option at 
Stage 1. Due to timing constraints, if the company tendered for V2000 and failed to 
get through Stage 1, it would be too late to revert to the sure thing and their earnings 
would be zero7.
Participants were randomly allocated to experimental conditions, and 
received one of two versions of the case (see Figure 6). In the no-choice condition, 
Stage 2 of the V2000 tender process consisted of only the target bid (Venue T: 75% 
chance of earning £150,000 and 25% chance of nothing). These participants were 
asked what they would do at Stage 1. In the choice condition, they were able to 
choose to bid for one of the two events at Stage 2, either the target (Venue T) or a 
lure (Venue L: 75% chance of £50,000). As the target dominated the lure (a higher
7 In the materials, the regular annual arrangement (sure thing) festival was the 
fictitious Kirkbridge festival, and the two potential V2000 venues that represented 
the high payoff target (T) and the lower payoff lure (L) were Temple Newsam, Leeds 
and Chelmsford, respectively.
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potential payoff associated with the same risk), it was expected that no one would opt 
for the lure, and so, essentially, the choice at Stage 2 was illusory. Participants were 
asked to read through all the details of the options at both stages, and were then 
asked to indicate their choice of behaviour at Stage 1. It was made clear that only 
choices at Stage 1 were required, as it was important that participants did not assume 
that they would have the choice between the lure and the target, as this was 
technically only available to one in five (20% chance of going through to Stage 2).
Stage 1
Local Festival 
(sure thing) 
£ 20,000
/
T (target) payoff 
£150,000 
(EV- £22,500)
No-choice
condition
Figure 6. Decision structure of Study 1. Square boxes in the decision tree 
correspond to choice nodes, and the circles correspond to chance nodes. S = sure 
thing, T = target lottery, L = lure lottery and G = gamble (accept lottery). All 
probabilities (p, q, r) and payoffs were fully specified to participants.
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Once they had indicated their choice at Stage 1, they were instructed to turn 
the page in the materials booklet and had they had opted to tender (gamble), they 
were told to imagine that they had got through to the second stage of the tender 
process*. They were then asked which option they preferred at Stage 2 (either the 
target or the lure).
3.3.1. Results and discussion o f Study 1
The results of this study, reported in Table 2, show that more participants 
chose the risky V2000 tender option in the choice condition (62%, including those 
who chose either the target or the lure options, which drops to 57% when those 
choosing the lure option are excluded) than in the no-choice condition (39%) [x (1) 
= 5.43, p  < .05, Cramer’s V = .21, third-way analysis). The inclusion of the 
dominated option at Stage 2 lured people into a riskier course of action at Stage 1 
than they would have otherwise taken. This also led to a violation of the regularity 
condition. As explained in Chapter 2, the regularity condition of choice states that 
the market share of an option cannot be made larger by adding options to the choice 
set (Shafir et al., 1993; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). In this case, fully 18% (57% 
versus 39%) more participants chose the target in the choice condition, even though 
they had more options to choose from (three as opposed to two).
'  A" participants opting to gamble at Stage 1 were told after they had made their 
dec,s,on to assume they had got through to Stage 2 as it was important to assess what 
proportion chose the target and the lure.
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Decision at Stage 1
Condition
Sure
thing
Lottery
Decision at Stage 2 
Target Lure
No-choice (N = 64) 61 39
Choice (N = 63) 38 57 5
Excluding lure choices (N = 60) 40 60
Table 2. Results of Study 1, V2000 business scenario. Numbers represent percentage 
choosing each alternative.
This is a compelling result. There is clear evidence that simply including an 
additional (illusory) choice at Stage 2 led to a near-perfect preference reversal 
between the sure thing and the (riskier) target option, whereby the sure thing was 
preferred over the gamble in the no-choice condition and vice versa for the choice 
condition. This is evidence in support of hypothesis Hu (effect o f choice hypothesis), 
and is in the direction of the strong prediction of HIU (lure o f choice hypothesis). The 
null hypothesis can be rejected. In terms of effect size, this is considered to be a 
small to moderate effect (De Vaus, 2002).
However, this first demonstration of the lure of choice should perhaps be 
treated with caution. Realistic scenarios such as those used in Study 1 have high face 
validity and are motivating, yet they can become increasingly implausible when they 
are forced to fit theoretically interesting problems. Furthermore, the very fact that 
the materials are realistic could have somehow led participants to be unduly 
influenced by extraneous characteristics of the context. For example, it may have 
been features of the lure that attracted people in this direction at Stage 1, such as 
Chelmsford holding great appeal for the student participants in this study because of 
its geographic location (not recognised by the experimenter), rather than the allure of 
choice. The fact that Chelmsford was a financially unattractive option in comparison
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to Temple Newsam must have been realised at Stage 2, as very few participants 
selected this lure option.
This possibility is highly speculative, but demonstrates one of the main 
problems to be overcome when interpreting findings based on choices that resemble 
real life situations and which vary on any number of criteria outside of the control of 
the experimenter. To counter such possible confounding variables, the next three 
studies in this series stripped out potentially influential surface characteristics to test 
the influence of choice per se, with the features of the choices on offer 
experimentally manipulated on pre-determined dimensions. In the remaining studies 
in the exploratory series (Experiments 2 to 4) participants’ responses to classic 
hypothetical lottery problems for financial payoffs were tested.
3.4. Study 2
The rationale for Studies 2 and 3 was to replicate Study 1, with specific 
variations to investigate further aspects of the lure of choice, in particular whether 
the nature of the relationship between the lure and the target has an impact on the 
preference reversal observed in Study 1. There were three conditions in Study 2 (see 
Figure 7 for the structure of Study 2 and Appendix B for the materials).
The first two conditions were structurally the same as those in Study 1, except 
that the amounts of money involved were smaller (by a factor of one thousand). The 
third condition was an additional choice condition in which there was conflict 
between the target lottery and the lure: the probability of winning the lure lottery was 
higher, but the payoff was smaller than the target. Although it appeared from Study 
1 that the lure of choice occurred when the target dominated the lure, this option was 
included to establish if the presence of choice conflict would increase or decrease the
effect.
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Figure 7. Decision structure of Study 2. Square boxes in the decision tree 
correspond to choice nodes, and the circles correspond to chance nodes. S = sure 
thing, T = target lottery, L = lure lottery and G = gamble (accept lottery). All 
probabilities (p, q, r) and payoffs were fully specified to participants.
As in Study 1, the no-choice condition offered participants the choice 
between a sure thing and a lottery to go through to Stage 2. At Stage 2, these
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participants were faced with the target option. In the dominated-choice condition the 
lure was dominated by the target (same probability, lower payoff). In the conflicted- 
choice condition the lure option was in conflict with the target option (higher 
probability but lower payoff), although it was still considerably worse in terms of 
expected value (.2 x .9 x 50 = 9 for the lure, compared to .2 x .75 x 150 = 22.5 for the 
target). As suggested by the results of Study 1, if the presence of choice does affect 
people’s decision behaviour in a systematic way, it was predicted that both choice 
conditions would draw participants into taking the lottery at Stage 1 :
H.2i (lwe o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants selecting the 
sure thing in the no-choice condition will be greater than the proportion 
selecting sure thing in the dominated-choice and conflicted-choice 
conditions.
It might also be reasonable to hypothesise that the absolute transparency with 
which the target dominated the lure in Study 1 would moderate the lure of choice 
effect, and a choice option that is less obviously illusory (i.e. conflicted) would 
increase the likelihood of observing the lure of choice effect. Hence:
Ü2U (conflicted lure o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants 
selecting the sure thing in the dominated-choice condition will be greater 
than the proportion selecting the sure thing in the conflicted-choice 
condition.
One hundred and forty-four undergraduate management students (not involved 
with Study 1), comprising 59 females (41%) and 85 males (59%) with mean age 
18.59 years, took part in this study during class time. Each was randomly allocated 
to one of the three experimental conditions.
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3.4.1. Results and discussion o f Study 2
As a replication of Study 1 without the possible distracting features of a real 
world scenario, the results of Study 2 were as convincing as those of Study 1. As can 
be seen in Table 3, the proportion opting for the (safe) sure thing in the no-choice 
condition of Study 2 was 64% (compared with 61% in Study 1). Likewise, the 
proportion opting to gamble at Stage 1 in the replicated dominated-choice condition 
was remarkably close to the corresponding condition in Study 1 (37% compared with 
38% in Study 1). When there was the possibility of a choice at Stage 2, in both the 
dominated-choice and the conflicted-choice conditions, there was an increase in the 
number of participants taking the lottery. An overall chi-square analysis revealed a 
significant difference across all three conditions (x2(4) = 17.60, p  < .01, Cramer’s V 
= .24).
_____________ Decision at Stage 1
__________Lottery_____
Sure thing _____ Decision at Stage 2
Condition____________________________ Target_________ Lure
No-choice (N -  47) 64 36 -
Choice:
Dominated-choice (N = 51 ) 37 63 0
Conflicted-choice (N = 53) 38 53 9
Excluding lure choices (48) 42 58 -
Table 3. Results of Study 2. Numbers represent percentage choosing each 
alternative.
Separate analyses comparing choice and no-choice conditions revealed a 
significant effect for the dominated-choice condition (x2(l) = 6.91, p  < .01, Cramer’s 
V = .27). Like Study 1, the preference reversal demonstrated in the dominated- 
choice condition was almost symmetrical -  in the no-choice condition 64% selected 
the sure-thing option, and in the dominated-choice condition, 63% chose to gamble 
at Stage 2. When faced with the choice between the lure and the target at Stage 2 in
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this condition, all chose the target. Separate analysis for the no-choice and 
conflicted-choice conditions also showed a significant difference (y2 (1) = 4.68, p  < 
.05, Cramer’s V = .22, third way analysis). Taken together, these finding provides 
support for //?,, the basic lure of choice prediction, with a small to moderate effect 
(de Vaus, 2002).
The difference in effect sizes between the dominated and conflicted choice 
conditions (Cramer’s V = .27 and .22, respectively) occurred because while the same 
proportion opted for choice in the two choice conditions (63% and 62%), a few 
people (9%) in the conflicted-choice condition chose the lure over the target. The 
difference between the two choice conditions, however, was not significant (%2 (2) = 
5.26, n.s.). Hence, H2 „ (conflicted lure o f choice hypothesis), which suggested that a 
conflicted-choice might be more alluring than a dominated choice, was not 
supported. Possible reasons for this are identified in the general discussion of this 
chapter (Section 3.7) and tested explicitly in Studies 3,6 and 7.
Overall, Study 2 (like Study 1), revealed a strong violation of the regularity 
condition, the effect being slightly stronger in the dominated-choice condition. In 
other words, the proportion of people choosing the target was higher in conditions 
that led them there by way of a choice-route than in the condition which offered them 
no choice. Study 3 explores the parameters of this lure of choice effect more 
extensively.
3.5. Study 3
The rationale for Study 3 was to test the limits of the lure of choice effect by 
determining whether it would operate even when the sure thing was manifestly better 
than the target. This study addresses research question iii: “If people are attracted to 
choice, is the effect strong enough to lead them to make sub-optimal decisions?”
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Would participants forgo a “better” option, in order to follow a course of action that 
offered them the chance to make their own decision between two further options? 
This was achieved by increasing the value of the sure thing so that it had a higher 
expected value than the target. It is known that most people tend to be risk-averse in 
the domain of gains, and that a sure thing is generally preferred to a lottery with the 
same expected value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Study 3, in addition to 
attempting to replicate the general results of the earlier studies, was designed to 
determine if the lure of choice would be strong enough to overcome this normal 
disinclination to gamble. As can be seen in Figure 8, the sure thing in this study was 
£30 and the target alternative had an expected value of £22.50 (.2 x .75 x 150), as in 
Study 2. In the dominated-choice condition the lure was inferior to the target on both 
the probability and payoff dimensions, i.e. it was strongly dominated. The 
dominance of the target should therefore have been even more transparent than it was 
in the dominated-choice condition of Study 2, making the required tradeoffs easier 
for participants. The probability associated with the choice option in the conflicted- 
choice condition was the same as those used in the corresponding condition of Study 
2, although the payoff was increased slightly to be more in line with that of the 
dominated-choice condition. The expected value of the lure in this condition was 
still less than the target option (.2 x .9 x 100 = £18 compared to 22.5).
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Figure 8. Decision structure of Study 3. Square boxes in the decision tree 
correspond to choice nodes, and the circles correspond to chance nodes. S = sure 
thing, T = target lottery, L = lure lottery and G = gamble (accept lottery). All 
probabilities (p, q, r) and payoffs were fully specified to participants.
On the basis of the robust findings of Studies 1 and 2, the predicted 
relationship between choice offered and decision behaviour in the dominated-choice 
condition was as follows:
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Hn: (dominated lure o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants 
selecting the sure thing in the no-choice condition will be greater than the 
proportion selecting the sure thing in the dominated-choice condition.
Likewise, the findings for the conflicted-choice condition of Study 2 suggest 
a similar pattern for the conflicted-choice condition:
Hm (conflicted lure o f  choice hypothesis): the proportion o f  participants 
selecting the sure thing in the no-choice condition will be greater than the 
proportion selecting sure thing in the conflicted-choice condition.
One hundred and fifty participants were recruited from seating areas around a 
university campus and were randomly allocated to one of the three experimental 
conditions (see Appendix C for details of the materials). 47% of the sample was 
female, sample mean age was 20.4 years.
3.5.1. Results and discussion o f Study 3
Reflecting the greater value of the sure thing in this study, almost 10% more 
participants (nearly three quarters) in the no-choice condition in Study 3 opted for the 
sure thing than in either of the earlier lottery studies (see Table 4). An overall chi- 
square analysis revealed a significant difference between conditions (x2(4) = 35.59, p  
< .001, Cramer’s V = .49). Increasing the value of the sure thing did not, however, 
attenuate the lure of choice effect, and another clear preference reversal was 
demonstrated in the choice conditions. Far more participants ended up with the 
target in both choice conditions than in the no-choice condition, offering support for 
both H3l (dominated lure o f choice hypothesis) and H3ll (conflicted lure o f choice 
hypothesis). Separate analyses showed that the difference between choice and no­
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choice was significant for the dominated-choice condition (x2 (1) = 13.06, p  < .001, 
Cramer’s V = .37, third way analysis) and conflicted-choice condition (x2 (1) = 8.72, 
p  < .01, Cramer’s V = .32, third way analysis)9. Both these effects are moderate to 
substantial (de Vaus, 2002).
Decision at Stage 1
________Lottery
Decision at Stage 2
Condition__________________ __________ Target_________ Lure
No-choice (N = 46) 
Choice:
72 28 -
Dominated-choice (N = 51) 33 63 4
Excluding lure choices (N = 49) 35 65 -
Conflicted-choice (N = 53) 30 45 25
Excluding lure choices (N = 40) 40 60 -
Table 4. Results of Study 3. Numbers represent percentage choosing each 
alternative.
Despite the increased value of the sure thing, these effects were even stronger 
than their corresponding conditions in the earlier studies. According to de Vaus 
(2002), the effects sizes (.21 to .27) in the earlier study could be considered small to 
moderate, and these are considered moderate to substantial (.32 to .37). This can be 
explained by the fact that the increased sure thing in this study was enough to ensure 
people demonstrated the expected risk aversion in the no-choice condition, but 
seemed to do little to dissuade people from gambling in the choice conditions. 
Indeed, coupled with the increased EVs of the lures in the dominated-choice and 
conflicted-choice conditions of this study (16.8 and 18, respectively) compared with 
the lower EVs of the corresponding conditions of the earlier studies (7.5 and 9 in 
Study 2) it is perhaps unsurprising that the effect appears stronger here, and indicates 
that the lure option, although ultimately chosen by relatively few participants, has a
9 The difference between the basic choice conditions was significant (x2 (2) = 9.21, p 
< .01, Cramer’s V = .29) but when third way analysis was applied, the difference
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very real influence on the choice behaviour of people. Related to this fact, as in 
Study 2, a number of participants (25%) selected the suboptimal lure in the conflict- 
choice condition, a finding that is returned to in Section 3.7.
Study 3 demonstrates the robustness of the lure of choice effect. Even when 
the sure thing was preferred by the great majority of participants in a direct choice 
between it and the target (and by most accounts would be considered objectively 
superior), this reversed dramatically when the target lottery was made available as 
one of a choice. Indeed, the proportion choosing the lottery was much the same in 
Study 3 as it was in the earlier studies (58%- 64%), when the sure thing (but not the 
target) had a much lower expected value.
As discussed above, an additional difference between Study 3 and the earlier 
studies is that while the target was the same in Studies 1 and 3, the lures in Study 3 
had higher expected values than those in Studies 1 and 2. This higher value may, in 
turn, have acted as counterweight to the increased value of the sure thing in this 
study. Study 4 was designed to investigate how the lure of choice is affected by the 
value and number of lures. In order to ensure a full range of option values were 
replicated, the sure thing and target of Study 3 were used along with the same lure as 
in Studies 1 and 2.
3.6. Study 4
The rationale for Study 4 was to go beyond simple demonstrations of the lure 
of choice effect demonstrated in Studies 1-3 in order to test possible reasons for it. 
Specifically, it was designed to test two possible explanations for why the addition of 
an illusory choice increases the proportion of participants choosing the target option. 
Firstly, the lure of choice may be due to a contrast effect (e.g., Simonson & Tversky, 
1992; Tversky & Griffin, 1991), as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6.5.). Given
was non-significant (x (1) = .27, n.s., Cramer’s V = .06).
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that people were required to compare the target and lure options at Stage 2, the fact 
that the target was clearly superior to the lure could make it more attractive than 
when it was presented alone. If this is true, then the proportion taking the choice 
option should increase as the superiority of the target over the lure increases. In 
Study 4 two conditions were compared in which the size of the contrast between the 
target and the lure was varied, and where a contrast effect would predict a 
corresponding variation in the magnitude of the lure of choice effect.
A second possible explanation is that instead of comparing the attractiveness 
of the target and lure options independently (which is the normatively rational thing 
to do), the lure of choice effect may be due to the inappropriate summing of the 
available options at Stage 2. In other words, participants in the choice condition may 
have been acting as if they could have both the options available at Stage 2 (be it 
through participants either misunderstanding the nature of the task, or failing to 
utilise backward induction properly, and being subconsciously influenced by the 
array on offer). In Study 4 this was tested by comparing the strength of the lure of 
choice when the total value of the target and lure were varied. A summing effect 
would predict that the greater this total value, the stronger the lure of choice effect.
Study 4 had four conditions (see Figure 9 and Appendix D for materials). 
The no-choice condition was identical to that of Study 3. The high-contrast choice 
condition offered two options at Stage 2: the target and a dominated lure that was 
much worse than the target on the payoff dimension (£50 versus £150) but had the 
same probability of reward (.75). The lure in the low-contrast choice condition was 
also dominated, but was only slightly worse than the target on the payoff dimension 
(£140 versus £150), whilst maintaining the same probability (.75). The three-choice 
condition included both the high and low-contrast lures as well as the target as 
options at Stage 2.
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T (target) payoff 
€150
.75/  (EV * €22.5)
.2 5 ^ 00
75 LI (lure payoff) 
^  £50 
(EV * £7.5)
L2 (lure payoff)
£140
(EV « £21)
Three
choice
condition
Figure 9. Decision structure of Study 4.
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The basic lure of choice prediction can be made for each choice condition:
H4i (high-contrast lure o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants 
selecting the sure thing in the no-choice condition will be greater than the 
proportion selecting the sure thing in the high contrast-choice condition.
H4u (low-contrast lure o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f participants 
selecting the sure thing in the no-choice condition will be greater than the 
proportion selecting the sure thing in the low contrast-choice condition.
H m  (three-choice lure o f  choice hypothesis): the proportion ofparticipants 
selecting the sure thing in the no-choice condition will be greater than the 
proportion selecting the sure thing in the three-choice condition.
In addition, if the lure of choice is influenced by a contrast effect, then its 
magnitude should increase as the contrast between the target and lure increases. One 
would expect, therefore, a greater lure of choice effect in the high-contrast than in the 
low-contrast choice condition.
H4iv (contrast-determined lure o f choice hypothesis): the proportion o f  
participants selecting the sure thing will be less in the high-contrast condition 
than in the low-contrast condition.
This explanation would make no specific prediction regarding the three-choice 
condition. However, if the second possible explanation is true and summing effects 
contribute to the lure of choice, then the magnitude of the effect should increase as 
the total value of the target plus lure(s) increases. Hence it would be expected that 
the greatest lure of choice occurs in the three-choice condition, the next greatest in
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the low-contrast condition, and the least in the high-contrast condition. Put formally, 
this explanation would predict:
Option summing-determined lure o f choice hypotheses:
H4v: the proportion o f participants selecting the sure thing will he less in the 
three-choice condition than the in the low-contrast condition, and
H4vi: the proportion o f participants selecting the sure thing will be less in the 
low-contrast choice condition than the in the high-contrast condition.
This hypothesis is in direct competition to H4iv, the contrast-determined lure 
o f choice hypothesis. A supplementary hypothesis can be generated on the basis of 
the number of options available within the choice set. On the basis of previous work 
(particularly from an economic perspective) it is possible to speculate that in these 
conditions that if people favour choice over no choice, they will favour greater 
choice over less choice. Hence:
H4vu (number o f  options-generated lure o f choice hypothesis): the proportion 
o f participants selecting the sure thing in the three-choice condition will be 
less that in either o f the two choice conditions.
Two hundred and forty undergraduate students, not involved with previous 
studies, comprising 114 females (48%) and 127 males (53%), mean age 18.9 years, 
voluntarily took part in this study during class time and were randomly allocated to 
one of the four experimental conditions.
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3.6.1. Results and discussion o f Study 4
The pattern of results was a familiar one. As can be seen in Table 5, most 
individuals in the no-choice condition favoured the sure thing at Stage 1 (55%). This 
is somewhat lower than the comparable no-choice condition in Study 3. Once again, 
there was a shift to a majority preference for the lottery in all the choice conditions, 
indicating a lure of choice preference reversal effect. An overall chi-square showed
that there were significant differences between conditions (y (6) = 10.69, p  < .05, 
Cramer’s V = .21).
Decision at Stage 1
Lottery
Condition
Sure thing Decision at Stage 2 
Target Lure
No-choice (N = 60) 55 45 -
Choice:
High-contrast choice (N = 60) 35 65 0
Low-contrast choice (N = 60) 32 67 2
Excluding lure choices (N = 59) 32 68 -
Three choices (N = 60) 40 60 0
Table 5. Results of Study 4. Numbers represent percentage choosing each 
alternative.
Separate analyses between no-choice and the different choice conditions 
revealed some significant differences: for high-contrast condition, y2 (1) = 4.85, p  < 
.05, Cramer’s V = .20; for low-contrast condition, y2 (1) = 6.28, p  < .05, Cramer’s V 
= .23, third way analysis', and for the three-choice condition, y2 (1) = 2.71, p  = .1, 
n.s. The significant results were low to moderate effects (de Vaus, 2002). In terms 
of the basic lure of choice hypotheses, these results support H* (high-contrast lure o f 
choice hypothesis) and //*, (low-contrast lure o f choice hypothesis), but not 
(three-choice lure o f  choice hypothesis). It appears that the choice of three options at 
Stage 2 was not as attractive as a choice of two options (that is, there is no support 
for H4vU (number o f options-generated lure o f  choice hypothesis). This finding is not
-85-
incongruent with previous research that shows that too much choice can be 
unattractive (Bettman, 1979; Chemev, 2003a, 2006; Iyengar, et al., 2004; Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000) and will be discussed further in Section 3.7 and Chapters 5 and 6.
To turn to test the two competing possible explanations of the lure of choice, 
comparisons between the choice conditions amongst themselves showed no support 
for either the contrast or the summing hypotheses {H4iv contrast-determined lure o f  
choice hypothesis and H4v.vi option summing-determined lure o f  choice hypotheses, 
respectively). The contrast hypothesis predicted that the proportion choosing the 
target in the high-contrast condition would exceed that in the low-contrast condition. 
There was a very small difference in the predicted direction between groups, but this 
was far from significant, x (1) = 0.10, n.s. The summing hypothesis predicted that 
target choice would be greatest in the three-choice condition, intermediate in the low- 
contrast condition, and least in the high-contrast condition. The observed choice 
proportions were (non-significantly and trivially) in the opposite direction. It 
appears that the relative relationship between the criteria of the choice options is not 
necessarily a determining factor in the lure of choice. In fact, there were no 
significant differences between any of the choice conditions {% (4) = 2.82, n.s.). 
This suggests that the lure of choice has less to do with the relationships between the 
lure option and the target than to do with the presence of choice per se. This 
possibility is developed in greater detail in the next two empirical chapters.
3.7. Summary and general discussion o f Studies 1-4
These studies concern cases where people were offered a choice between a 
single option and a further ‘illusory choice,’ in which one option was superior to the 
others and so will usually be chosen. A lure of choice was demonstrated in nearly
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every choice condition of every study, showing that the frequency with which an 
option is ultimately chosen increased when it is first offered as part of an illusory 
choice set than when it is offered alone. This was demonstrated in several studies, 
using two different methods with both gambles and more realistic scenarios. In 
nearly every condition of Studies 1-4 violations of the regularity condition were 
observed, in that pairing a target option with a lure significantly increased the 
‘market share’ of that target.
Several possible explanations for the lure of choice were ruled out. Study 4 
showed that it was independent of the specific value of the lure or lures, indicating 
that it could not be explained by a contrast effect (in which the better item in a choice 
pair looked even better when offered with a relatively inferior alternative, and that 
attractiveness is related to the relative superiority) or by a summing effect (in which 
all the options were added up, possibly in the mistaken belief that all the options in 
the choice set were available).
However, a number of issues remain to be resolved. For example, why do 
some people, on reaching Stage 2, select the lure option which is inferior in terms of 
EV? This appeared to be more common in situations when the target is paired with a 
lure that was in conflict with it on the dimensions of payoff and probability (for 
instance in Study 2 and Study 3’s conflicted-choice conditions where 9% and 24% 
respectively chose the lure at Stage 2). One explanation is that when faced with the 
choice at Stage 2 between the target and the lure, some people adopted a risk-averse 
stance, and opted for the lure (which in both cases had a probability of .9 compared 
with .75 for the target options). This seems somewhat unlikely however, given that 
they had already been willing to gamble on a lottery with probability .8 at Stage 1 to 
enable them to reach Stage 2.
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A potentially more straightforward explanation is that some people have 
difficulty calculating and comparing the expected values of a number of alternatives, 
(Dhar, 1997; Hauser & Wemerfelt, 1990; Huffman & Kahn, 1998; Luce, 1998; 
Tversky & Shafir, 1992b) and when the relative values of options is not transparent 
(as in the cases of the conflicted-choice conditions of Studies 1-4), they either 
miscalculate or simply guess. This would explain why the proportion of people 
selecting the lure in the conflicted-choice condition of Study 3 was greater than that 
in the comparable conflicted-choice condition of Study 2: in Study 3, the EV of the 
conflicted lure was 18, much closer to the target than in Study 2, where it was only 9 
(both targets had EVs of 22.5). The closer the EVs of alternatives, potentially the 
greater the possibility of miscalculation or confusion which could have led to 
“irrational” choice behaviour. For this reason, most of the studies reported in the rest 
of this thesis moved away from classic gambles and the associated probability- 
naivety of people, and concentrated on choices described in potentially more 
straightforward ways.
There is another unresolved question: if choice is attractive, why is more 
choice not even more attractive? The lack of a significant result in the three-choice 
condition of Study 4 can perhaps be accounted for in two ways. First, it is possible 
that the issue mentioned above regarding people’s inability or unwillingness to 
calculate and compare classic expected values is compounded when people are faced 
with more than two options. In this case, however, the lures were not conflicted, and 
the superiority of the target should have been obvious. This is reflected in the fact 
that nobody in this condition selected the lure option. Hence it seems that the second 
possibility is more plausible: people were simply not lured by the extra choice. This 
is in line with the findings of other researchers who argue that increased choice is 
unattractive or demotivating to people (Bettman, 1979; Chemev, 2003a; Iyengar &
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Lepper, 2000). Desmeules (2002) suggested that there is an inverted U shape 
function of the relationship between variety and the positiveness of a consumption 
experience. To follow this argument to its logical conclusion, one might speculate 
that although people demonstrate a lure of choice with a small number of choice 
alternatives, increasing the number of these at Stage 2 beyond this range might result 
in a preference reversal in the opposite direction, that is, that more people would opt 
for the sure thing in conditions offering more choice. This possible nature of the 
relationship between the extent of choice and the lure of choice is examined 
explicitly in Study 9b and discussed further in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.5).
This chapter has reported four studies in a particular context that taken 
together demonstrate convincingly a moderate but robust effect that has been coined 
the lure of choice. Although some potential explanations for the findings have been 
ruled out (contrast effects and inappropriate summing of options), it is clear that a 
more thorough test of possible theoretical explanations is required. In particular, it is 
necessary to establish the precise relationship between the lure of choice and the 
other well known choice effects discussed in Chapter 2. For example, event-splitting 
(see Section 2.5.7) is like the lure of choice in that both phenomena show how an 
increase in numerousness increases decision weight, but event-splitting differs from 
the lure of choice because in event-splitting the number of items is produced by 
subdividing one option into several, while in the lure of choice it is in placing several 
options side-by-side. Probably the most closely related context effect is the 
asymmetric dominance effect. The studies reported in Chapter 4 were designed to 
examine firstly the relationship between the lure of choice effect and existing 
documented context effects, particularly the asymmetric dominance effect. 
Secondly, they were designed to test whether the lure of choice is demonstrated in 
contexts other than lotteries (real or hypothetical).
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Chapter 4: Floating lure studies: Relationship between the lure of choice and
other context effects.
“When possible make the decisions now, even if action is in the future. A 
reviewed decision usually is better than one reached at the last moment.”
William B. Given, Jr.
4.1. Introduction
On the basis of the evidence presented so far, when people choose, they can 
be lured by options that offer them a further choice, even when that choice is 
‘illusory’ so that what they will eventually choose should be predictable (research 
questions i, ii and iii). In every choice condition but one of Studies 1 through 4, this 
lure of choice led to a significant violation of the regularity condition. These 
findings may, however, be related to findings relating to the asymmetric dominance 
effect (Huber et al., 1982) or the attraction effect (Simonson, 1989) as discussed in 
Chapter 2. This chapter reconsiders the asymmetric dominance effect as a potential 
explanation for the lure of choice and presents evidence to support the argument that 
the lure of choice is a separate, but possibly related effect. The focus therefore for 
the studies in this chapter is research question vi: “If people are attracted to choice, 
what are the possible underlying causes of this attraction?”
4.2. The asymmetric dominance effect revisited
Figure 10 plots the targets, sure things and lures offered in Studies 1-4 along 
the two dimensions of probability of receipt (pq for targets, pr for lures, and 1 for 
sure things), and the amount that could be won or earned. In these studies, the lure 
was superior to the sure thing on the payoff dimension, but usually at least weakly 
dominated by the target. Given that the target and the lure options in these studies 
were more closely related on the evaluative dimension of payoff than were the sure
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thing and the lure, and were only ever presented alongside the target option 
(essentially in a triadic choice set), it is possible that the lure of choice might be 
related to the asymmetric dominance effect (see Figure 3, Chapter 2). The other 
context effects discussed in Chapter 2 (the similarity effect, the compromise effect 
and reference point effects) do not apply in this case due to the relative values of the 
choice options on the two dimensions.
Figure 10. Plot of target, sure thing (S) and lure options (L) in Studies 1- 4 on the 
dimensions of payoff and probability that reward will be received (see pq/pr in Table 
1). Numbers refer to study number and condition. Where more than one choice 
condition exists, this is specified in parentheses.
As discussed, the asymmetric dominance effect is shown by comparing two 
choice situations: in the control condition, the choice is between two options that 
conflict with one another (A and B, such as two cameras where the cheaper one is of 
lower quality); in the experimental condition, the choice is between the same two 
options and a third one that is dominated by A but not by B (e.g., the camera is more 
expensive than A but of poorer quality). The common result is that A is chosen more
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These findings are consistent with the lure of choice in that they show how 
the preference for one option over another depends not only on the relationship 
between the two options, but also on their relationships with other options. 
However, this thesis proposes that the asymmetric dominance effect and the lure of 
choice are fundamentally different. The asymmetric dominance effect is due to the 
number of items in the choice set and their relative standing on different dimensions. 
Broadly speaking, it is observed in comparisons between two choice situations, one 
with two options that conflict on different dimensions, and another with the same 
two conflicting options plus a third option that is clearly inferior to one option but 
not to the other. The effect is due to the presence or absence of the third item, 
therefore, and not on the decision structure. The argument presented here is that the 
lure of choice, on the other hand, is attributable to the decision structure, and in 
particular how items are grouped together in terms of offering choice, and not on 
how many items there are to choose from. The lure of choice argument states that 
given a choice between three items structured in the form of a choice between {A} 
and {B, C}, and then (if necessary) a choice between {B, C}, there will be more 
choices of B than in a situation in which the first choice is between {A, C} and {B}. 
The three studies reported in this chapter were conducted in order to tease apart the 
lure of choice and asymmetric dominance effects.
4.3. Overview o f Studies 5-7
These studies were based on what was called a floating lure design. This 
kind of lure is different from those in the experiments reported in Chapter 3 where 
each lure was associated with only one target option. A floating lure can be paired
often in the experimental condition. It is argued that because A is clearly better than
the third decoy option, this increases the strength of the reasons for choosing A.
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with any option, rendering it the target. The general structures of the two conditions 
used in Studies 5-7 are illustrated in Figure 11.
.2 «tA 3C
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¿  = T,
B  =  T l
Dimension 1 
(enjoyment)
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c 373>
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Dimension 1 
(enjoyment)
Figure 11. General structure of the two conditions in floating lure Studies 5-7. 
Options A  and B become TLure (T L) and TIsoiation (TO depending on whether it is 
paired with the lure (L) or presented alone (in isolation). Examples of dimension 
labels refer to Study 5.
All participants (in between-participant designs) chose between two targets 
(pre-tested to establish equal desirability) and a lure. These were paired in such a 
way that they made a choice between one target in isolation (target]) and one target 
paired with the lure (targetL). Both targets played the role of target and targetL for
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different groups of participants. In other words, for half the participants the lure was 
paired with one target and for the other half it was paired with the other target.
With reference to the asymmetric dominance effect, L is the additional option 
that is dominated by B, but not A, where A would be considered a context or 
competitor option. In this specific design, the lure is dominated in such a way that it 
increased the range on the dimension on which B was inferior to the context option 
(A)10. An asymmetric dominance effect explanation would predict that the 
introduction of L would increase the attractiveness of B in both conditions, i.e. 
regardless of the particular presentation of options. An asymmetric dominance effect 
explanation would not offer any prediction about the influence of the way in which 
options are presented as pairs or otherwise.
In all these scenarios, all three options were presented simultaneously and 
were fully specified to participants. The options were paired in such a way that if 
people were sensitive to increased choice in the way that the lure of choice effect 
predicts, they should show an increased preference for whichever option (A or B) 
was presented as a pair with the lure item. In this way, their behaviour would 
contradict the predictions of the asymmetric dominance effect. More formally, these 
two approaches lead to competing general hypotheses:
Asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis: The presence o f L will correspond 
with a preference for option B in both Condition 1 and Condition 2.
Lure o f choice hypothesis: The presence o f L will correspond with a 
preference for Ti (option B in Condition 1, and option A in Condition 2).
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In line with the noted limitations of hypothetical gambles made in Chapter 3, 
Studies 5 and 6 used brief realistic scenarios selected in which everyday choices 
were replicated. The nature of these decisions meant that only a single option was 
viable, and that decision was final (participants could not “hedge their bets” through 
multiple choices). To counteract the drawbacks of using realistic scenarios as noted 
in Chapter 3, Study 7 incorporated more abstract gambles of the type used in Studies 
1-4 within a realistic context.
4.4. Study 5
This study involved the choice of a nightclub. The scenario described a 
Friday night out with friends in a small town and the choice task was to decide which 
part of town to take a taxi to in order to spend the rest of the evening at a nightclub 
(see Appendix E for full details). The town depicted has three nightclubs that varied 
on the dimensions of entrance charge and quality o f  experience/enjoyment (see 
Figure 12). One target nightclub, Club Cherish, was cheap (£4) but did not play very 
good music, while the other, Club Diesel, was moderately expensive (£12) and 
played enjoyable music. The lure (Club Atom) was expensive (£15) and played 
enjoyable music. The three items were pre-tested (n = 48) in a direct choice 
(i.e. with no pairing of items), and it was found that preference was almost exactly 
split between the two targets, with nobody choosing Club Atom. 10
10 The range-increasing explanations for the asymmetric dominance effect are those 
that appear to have greater supporting evidence, e.g. Huber et al. (1982), Wedell 
(1991) (see Section 2.6.1-3).
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Club Cherish - target
•  Club Diesel - target 
Club Atom - lure
moderate high
enjoyment
Figure 12. Relative dimensions of targets and lure in Study 5.
Participants read the entire scenario, and first decided where to take a taxi, 
to the north or south of the town. For half the subjects, the lure (Club Atom) was 
paired with Club Diesel, thus making this targetL (equivalent to Condition 1 in Figure 
11) and for the remainder the lure was paired with Club Cherish (as represented by 
Condition 2 in Figure 11). The side of town where the targets were located was 
systematically varied between subjects. After deciding which direction to send the 
taxi, participants who opted for the area with two clubs then immediately chose the 
one nightclub they preferred. The primary dependent measure was whether the 
respondent directed a taxi towards the north or the south of the town, specifically 
whether this was the direction where there were two nightclubs or one, and the 
secondary measure was the market share of the two targets, depending on whether 
they were paired with the lure club or were alone (i.e. designated TL or Ti).
In terms of the general hypotheses introduced above, given the pre-tested 
preference equivalence between club Diesel and Club Cherish, the asymmetric 
dominance effect would predict a preference for Club Diesel, regardless of where 
Club Atom was located. The lure of choice would predict a preference for whichever
go£
>> £4
J3
>
£12
£15
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club (Diesel or Cherish) was offered as part of a choice set alongside Club Atom (i.e. 
located in the same part of town). That is:
H5i (asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis): The presence o f Club Atom 
will correspond to a preference for Club Diesel both in Condition 1 and 
Condition 2.
H5u (lure o f choice hypothesis): The presence o f Club Atom will correspond 
to a preference for Ti (Club Diesel in Condition 1, and Club Cherish in 
Condition 2).
Participants were 150 members of the general public (68% female, mean age 
23.2 years) approached in a shopping centre on a weekday morning (over a period of 
two days). They were randomly allocated to an experimental condition.
4.4.1. Results and discussion o f Study 5
Results are presented in Table 6. Analysis revealed that the distribution of
choices differed between conditions (x (2) = 12.42,/? < .01, Cramer’s V = .29). As 
can be seen in Table 6, the overall market share of both clubs was increased when 
they were paired with the lure. Club Diesel’s share increased by 24% and Club 
Cherish’s by 9%. A further third-way analysis that excluded choices of lures from 
the analysis revealed that this increase in choices of the same club when it was
targetL over when it was target was significant (x (1) = 4.42, p  < .05, Cramer’s V = 
.18), a low to moderate effect size (de Vaus, 2002).
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Choice
TargetL Club Cherish Club Diesel Club Atom
Including lure choices
Club Diesel (N = 75) 36 60 4
Club Cherish (N = 75) 45 36 19
Excluding lure choices
Club Diesel (N = 72) 37 63
Club Cherish (N = 61) 56 44 -
Table 6. Results of Study 5, Nightclub scenario. Numbers represent percentage 
choosing each alternative. Club Atom, the floating lure, was paired with the item 
designated TargetL in each row.
Thus, in this case, the findings support H5U, the lure o f choice hypothesis: 
there was a significant preference for whichever target was paired the lure, rather 
than H5i, the asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis which predicted a preference 
for the dominating item (Club Diesel). However, despite efforts to ensure that their 
decisions were considered singular and final, it is possible that extraneous context 
factors may have influenced participants towards selecting an area of town where a 
number of options were available (for example, people may have been influenced 
towards targetL for reasons such as if one nightclub turned out to be unenjoyable, an 
alternative would be available nearby, or that one would have a better time in an area 
of town in which there was a party “atmosphere” reflected by a number of nightclubs 
in the same area). The next study was designed to test further the differing 
predictions of the lure of choice and the asymmetric dominance effect in a scenario 
where the undue influence of contextual features is minimised. Furthermore, a lure 
with a slightly different relationship to the targets was used.
4.5. Study 6
In Study 6, participants were asked to imagine that they had inherited some 
money, £5,000 of which they had decided to invest in a savings account. Their
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choice had been narrowed down to three savings accounts in two banks (see 
Appendix F); with one bank offering two possible accounts, the other offering one. 
Two of the accounts were targets. Account 1 offered 6.1% interest with 60 days 
notice for withdrawals, Account 2 offered 5% interest with instant access. The 
floating lure (Account 3 in Figure 13) account offered 6% interest with 45 days 
notice. Direct preference for these accounts was pre-tested, and relative dimensions 
adjusted until the dimensions of the two targets led to roughly equal preferences for 
the two target accounts. Whereas the floating lure in Study 5 was more closely 
related to, and dominated by Club Diesel, the floating lure in this instance was in 
conflict with both targets (better on one dimension and worse on the other). There is 
evidence that the asymmetric dominance effect also occurs with sub-optimal, but not 
necessarily strictly dominated decoys (Huber & Puto, 1983), which in this case 
should correspond to an increased number of people selecting Account 1.
ucdOiV,K
Account 1- target 
♦  Account 3 - lure
Account 2 
target
60 45 0
Notice Period (days)
Figure 13. Relative dimensions of targets and lure in Study 6.
For half of the participants the lure was paired with the high interest account, 
and for the other half it was paired with the low interest account. Participants 
decided which bank they were going to visit, and if they selected the two-account 
bank they then chose one of the two accounts in which to deposit their money. As in
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Study 5, the order in which the options were presented on the page (top/bottom, 
right/left) was counterbalanced. Formally put, the hypotheses for this study were:
116i (asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis): The presence o f Account 
3 will correspond with a preference for Account 1, regardless o f which target it 
is paired with.
H6n (lure o f choice hypothesis): The presence o f Account 3 will 
correspond with a preference for Ti (i.e. whichever account it is paired with in 
that condition).
The primary dependent measure was whether the respondent chose to go to 
Bank J or Bank K, specifically whether this was the bank which offered one or two 
accounts, and the secondary measure was the market share of the two targets, 
depending on whether they were paired with the lure or were alone (i.e. designated 
Tl or Ti).
Participants were 100 visitors recruited on a weekday morning at the same 
shopping centre as Study 5, who had not been involved with the earlier study. The 
sample comprised 64% female, mean age 26.6 years. They were randomly allocated 
to one of the two experimental conditions.
4.5.1. Results and discussion o f Study 6
Results of Study 6 are summarised in Table 7. An overall Chi-square
2analysis revealed that the distribution of responses differed between conditions (x 
(2) = 6.87, p < .05, Cramer’s V = .26). More people chose each target account when 
it was paired with a lure than when it was unpaired -  the advantage was 26% for
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Account 1, the high interest account, and 16% for Account 2, the low interest 
account. Consistent with this observation, a third-way analysis excluding those 
selecting the lure (Account 3), revealed a low-to-moderate significant effect of
condition (x2 (1) = 4.93, p  < .05, Cramer’s V = .24).
Choice
Account 1 Account 2 Account 3
TargetL 6.1%/60 5.0%/instant 6.0%/45
Days access days
Account 1:6.1%, 60 days (N = 50) 68 22 10
Account 2: 5%, instant access (N = 50) 42 38 20
Excluding lure choices
6.1%, 60 days (N = 45) 76 24 -
5.0%, instant access (N = 40) 52 48 -
Table 7. Results of Study 6, Bank scenario. Numbers represent percentage choosing 
each alternative. The 6%, 45 days account (Account 3) is the floating lure option and 
was paired with the account designated as Target in each row.
Once again, there was no evidence to support H6h the asymmetric dominance 
effect hypothesis, as a clear preference for Account 1 was not demonstrated in both 
conditions. There was evidence support H6u, the lure o f choice hypothesis, as a 
preference swing is demonstrated across conditions. Like the conflicted-choice 
conditions of Studies 2 and 3, the result was not a perfect symmetrical preference 
reversal, a finding most probably tempered by the relatively large number of people 
who selected the lure option, especially when it was paired with Account 2. Once 
again this seems to correspond with the extent to which the target option’s 
superiority is obscured. As noted elsewhere (Tversky & Shafir, 1992b; Gourville & 
Soman, 2005), people appear to have some difficulty making tradeoffs and perhaps 
more so when deciding between an account with different major characteristics (5% 
interest and instant access to be traded off against 6% interest and 45 days access).
Interestingly, this reasoning suggests that the tradeoffs to be made are mostly 
between the pair of options, and not all three options (in which case there ought to be
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no differences between conditions in difficulties encountered, nor the numbers 
selecting the lure option). It would seem that people may be lured towards the pair 
of options, and then decide between the two remaining viable options (requiring the 
relative tradeoffs), rather than choosing the outcome they want first and then 
following the route required to reach it. The work of Brenner et al. (1999) and Sood 
et al. (2004), discussed in Section 2.9.2 would support this view, although these 
authors argued that the outcome of this process damages the attractiveness of those 
items presented in the choice set, a contrary finding to the lure of choice (a view 
investigated more fully in Chapter 5). This two-stage trade off behaviour could be 
due to either a way of simplifying the task (tradeoffs required between two options 
rather than three) or being a mechanism for “staying in the game” or momentarily 
delaying the final decision. Both of these possibilities are discussed later in this 
chapter and in Chapter 6.
The findings of Study 5 and 6 demonstrate the lure of choice in situations 
quite different from those of the earlier studies. In particular, they confirm that it is 
not a further instantiation of the asymmetric dominance effect, and that people 
appear to like options that offer them choice, even when this means they may not 
select options they would otherwise have done.
4.6. Study 7
Study 7 was designed to test participants’ responses using the floating-lure 
design in a scenario offering more experimental control over subjective expected 
utility. As mentioned before, semi-realistic scenarios such as those used in Studies 5 
and 6 have high face validity and are motivating, yet may detract participants with 
interesting surface characteristics. Such detraction is not necessarily unwarranted in 
many real life situations. For example, in a real life scenario such as the Nightclub
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scenario of Study 5 it is not unreasonable that people may have decided that having 
two clubs close together enhanced the subjective utility of either of them (in case one 
was closed when they got there, or they decided to leave one to try the other). This 
hedging of bets might be one of the reasons why the lure of choice has developed, 
and is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 6. However, the interesting 
question for this study was whether the tendency for people to be attracted in the 
direction of choice still remained when only one option was allowed, and the 
possibility of changing one’s mind was not available because the decision was one- 
off and finite. If it did remain, this suggests that the lure of choice may be some kind 
of behavioural decision heuristic (as described in Chapter 2, Section 2.7) which 
although often used to our advantage, may be also used in situations in which it is not 
the most appropriate strategy.
Related to this point, this study also tested whether the lure of choice effect 
was eliminated by removing the part of the decision process that allowed people to 
select an option that retains the possibility for them to exercise further choice. In a 
straightforward choice between the options with no first stage (with other factors, 
such as the physical proximity of the options and contextual factors remaining the 
same), does the lure of choice remain? This would indicate whether the lure of 
choice preference reversal witnessed in Studies 5 and 6 was due to physical 
proximity of alternatives or attributable to the explicit pairing of items into choice 
sets.
In this study there were four experimental and four control conditions. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were at a casino, and had a single token 
left to spend on a roulette-type game, which Hacking (1965) calls a chance setup. 
(See Appendix G for materials). In each condition there was a choice of three 
spinners, of which two were targets and one a floating lure. For all conditions, the
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two targets were: the chance of winning £50 with probability .45 and nothing with 
probability .55 (Ti) and the chance of winning £60 with probability .375 and nothing 
with probability .625 (T2). The expected values of these two options are the same 
(£22.5). In the two dominated lure conditions and the two corresponding control 
conditions, the lure option was the chance of winning £50 with probability .375 and 
nothing with probability .625 (expected value £18.75). In other words, it was 
dominated by both targets, each dominating it on a different dimension, either payoff 
or probability. In the two conflicted lure conditions and corresponding control 
conditions, the lure offered the chance of winning £40 with a probability of .47 and 
nothing with probability .63 (expected value £18.75). In this case, therefore, it was 
in conflict with both targets (that is, had a higher probability, but a lower potential 
payofl). The relative dimensions of the different options are detailed in Figure 14.
0.5 -I Spinner C
a  Spinner A
^  0.45 - 
•C* •
m 0.4 ■-O
Ob. ♦
& 0-35 - 
0 J  -
Spinner D 
1 1
30 40 50 60
Spinner B
70
payoff £
80
Figure 14. Relative dimensions of targets and lures in Study 7. Spinners A and R 
are the targets, and play the role of both Target, and Target,.. Spinner C is the 
conflicted floating lure, and Spinner D is the dominated floating lure
For the participants in half the experimental conditions the floating lure was 
explicitly paired with T, thereby rendering that option target^ and for the others it 
was paired with T2. The pairing was made explicit by locating targetL and the lure at 
the same table in the casino (see Figure 15). The instructions given to participants in
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the experimental conditions were “Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to 
leave and you have one token left. Near the exit there are two tables offering a 
chance of winning a prize in exchange for your token. You can get one spin of the 
wheel in exchange for your token, and if the pointer ends up in the light section, you 
win the amount specified. This is what you decide to spend your token on. Choose 
the table at which you would like to spend your token.” The position of each table 
(left or right of the page) and the spinners on each table (top or bottom) were 
systematically varied across experimental conditions.
Table 1 Table 2
Figure IS  Example of presentation of choice options in Study 7 (dominated lure 
condition - Sptnner A (T,) pa,red with lure D on left-hand side and Spinner B (T,t 
presented alone on right-hand side). v 2>
As mentioned, one aim was to rule out the possibility that the physical 
proximity rather than the pairing of options together in the materials rendered targetL 
preferable to targetj. Therefore, the control conditions offered a direct choice
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(without pairings) between exactly the same options, in precisely the same physical 
locations on the page. The instructions for control participants were “Imagine that 
you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. Near the 
exit there are three games offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange for your 
token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if the 
pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what you 
decide to spend your token on. Choose the spinner at which you would like to spend 
your token.” These participants do not have the chance to select an option that 
provides greater choice, and therefore the only effects that should be evident are 
those attributable to the physical proximity of options and (perhaps more 
importantly) the relationship of the options on the two salient dimensions (if the 
asymmetric dominance effect is evident in this context, it should also occur in this 
control condition). The positions of the targets and the lure were systematically 
varied in exactly the same way as for the experimental conditions.
Based on the earlier studies, the basic lure of choice hypothesis predictions
were:
H7t (dominated lure o f choice hypothesis): The presence o f Spinner D 
(dominated lure) will correspond with a preference for TL (i. e. whichever 
account it is paired with in a given condition).
H7ii (conflicted lure o f hypothesis): The presence o f Spinner C (conflicted 
lure) will correspond with a preference for TL (i.e. whichever account it is 
paired with in a given condition).
On the other hand, a competing explanation reflecting the asymmetric 
dominance effect would predict:
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H7jji (asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis): The presence o f Spinner C 
(conflicted lure) will correspond with a preference for Spinner A (regardless 
o f which account it is paired with it).
There is no corresponding asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis for the 
dominated lure condition, because the lure in this condition is not asymmetrically 
dominated, it is dominated by both targets. The control conditions allowed the 
following prediction to be tested:
H7tv (physical proximity versus explicit pairing hypothesis): The preference 
reversal known as the lure o f  choice will only be demonstrated when the floating lure 
(Spinner D or C) is explicitly paired with Tl, and not when the physical proximity is 
the same, but with no explicit pairing (control conditions).
The primary dependent measure for the experimental conditions was which 
table the respondent chose to spend their token at, specifically whether this was the 
one with two spinners or one, and the secondary measure was the market share of the 
two targets, depending on whether they were paired with the lure or were alone (i.e. 
designated Tl or Ti).
Participants were 469 undergraduate management students, not involved with 
any previous study who volunteered to take part (55% female, mean age 18.8 years). 
They were randomly allocated to conditions.
4.6.1. Results and discussion o f Study 7
Tables 8a and 8b illustrate the choice preferences of participants. The upper 
four rows show the results for the experimental conditions, and below are their
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corresponding control conditions. The pattern of results for the experimental 
conditions was a familiar one. For the dominated lure condition (n = 130) there was 
a slight preference reversal in favour of whichever target gamble was paired with the 
lure; when Spinner A was paired with the lure it was chosen by 54% of the 
participants, compared with 43% when it was presented alone. Similarly, when 
Spinner B was presented as targetL, it was preferred by 57%, compared with 46%
when it was alone, although this failed to reach significance (x2 (1) = 1.56, p  = .46, 
n.s., third way analysis). Hence there was evidence to support H7i, the dominated 
lure o f  choice hypothesis. This result is interesting, as in previous studies, all 
dominated lures had been associated with the lure of choice effect, and in those 
studies that contained both conflicted and dominated lures (Studies 2 and 3), the 
dominated lure’s effect had tended to be more distinctive than the conflicted one. 
One explanation for this result could be that the pictorial representations used in this 
study made tradeoffs between relative values of options on probability and payoffs 
more difficult than anticipated.
Choice
Spinner A Spinner B Dominated Lure
£50 with £62.5 with Spinner D
largetL probability probability £50 with
.45 .375 probability .375
Experimental conditions
Spinner A (N = 65) 52 45 3
Spinner B (N = 65) 42 55 3
Excluding lure choices
Spinner A (N = 63) 54 46 -
Spinner B (N = 63) 43 57 -
Control condition (no explicit pairing)
Spinner A (N = 53) 66 34 0
Spinner B (N -  56) 86 14 0
Table 8a. Results of Study 7, Casino scenario -  Dominated lure condition. Numbers 
represent percentage choosing each alternative. Spinner D is the floating lure option 
and was paired with the account designated as TargetL in each row.
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The conflicted lure condition (n = 127) showed a stronger lure of choice
effect (see Table 8b), overall x2 (2) -  7.53, p  < .05, Cramer’s V = .24). A third way 
analysis revealed that 65% preferred Spinner A when it was targetL compared with 
39% when it was target In the same way, 61% chose Spinner B when it was targetL
compared with 35% when it was presented alone (x2 (1) = 7.45, p < .01, Cramer’s V 
= .27), thus offering support for H7iU the conflicted lure o f choice hypothesis. These 
effect sizes are low to moderate (de Vaus, 2002).
Choice
Spinner A Spinner B Conflicted Lure
£50 with £62.5 with Spinner CTargetL probability probability £40 with
.45 .375 probability .40
Experimental conditions
Spinner A (N -  63) 54 29 17
Spinner B (N = 64) 33 52 16
Excluding lure choices
Spinner A (N = 52) 65 35 -
Spinner B (N = 54) 39 61 -
Control condition (no explicit pairing)
Spinner A (N = 53) 66 17 17
Spinner B (N = 50) 56 24 20
Table 8b. Results of Study 7, Casino scenario -  Conflicted lure condition. Numbers 
represent percentage choosing each alternative. Spinner C is the floating lure option 
and was paired with the account designated as TargetL in each row.
The asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis (H7Ui) was rejected. The 
presence of Spinner C (conflicted lure) did not correspond with an overall preference 
for Spinner A. This preference switched to Spinner B when it was paired with the 
lure.
These results are clearer when considered in the light o f those from the 
control conditions (n’s “  109 and 103 for dominated lure control and conflicted lure 
control, respectively). Across both the dominated and the conflicted lure control 
conditions, there was a strong preference for Spinner A, regardless of whether or not
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it was presented in close proximity to the lure (that is, as targetL). Critical statistics
for the dominated lure control condition were (x (2) = 5.80, p  < .05, Cramer’s V = 
.23), a significant effect attributable to the large number choosing Spinner B when it 
was target^ rather than a caused by a preference reversal and for the conflicted lure 
2
control condition (x (2) = 1.17, p  = .56, Cramer’s V = .11). These findings 
provided support for H7„, the physical proximity versus explicit pairing hypothesis, 
indicating that the preference reversal witnessed was caused by the explicit paring of 
the targets with the conflicted lure, and not because of the relative physical locality 
of the pairs. This preference for Spinner A suggests that when the items were not 
explicitly paired, the asymmetric dominance effect was able to operate (on the basis 
that target items were pre-tested to establish roughly equal preferences). However, 
without a condition that compares preferences between the targets without the lure 
(or decoy) option C, it cannot be confirmed that this distribution was caused by the 
asymmetric dominance effect.
Overall, Study 7 suggests that the preference reversals and violation of 
regularity witnessed thus far cannot be attributed to the physical pairing of options 
that made the superior one seem more attractive (the attraction effect) alone, and 
required the explicit pairing of options into choice sets. Indeed, by simply removing 
the possibility for participants to follow a route to choice, the preference reversal was 
eliminated.
4,7. Summary and discussion o f Studies 5, 6 and 7
Studies 5, 6 and 7 showed that when an identical set of items is on the table, 
with two items offered as a choice pair, and one offered alone, a target item was 
chosen more frequently when it was offered as part of a pair than when it was offered
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separately. These findings constitute a violation of procedure invariance, according 
to which normatively identical problems should lead to identical decisions (Tversky, 
Sattath & Slovic, 1988). It is now known that this principle is often violated, and a 
widely accepted view is that people often do not have definite preferences between 
options, but actually construct their preferences based on such factors as the context 
of choice and the way it is to be expressed (e.g. Bettman et al.,1998, see Section 2.4). 
The lure of choice appears to be an additional factor determining what preferences 
are constructed from a particular set of options.
Moreover, these studies showed that whilst sharing some similarities, the lure 
of choice is not just another version of the asymmetric dominance effect. Broadly 
speaking, similarities hinge on the fact that altering in some way the array from 
which people can chose can fundamentally change their preferences. The two 
classes of phenomena differ, however, in that attraction and compromise effects 
occur when the choice set is changed, but the lure of choice occurs when the choice 
set is held constant but the decision structure is changed.
Even when participants always had three options available, they generally 
preferred a choice to a no-choice option even if that meant they ended up with an 
ultimate option that was not as good (when they ended up choosing the lure option, 
as was the case of Studies 5, 6 and conflicted lure condition of Study 7), or was at 
least different to that which they would otherwise have chosen (on the basis that 
target options were preferred equally in pre-testing).
Furthermore, two of the main theoretical accounts for the asymmetric 
dominance effect, the range-increasing account, (Huber et al., 1982, see Section 
2.6.1) and frequency-increasing account (Huber et al., 1982, see Section 2.6.2) could 
not be applied to the results demonstrated here. Neither increasing the range on 
which one target was weakest, nor adding a level on the dimension on which one
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target was strongest had the one-sided preference increases that these explanations 
would suggest. However, the emergent value account for the asymmetric dominance 
effect (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996, see Section 2.6.3) 
shares some characteristics with the explanation of the lure of choice to be examined 
next, in particular, that people rely on more qualitative comparisons (akin to the use 
of heuristics), such as the fact that domination makes the selection of a particular 
target easier to justify.
The lure of choice may be a manifestation of a more general desire to defer 
commitment for as long as possible. This may be related to the effect discussed by 
Bastardi and Shafir (1998; see also Shafir et al., 1993), in which people like to search 
for information beyond the point where it is beneficial (reviewed in Section 2.6.4). 
For instance, to use one of Bastardi and Shafir’s examples, a student deciding 
whether to take a course might wait to find out whether the professor has a good or 
bad reputation, even when the knowledge is irrelevant to his or her decision. 
Bastardi and Shafir’s studies suggest that people often unnecessarily delay 
commitment until all information is gathered. Choosing a choice-path gives people 
another way to defer making a final and irrevocable commitment. It does not 
eliminate all commitment, of course, since choosing can mean the loss of potentially 
desirable outcomes. For instance, in Studies 5-7, choosing a choice-rich route meant 
a commitment to not getting targeti.
The emerging pattern of results supports the suggestion that the lure of choice 
is an example of a simplifying choice heuristic, such as ‘it is better to choose from a 
larger selection than a smaller one.’ This is consistent with Payne et al.’s (1993) 
suggestion that, all things being equal, an easier to implement procedure will be 
chosen over a more taxing one. An easy way to choose a cinema, for instance, is to 
choose the one with the most screens, without bothering to consider what is showing
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on those screens. Such a mechanism may account for why, in Study 5, many 
participants chose the lure (Club Atom) when it conflicted with targetL (in this case, 
the 'cheap and cheerful' Club Cherish) than when it was dominated by it (Club 
Diesel). If the first decision was made on the basis of the ‘choice is better’ heuristic, 
then the first time the options were explicitly compared might have been at the 
ensuing pairwise choice stage. In the conflicting choice scenario, if the cover charge 
was more important to the participant, then Cherish was chosen; but if the quality of 
experience was more important, then the lure was chosen -  even though the lure was 
dominated by Club Diesel, which was no longer available. This kind of asymmetry, 
also reflected in the bank scenario in Study 6 and Study 3 (and to a lesser degree in 
the conflicted lure condition of Study 2) suggests that people were not thinking 
through all the options before making their decisions, but were first making the very 
simple decision of choosing on the basis of the presence or absence of a further 
choice between options, and only after they have taken the choice path did they give 
in-depth examination to the options that were then available. This suggests that a lot 
of the decision making in the choice conditions of these studies was driven by a 
preference for choice itself, and not necessarily by the options on offer (an idea that 
is developed in greater detail in Chapter 6).
The set of empirical studies reported in the following chapter extend 
investigations of the lure of choice into different experimental domains, and examine 
the idea of the lure of choice as a decision heuristic in more detail.
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Chapter 5. Follow up studies: Assessing the roots of the lure of choice.
“The more alternatives, the more difficult the choice.” Abbe' D'Allanival.
5.1. Introduction
The lure of choice has now been demonstrated in seven different studies, 
using a number of different methodologies with a variety of participants. A number 
of alternative explanations and potential mechanisms underlying the effect have been 
ruled out. This chapter describes three studies designed to address some further 
issues regarding the lure of choice, in particular the range of contexts in which the 
lure of choice is demonstrable. It also reports how the lure of choice relates to other 
published research with apparently contradictory findings.
Specifically, the studies reported here were designed to concentrate on the 
following three research questions (iv-vi): “If people are attracted to choice, are there 
certain kinds of choice that are more attractive than others?” “If people are attracted 
to choice, is there a point at which too much choice is unattractive, and people are 
detracted from it?” and “If people are attracted to choice, what are the possible 
underlying causes of this attraction?” The first study used a well known, widely- 
cited decision problem that lends itself well to investigating the lure of choice, and 
the other two studies replicated a piece of work which seems to directly contradict 
the lure of choice.
5.2. Study 8U
This study used a variant of a problem that has undergone considerable 
academic scrutiny -  the Monty Hall problem (Granberg & Brown, 1995; Nickerson, 1
11 This study was conducted in collaboration with Barbara Summers and Daniel 
Read, who have given their permission for this work to be presented here (see Bown 
et al., 2003).
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1996). Three versions of the Monty Hall problem were tested. The first was the 
traditional 3-door problem. The others were 4-door problems, with and without a 
lure of choice element.
In the traditional two-stage Monty Hall Problem a contestant (or participant) 
is shown three doors, behind one of which a prize is hidden. The contestant is told 
he or she will win the prize if they select the right door. They first choose a door. 
This door is not opened, however, but the knowledgeable host opens another door to 
show it does not conceal the prize. There are now two unopened doors, the chosen 
and unchosen one. The contestant is then given the option of sticking with their 
originally chosen door, or switching to the unchosen one. The correct, but strongly 
counter-intuitive, solution is to switch, which gives a two-thirds probability of 
winning12 (see Baron, 2000; Mosteller, 1965; Selvin, 1975; Shaughnessy & Dick, 
1991).
The scenario was described to participants using a row of boxes to represent 
the doors. An experimenter explained the scenario to participants in the following 
way: “I want you to imagine a TV game show. In the show the contestant who wins 
in the early rounds gets a chance to go for the star prize. On the game show set there 
are three (four) doors, represented by these three (four) boxes. The host says that the 
star prize, a Ferrari, is in one of the boxes and that if the contestant chooses correctly 
he or she will win it. The other boxes contain goats, which are the consolation 
prizes. He then asks the contestant to choose a box”. At this stage one participant, 
volunteered or chosen at random, chose a box. The experimenter then opened one of 
the other boxes that did not contain a prize, and announced that “The host now says 
‘you have chosen this box but before you open your box, I’m going to give you the
12 The probability of winning by switching is (N-l) /  [N(N-n-l)J, where N = total 
number of doors and n = number of incorrect alternatives revealed (Selvin, 1975).
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chance to change your mind.”’ All participants observed this and then answered the 
experimental questionnaire (see Appendix H).
In all conditions participants first learned that “You are a contestant in the 
game show described. Initially you have chosen box K”. There were three 
conditions: The standard three-door condition; the four-door choose-a-door (CAD) 
condition; and the four-door choose-a-choice (CAC) condition. In the three-door 
version participants were asked whether they wished to stick with Box K or switch to 
Box L (the other unopened box), in the four-door versions they could switch to either 
Box L or M (the two remaining unopened boxes). In the four door versions, the 
probability of winning by switching is 3/8, compared to 2/8 for sticking.
In the choose-a-door condition after the experimenter opened one of the 
boxes, participants simply specified whether they wanted Box K (their original 
selection) or Box L or Box M. In the choose-a-choice condition participants had the 
option to either stick with Box K or “Choose to switch to one of the other two boxes 
(L or M). You don’t need to decide yet which box you will finally choose”. The 
usual finding, “the Monty effect,” is that people are reluctant to switch, regardless of 
whether there are one or two alternative doors to choose from:
H8i (the Monty hypothesis): The majority o f  people will stick to Box K in the 
three-door, CAD and choose-a-choice conditions.
The lure of choice effect predicts that participants will be attracted to the 
opportunity of choice in the choose-a-choice condition, and will therefore switch 
more often in the choose-a-choice condition than in the choose-a-door condition. It 
makes no predictions regarding behaviour in the three-door condition because there 
is no choice offered here.
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H8u (lure o f choice hypothesis): More people will switch in the choose-a- 
choice condition than in the choose-a-door condition.
Participants were 373 undergraduate management students who volunteered 
to take part during class time (45% female, mean age 19.4 years). The participants in 
each class in which data was collected were randomly allocated to one of the three 
experimental conditions.
5.2.1. Results and discussion o f Study 8
Table 9 shows the proportion choosing to switch in the three conditions.
Condition Choice
Stick Switch
Standard 3 door (N = 103) 86 14
4 door Choose-A-Door CAD (N = 138) 78 22
4 door Choose-A-Choice CAC (N = 132) 66 34
Table 9. Results of Study 8. Numbers represent percentage participants sticking 
with original selection or switching in 3-door and 4-door Choose-A-Door (CAD) and 
Choose-A-Choice (CAC) conditions. In the CAD condition participants switched to 
a named alternative, in the CAC condition they switched to either alternative, 
without specifying which.
As usual in studies of the Monty Hall problem, very few participants 
switched in the standard condition, and the difference between the standard and
choose-a-door conditions was not significant ( i  (1) = 2.62, n.s., Cramer’s V = .10). 
This is consistent with Granberg and Dorr (1998) who found no significant 
difference in switching behavior for three, five and seven doors. On the other hand, 
significantly more participants switched in the choose-a-choice than in both the
standard condition ( f 2 (1) = 12.93, p  < .001, Cramer’s V = .24) and the choose-a- 
door condition, (x (1) = 5.13, p < .05, Cramer’s V = .14). This demonstrates the
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lure of choice and offers evidence for H8U, the lure o f choice hypothesis but not H8U 
the Monty hypothesis, specifically for the choose-a-choice condition. Although 
identical in every other respect, being able to switch (and having to commit to) a 
particular option in the choose-a-door condition was not as attractive as retaining the 
option of choosing at a later point in the choose-a-choice condition.
The lure of choice in Study 8 can be seen as yet another violation of 
regularity (Shafir et al„ 1993; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Formally, the regularity 
condition states that the proportion of times A is chosen from {A or B or C} cannot 
exceed the proportion of times it is chosen from {A or B}. In the standard condition 
participants chose one from {K or L}, and in the choose-a-choice condition they 
chose one of {K or (L or M)}, where the inner parentheses denotes the second 
decision. When option M was added, more than twice as many people chose (L or 
M) than chose L in the standard condition. This occurred even though the value of L 
was reduced from a 2/3 chance of winning in the standard condition to a 3/8 chance 
in the choose-a-choice condition.
A possible explanation for this finding which is especially applicable to the 
Monty Hall, but also the three-spinner problems of Study 7, is that choosing the 
alternative that offers more choice allowed participants to ‘stay in the game’ longer. 
Once the final option is chosen, one has to face the reality of losing, and can no 
longer derive pleasure from anticipating what it would be like to win (Elster & 
Loewenstein, 1992). People might therefore prefer selecting an option in this 
situation because it allows them to enjoy the possibility of winning for longer. To 
illustrate, imagine a choice between a lottery ticket that is going to be played 
immediately, and one that will be played in a week. An expected value maximizer 
who discounts future outcomes would naturally take the immediate payoff ticket, but 
it is probable that most people will take the delayed one. Whether the “staying in the
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5.3. Studies 9a and 9b
These studies replicated a study which suggested a directly opposing thesis to 
the lure of choice (Brenner et al., 1999). In two studies they investigated the ways in 
which the comparisons that decision makers make between options as a result of 
their groupings affect behaviour. They argued that grouping items together 
encourages within-group comparisons of options rather than between-group 
comparisons, and when the options being compared have both meaningful 
advantages and disadvantages, comparative loss aversion weighs more heavily and 
such comparisons damage the attractiveness of grouped items. This argument is 
hereafter referred to as the “comparisons-hurt” explanation.
The results of Brenner et al’s (1999) second study in particular appear to be a 
direct contradiction of the lure of choice. A large number of students were asked to 
indicate their preferences in a number of decision problems (choices between 
restaurants, entrées, fast foods, videos, snacks, Saturday activities, drinks, gifts and 
desserts). Each problem consisted of four options, and each was presented in such a 
way that participants were asked to choose between a lone item and the remaining 
three grouped together. For example:
"Which o f the following do you prefer?
Seafood restaurant
Your choice o f either Italian, Mexican or Thai restaurant? ”
If the grouped options were selected, participants were not required to 
indicate their preference between the options of that group. Every decision problem
game” explanation is applicable to all examples of the lure o f choice is discussed in
the next chapter (Sections 6.4.6i-iii).
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was presented in four formats, with each option playing the part of the lone option 
once.
To measure the effect of grouping, Brenner et al. calculated the sum of the 
lone option choice share (the proportion of participants preferring the lone option) 
across the four formats for each decision problem. In other words, if all options were 
preferred equally, the sum of the four lone option choice shares should be: 25% + 
25% + 25% +25% = 100%. If one option was greatly preferred, the lone option sum 
might be: 55% + 15% + 15% + 15% = 100%. Regardless of the actual distribution of 
preferences for individual items, if the grouping of the options has no effect, the sum 
of the lone option share would be approximately 100% for each decision problem. If 
the lone option is preferred to the group, this sum would be greater than 100%. If the 
group is preferred to the lone option the sum would be less than 100%.
Across the nine problems, the average sum of lone option choice share was 
116%, significantly greater than 100% (z = 3.61, p  < .001). The authors argued that 
this was due to comparative loss aversion arising from the increased number of intra­
group comparisons for the grouped items compared with the lone item, which, at 
most, was compared to the “best” of the grouped items.
These results contrast the lure of choice. The lure of choice thesis would 
argue that the choice offered by the group is inherently attractive and would therefore 
predict that the sum of the lone option choice share to be less than 100%, indicating 
that individual options are more attractive when offered as part of a choice set than 
when offered in isolation.
To clarify this seeming contradiction, Brenner et al.’s (1999) study was 
replicated, with some modifications, in two exploratory studies, Study 9a and 9b. 
Study 9a had two conditions and used one of the decision problems used by Brenner 
et al. Condition 1 was a direct replication of Brenner et aL ’s paradigm -  the decision
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problem had four items, and hence each lone option was offered alongside a 
grouping of three items. This served as a control condition and a comparisons-hurt 
prediction would be a lone option sum of more than 100%, specifically, in the region 
of 125% - the results for this decision problem in the original paper. However, if the 
choice afforded by the grouping is attractive, and lures participants, the lone option 
sum will be less than 100%. Hence:
H9i (basic comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for control 
condition o f Study 9 a will be > 100%.
H9u (basic lure o f choice hypothesis): lone option sum for control condition 
o f Study 9a will be < 100%.
Condition 2 was designed to test explicitly the explanation that the intra­
group comparisons that occur in a grouping of items damage the attractiveness of 
those items. In Brenner et al.’s original work, these intra-group comparisons are 
assumed to occur, but here participants were required to make them directly. That is, 
before deciding between the lone item and the grouped items, participants were 
asked to compare directly the individual items within the grouping. If (assumed) 
comparisons hurt, then explicit comparisons should hurt even more, and the sum of 
the lone option share for this decision problem should be even greater than for the 
control condition 1. On the other hand, if the lure of choice effect operates, explicit 
comparisons before the decision should have no effect on the attractiveness of the 
grouped set, although the lure of choice would not make any specific predictions in 
respect of differences between the conditions in Study 9a.
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H9m (forced comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for forced- 
comparisons condition o f Study 9a will be > 100%, and greater than lone 
sum option for control condition o f Study 9a.
H9,v (forced-comparisons lure o f choice hypothesis): lone option sum for 
forced-comparisons condition o f Study 9a will be < 100%.
Study 9b was designed to investigate a different aspect of this work. One 
difference between the comparisons-hurt study and the early lure of choice studies is 
the number of options on offer. The lure of choice studies reported thus far have 
usually had a total of three options (one lone item and a pair of items), whereas 
Brenner et a l ’s study had four options (one lone option and a triplet of items). It 
may be the case, therefore, that the number of options in the grouped set is a critical 
difference. For this reason, Study 9b had two conditions, one with a choice set of 
three items (the standard lure of choice number -  one lone item and a choice pair) 
and one with five items (one lone item and a grouping of four items).
A weak comparisons-hurt prediction would not differentiate between the two 
conditions of Study 9b, but would simply predict a sum of the lone option choice 
share greater than 100% for both conditions. A strong comparisons-hurt prediction 
would be that as the number of items in a choice set increases, so too does the 
number of likely damaging intra-group comparisons, and hence the lone option 
would be even more favoured in these conditions. Following this reasoning, a 
decision problem with five options would have a sum of lone option share not only 
greater than 100%, but greater than one with three options.
H9V (weak comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for three-choice 
and five-choice conditions o f Study 9b will be > 100%.
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H9vi (strong comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for five-choice 
condition o f Study 9b will be > 100% and > lone option sum for five-choice 
condition o f Study 9b.
A weak lure of choice prediction would not suggest a difference between the 
five and three item decision problem in terms of the lone option share. It would 
expect that the attraction of the choice offered by both the two and four-item choice 
sets would damage the lone option share equally. Consequently, the sum of the lone 
option shares would be lower than 100% in both cases. A strong lure of choice 
hypothesis would state that as the number of options in a group increases, so does its 
attractiveness (up to an unspecified ceiling number of options where choice perhaps 
becomes less attractive or indeed off-putting). Hence the lone option sum for a 
problem set of five items would not only be less than 100%, it would also be 
substantially less than for a problem set with three items.
H9vli (weak lure o f choice hypothesis): lone option sum for three-choice and 
five-choice conditions o f Study 9b will be < 100%.
H9vm (strong lure o f choice hypothesis): lone option sum for five-choice 
condition o f Study 9b will be < 100% and < lone option sum for three-choice 
condition o f Study 9b.
The conditions of Study 9a and 9b and these predictions are summarised in 
Table 10. Study 9a used the four dessert choices used by Brenner et al. (1999): 
chocolate cake, icecream, cheesecake and fruit salad and Study 9b used the 
restaurant choices used by them (seafood, Mexican, Italian in the three-choice
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condition, with Thai and Indian added for the five choice-condition). These two 
decision problems were selected as being most applicable to a UK participant pool, 
as many items in the other decision problems would have been unfamiliar (e.g., Taco 
Bell, Jack in the Box, Butterfinger, Hershey’s Kisses and Gatorade). In addition, 
they were the conditions in the original study which had the greatest and third 
greatest lone option choice sum, hence being the most conservative way to test the 
lure of choice. Each participant answered two questions, one pertaining to restaurant 
choice and one relating to the choice of desserts. For roughly half the participants 
the dessert question was presented first, for the rest the restaurant question was 
presented first. In all, there were 16 versions of the experimental questionnaire (see
Appendix I for examples of 8 versions, covering all experimental presentations).
Study, condition and pre-test Lone Group Lone option share
forced comparisons option sum predictions
CH LoC
Study A: Condition 1, Control
- A (BCD)
•
B
C
(A CD) 
(ABD)
123-
125% <100%
- D (ABC)
Condition 2, Forced-comparisons 
Do you prefer B or C, C or D, B or D? A (BCD)
Do you prefer A or C, A or D, C or D? B (A CD)
>125% <100%Do you prefer A or B, B or D, A or D? C (ABD)
Do you prefer A or B, A or C, B or C? D (ABC)
Study B: Condition 1, three-choice
- A (BC)
- B (AC) ? 100% < 100%
- C (AB)
Condition 2, five-choice
- A (B C D E)
-
B
C
D
(A C D E) 
(A B D E) 
(A B C E)
»
100% «100%
- E (A B C D)
Table 10. Structure and conditions o f Studies 9a ¿ d 9b. with predicted outcomes ' 
a U ^ s T d ^  L° C = IUre °f  Ch0iCe' CH PrediC,i0nS based “  Brenner'e,
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Participants were 301 undergraduate students, not involved with any other 
study, who completed the task in class time (49% female, mean age 18.4 years).
5.3.1. Results and discussion o f Study 9a and 9b
The results for Study 9a and 9b are presented in Table 11.
Lone Choice Share Total
Study 9a (n = 299)
Cheese- Ice Choc Fruit
cake Cream Cake Salad
Control , q 
(n = 149)
Forced-
27 26 22 - 94
comparisons 13 
(n= 150)
28 30 25 - 96
Study 9b (n = 301)
Italian Mexican Thai Seafood Indian
Three-choice 
(n= 113) 38 
Five-choice 
in =188)
22
17
33
14 11 16
93
89
Tabk 11. Results for Studies 9a and 9b. Numbers represent percentage participants 
selecting each option when it was presented as lone option. Total refers to lone 
option sum for each condition across all presentation formats, expressed as a total 
percentage.
As can be seen, there was a consistent pattern across all conditions in both 
studies. The total lone option choice share was less than 100% in each condition in 
both studies. In Study 9a, the weighted mean lone share for the four decision formats 
for the control condition was 23.49, significantly lower than the expected 25%13 (t 
(148) = 5.72, p  < .001) and for the forced-comparisons condition the weighted mean 
lone option share was 24.00, lower than the expected 25%, but not significantly
13 As only one decision problem was used to test these hvnnthe«»« 
share sum, as used was Brenner et al. (1999) could not be calculatedthe” T re  Z  
mean lone option share across decision formats was c a l m l y  ,
25%. The expected lone option share should be 2^/! fc a I t o  C°mpared t0
items, regardless of the popularity o f  any individual item. ^  problem Wlth 4
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different (t (149) = -1.96, p = .052). This suggests that rather than being favoured 
when presented alone, as proposed by Brenner et al., an option that was presented 
alone was chosen less often than when it was presented with others in a group. This 
is contrary to the predictions of the comparisons-hurt explanation, H9t, supports H9iit 
the basic lure o f choice hypothesis, and provides weak evidence for H9iVi the forced- 
comparisons lure o f choice hypothesis. In terms of the relative size of the effects, 
there was very little evidence that forcing people to compare options before deciding 
had any effect on whether they selected the lone option or the grouping. After forced 
comparisons, there was a slight increase in the number of people selecting the lone 
option, but this was not sufficient to raise the lone option sum to 100% or above, 
therefore offering no support for H9iU (forced comparisons-hurt hypothesis), in 
which we would have expected a much stronger effect than in the control condition.
In Study 9b, the weighted mean lone option sum for the three presentation 
formats in the three-choice condition was 30.97%, significantly different to the 
33.33% that would be expected in a three-choice problem (t (112) = .3.70, p  < .001). 
For the five-choice condition, the weighted mean lone option share for the five 
presentation formats was 18.09%, significantly different from the expected 20% (t 
(187) = -3.65, p < .001). Once more, we have support for the lure of choice 
hypotheses, specifically H9vii, the weak lure o f choice hypothesis for these 
conditions, and H9» weak comparisons-hurt hypothesis can be rejected. In its strong 
form, the lure of choice predicted that choosing from a 4-item grouping would be 
more appealing, and therefore demonstrate a stronger lure effect, than a choosing 
from a 2 item set in Study 9b (H9viiit strong lure o f choice hypothesis). There is 
evidence to support this. There was a reduction in the lone share sum in the five- 
choice condition compared to the three-choice condition from 93 to 89. The
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In this case, the lure of choice predicted the results of Studies 9a and 9b better 
than the comparisons-hurt explanation. The important question is why these 
differences have occurred given that the studies reported here (in particular, the 
control condition of Study 9b) were close replications of the earlier study. One post 
hoc observation is that Brenner et al. (1999) used very large samples (n’s ranging 
from 105 to 251). In the case of the desserts problem set (the only condition where a 
direct comparison can be made), n = 251 and in the corresponding condition in the 
study reported here, n = 149. It seems unlikely, however, that a difference in the 
sample sizes was responsible for the difference in results (i.e. a complete reversal).
Another difference is that the comparisons of the lone option share in Brenner 
et al.’s study were made between 100% and the mean lone option share across nine 
decision problems. As an exploratory study, Studies 9a and 9b used one decision 
problem each. However, it is again unlikely that the difference in these results is 
caused by that factor -  all but one of the decision problems described by Brenner et 
al showed a lone option share of 100% or over, whereas all four conditions reported 
here demonstrated a lone option share of less than 100%. In other words, a 
consistent pattern was demonstrated in both experiments, and there is no real reason 
to believe that more or less examples in either experiment would have yielded 
different findings.
It is difficult to say whether subtle differences in wording may have caused 
the dramatic differences in the studies’ findings without precise details of the exact 
nature of the materials14, but this could be an important factor. Sood et al. (2004)
14 The authors were contacted to ask for further details and to discuss the 
comparative findings of the studies but no response was received.
comparisons-hurt hypothesis predicted the opposite effect (H 9 vi> s tr o n g  c o m p a r iso n s -
h u rt h yp o th esis ), and hence was rejected.
-1 2 7 -
suggested that the way a preference is elicited does have an effect on whether the 
group or lone option is preferred. In a follow up to Brenner et al. (1999), they 
suggested that preference for choice can depend on whether the elicitation question 
focuses on the group choice set (e.g. the stores available) or on the individual items 
within it (e.g. the individual brands of soda available at each store). Sood et al. 
differentiated between what they call direct and derived preferences. A choice such 
as this one between two restaurants offering different dishes15 evokes a direct 
comparison of restaurants, which “focus(es) on aspects of current choice alternatives 
that are not properties of any individual subsequent options” (i.e. the individual 
dishes on the menu). A direct preference elicitation is related to a group advantage, 
which is more likely when an option has a meaningful characterisation or coherent 
unit identity (as a type of restaurant). On the other hand, Brenner et al.’s studies 
required derived evaluations which “base evaluations of current alternatives on 
properties of the options available in subsequent choices” (Sood et al., page 17) 
which are more related to a group disadvantage.
The next study was related to this differentiation between direct and derived 
decision foci. In particular, one might speculate that participants’ interpretations of 
the subtle differences in the experimental materials had an impact on their behaviour. 
Brenner et al. (1999) told participants that the experimenters had “randomly grouped 
together three of the options in each problem” (page 227), whereas the instructions 
given to the participants in these studies included “Imagine you are planning an 
outing for tonight, and you can choose between the following restaurant options. 
Which would you prefer?” followed by the two choices (lone option and grouping). 
It is possible that there were subtle differences in the perceived consequences of
15 Or the lone-alternative effect reported by Kahn et al. (1987) and Glazer et al. 
(1991), discussed in Chapter 2.
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decisions made in the two studies, which could have been associated with differing 
psychological motivations of participants.
The Brenner et aL (1999) study may have engendered feelings that the 
preferences being asked for were context-free and wholly independent, one-off 
selections. This is especially likely as if a participant chose the grouping option, they 
were not asked which of the individual items they preferred and were asked a 
number of such questions in a row, without feedback. They perhaps therefore came 
to expect “quick-fire” questions with few consequences. On the other hand, the brief 
scenario that preceded the questions posed to participants in Studies 9a and 9b, 
which asked them to imagine that they were in a particular situation (choosing a meal 
or choosing a dessert) may have made some to believe that choosing the grouped set 
would have had later consequences (such as having at some point, to choose their 
favourite from among theses items).
It is possible to speculate post hoc that subtle difference in instructions 
engendered a different orientation in the participants, which could be classed as a 
more “active” orientation in the studies reported here, compared to the more 
“passive” orientation in the Brenner et al (1999) studies. If this is the case, an active 
or passive orientation may have caused different psychological mechanisms to be 
triggered, accounting for the different behavioural observations. This possibility has 
some support from existing research evidence and is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. For example, the work of Reeve et al. (2003) relating to self 
determination and choice discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.9.4) suggested that 
people are more likely to feel a sense of self-determination and greater intrinsic 
motivation in situations of action-choice than in those where less action is required. 
The final study reported here was designed to test the possibility that the
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active/passive distinction was the critical difference between the original study and 
this replication.
5.4. Study 10
In the light of the previous discussion, Brenner et al.’s (1999) explicitly 
random grouping of options is referred to as passive choice. However, in many of 
the conditions used in the previously reported studies, the situations in which the lure 
of choice was demonstrated could be described as active choice (participants were 
asked to imagine themselves in realistic situations, e.g. “which part of town to go to 
for a nightclub?” “which bank to visit?” and which table to play a game at?”) 
Furthermore, the only main difference between Studies 9a and 9b and the Brenner et 
al. study was a slight difference in wordings used to present the decision problems. 
The basic tenet behind Study 10 was that this difference changed the decision 
motivation from passive to active. A change in motivation may relate to a change in 
preference for choice. Study 10 replicates a number of the decision scenarios used 
by Brenner et al., presented in such a way that direct comparisons between passive 
and active choices could be made.
Study 10 had two conditions; the passive condition (participants were told 
that options were “randomly grouped” together, following the instructions used by 
Brenner et al. as closely as possible) and the active condition, which used brief 
scenarios to introduce each decision problem. Once more, each decision problem 
was presented in four formats, with each option playing the role of the lone option 
once.
HlOi (passive decision hypothesis): when the options are grouped randomly, 
the comparisons-hurt explanation predicts a lone option sum for the passive 
condition to be > 100%.
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HlOu (active decision hypothesis): when the options are described in terms o f 
a brief scenario, the lure o f choice explanation predicts a lone option sum for 
the active condition to be < 100%.
It is hypothesised that the comparisons-hurt explanation and the lure of 
choice explanation can work side by side because of the different intrinsic motivation 
of the participants, as determined by the experimental format. In the active 
condition, if people are more likely to imagine themselves actually making the 
decision for real, building on Reeve et al.’s (2003) argument, they are more likely to 
wish to operate with a greater level of self determination. Hence a course of action 
in which they are able to exercise further choice within the grouping would seem 
more attractive. In a situation where self determination is less salient (the passive 
condition), people are more likely to rely on internal cues to evaluate the options and 
therefore intra-group comparisons within the group would render the lone option 
more attractive.
In order that a more comprehensive test of the hypotheses could be made, 
each condition used four different decision problems, so that the mean lone option 
sum could be compared against the expected 100% sum (as in the original paper). 
As discussed before, not all nine original examples were relevant to a UK participant 
pool. The four selected were those considered most meaningful: restaurant: seafood, 
Mexican, Italian and Thai; main course: chicken, beef, fish and pasta; drink: fruit 
juice, tea, coffee and cola16; dessert: chocolate cake, ice cream, cheesecake and fruit 
salad.
16 Cola and coffee were substituted for Fruitopia and Gatorade in the original 
materials.
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Each participant was randomly allocated to either the passive or active 
condition and received four decisions (drink, restaurant, main course and dessert). 
Each option within the choice set played the role of lone option once and the order of 
the items in the grouping was rotated. For half the participants the lone option was 
presented first and for the other half the grouping was presented first. Table 12 
shows the items presented in each condition (see Appendix J for materials). 
Participants were 374 undergraduate students (55% female, mean age 18.8 years) 
who took part in class time and were not involved with any earlier experiments.
Version Lone option Group
Version 1 Fruit juice 
Seafood 
Chicken 
Chocolate cake
(Cola, coffee, tea) 
(Mexican, Italian, Thai) 
(Beef, fish, pasta)
(Ice-cream, cheesecake, fruit salad)
Version 3 Cola
Mexican
Beef
Ice-cream
(Coffee, tea, fruit juice)
(Italian, Thai, seafood)
(Fish, pasta, chicken) 
(Cheesecake, fruit salad, chocolate cake)
Version 5 Coffee
Italian
Fish
Cheesecake
(Tea, fruit juice, cola)
(Thai, seafood, Mexican)
(Pasta, chicken, beef)
(Fruit salad, chocolate cake, ice-cream)
Version 7 Tea 
Thai 
Pasta 
Fruit salad
(Fruit juice, cola, coffee) 
(Seafood, Mexican, Italian) 
(Chicken, beef, fish) 
(Chocolate cake, ice-cream, cheesecake)
active or passive condition, as determined by the instructions given to participants. 
For versions 1,3,5 and 7 of each condition the lone option was presented first, for 
corresponding versions 2 ,4 ,6  and 8 the grouped items were presented first.
5.4.1. Results and discussion o f Study 10
The lone option sums and the mean lone option sum for the four decision 
problems in each condition are shown in Table 13.
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Condition Lone option share Sum
Passive Fruit juice Cola Coffee Tea
choice 64 28 16 29 137
(N = 188) Seafood Mexican Italian Thai
11 22 60 20 112
Chicken Beef Fish Pasta
49 30 9 31 119
Choc cake Ice Cream Cheese cake Fruit Salad
45 28 31 24 128
Mean sum of lone option 124
Active Fruit juice Cola Coffee Tea
choice 37 15 15 19 86
(N= 186) Seafood Mexican Italian Thai
7 19 54 19 99
Chicken Beef Fish Pasta
39 28 6 30 103
Choc cake Ice Cream Cheesecake Fruit Salad
37 28 24 8 97
Mean sum of lone option 96
Table 13. Results for Study 10. Figures represent percentage of participants selecting 
each option when it was presented as the lone option.
It can be seen that, in line with Brenner et al.’s (1999) original findings, in the 
passive condition, an option was more attractive when it was presented as a lone 
option than when it was presented as a member of a three-item group. For all four 
decision problems, the sum the lone-sum option across the four decision formats 
(124%) was significantly greater than the 100% one would expect if presentation had 
no effect, (t (137) -  36.25, p  < .001). This is evidence for H10h the passive decision 
comparisons-hurt hypothesis.
To turn the active choice condition: as HI On, the active decision hypothesis 
predicted, when the options were described in terms of a brief scenario, the mean 
lone option sum for the active condition was less than 100% (96%). This was 
significantly different from 100% (t (,85) = -7.87, p  c.001). Furthermore, as one 
would expect, comparing the mean lone option sum across conditions, a significant
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difference was observed (F(i, 376) = 2509.07, p  < .001, r2 = 8.70), suggesting that the 
instructions given to participants had an effect on their behaviour.
These results offer evidence for the different possible psychological effects at 
work, depending on whether the decision is considered active or passive. However, 
the lone option sum for the active condition was close to 100%, and warrants further 
discussion. Of the four observations, three (restaurant, main course and dessert) 
were very close to 100% (99,103 and 97), and it was probably due to the lone option 
sum for the drink problem (86) that the overall mean lone option sum was 
significantly less than 100%.
However, with hindsight, there may have been possible ceiling and floor 
effects in operation. The options selected were predominately the same as those used 
by Brenner et a l, but in this sample, it appears that some of the options were 
universally unpopular (regardless of condition). For example, only 11% and 7% of 
participants selected the seafood option as the restaurant choice in the passive and 
active conditions respectively. On the other hand, the Italian restaurant was selected 
by 60% and 54% in the two conditions. Furthermore, when it came to selecting main 
courses, only 9% and 6% chose fish in the passive and active conditions respectively. 
Although the logic of the analysis suggests that underlying base rates should not 
fundamentally impact on the lone option sum (if an individual option is preferred by 
90% of participants per se, it should be preferred by 90% of participants whether 
presented as a lone option or within a group), it would have been preferable to have 
used options that had been pre-tested to have been roughly equivalent in 
attractiveness in a direct choice17. It appears that the young undergraduate
17 Equivalent comparisons cannot be made with Brenner et al.’s (1999) participants’ 
preferences as individual cell contents were not provided in the paper.
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population tested here did not care much for seafood and fruit salad, preferring 
chicken, pasta and chocolate cake.
This observation may be related work on the differential impact of single 
versus joint evaluation of options (Hsee & Leclerc, 1998). If options are already 
attractive in separate evaluation, then subjecting them to joint evaluations will hurt 
their attractiveness. If the focal options are unattractive in separate evaluation, 
subjecting to joint evaluation will enhance their attractiveness. However, it is 
difficult to say how much of an impact underlying preferences actually did have, as 
these options were not evaluated separately (other than in comparison with the 
grouped items).
Retrospectively, another important issue might account for the smaller lure of 
choice than expected. In the active condition, as described, a short scenario 
introduced each situation. Two observations can be made about this. First, the 
description was very brief, and could have been more effective at getting the 
participants to envisage themselves in such as situation (that is to get them to feel as 
close to making an “active” decision as possible). An alternative might have been to 
have either asked people to make real decisions (for example between small, fast- 
moving consumable goods) or to engage them in some real visualisation techniques.
Secondly, the order of the presentation of the items to participants was kept 
constant in order to be more logical to participants (they chose a restaurant, followed 
by main course, followed by dessert). This may have inadvertently led to some 
experimental artefacts. For example, by selecting a particular restaurant, say a 
seafood restaurant, you are limiting the range of options that it would make sense to 
select as a main course; you are unlikely to choose beef as main course having just 
selected a seafood restaurant. Likewise, fish is probably not considered a typical 
Mexican dish. Although this may have had some mild confounding effects, the
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options with which this would have had the most impact (seafood and Mexican 
restaurant) were the least popular and hence any follow-on effects would have been 
minimal.
Taken together, however, these two post hoc observations suggest the study 
provides a rather conservative test of the lure of choice, and therefore its modest 
demonstration in the active choice condition should be regarded as all the more 
convincing.
5.5. Summary and discussions o f Studies 8, 9a, 9b and JO
The studies reported in this chapter move beyond straight-forward 
demonstrations of the lure of choice in simplistic conditions, and show them in 
contexts which have been previously examined in detail by other researchers. In all 
cases, namely a version of the Monty Hall problem, and a replication of a previously 
published study by Brenner et al. (1999), the lure of choice occurred consistently and 
was demonstrated in every condition in which it was predicted (although the 
magnitude of the effect was not always predicted).
Study 8 demonstrated that the lure of choice is strong enough to overcome a 
well-documented resistance to switch the initially chosen option in a version of the 
Monty Hall problem. This study also demonstrated that the lure of choice is not 
restricted to hypothetical gambles or contrived scenarios.
The motivation for Studies 9a, 9b and 10 was a study previously published by 
Brenner and his colleagues (1999) which found results inconsistent with the lure of 
choice. Studies 9a and 9b constituted a short replication of the study, along with 
some particular manipulations that were designed to test aspects of the lure of choice 
explanation and the authors’ competing explanation, the comparisons-hurt 
hypothesis. In all cases, the lure of choice explanation had more support than its
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rival. A possible reason that reconciles the differences in such empirical studies was 
addressed explicitly in Study 10. There appears to be evidence to suggest that the 
lure of choice is more likely in decision situations which can be construed as active, 
compared with those which are more passive in nature. This active/passive 
distinction has been discussed in the literature on intrinsic motivation and self- 
determination (see Section 2.9.4) and may well have implications for much 
behavioural decision research on choice. This idea is discussed more fully and 
developed in the next chapter.
The next and final chapter draws together the various illustrations of the lure 
of choice reported in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, and demonstrates how these fit with 
existing related bodies of literature in order to answer the research questions posed at 
the start of the thesis. The chapter contains discussion of the possible psychological 
mechanisms the lie behind the lure of choice, including explanations that have been 
ruled out and those that appear promising and warrant further investigation. In 
particular, as first suggested in Chapter 4, the notion is put forward that the intrinsic 
motivation to follow choice-rich paths is determined, at least in part, by a decision 
heuristic that has developed over generations, because this strategy has proved 
developmentally and evolutionarily advantageous.
Chapter 6. Discussion and conclusions
“The strongest principle o f  growth lies in human choice,” George Eliot (1819 - 
1880).
6.1. Introduction
The main contributions of this work are expanded in this chapter. It is 
organised in the following way. After a brief introduction, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 
provide a summary of the studies reported in the previous three empirical chapters, in 
particular detailing the conditions under which the lure of choice was demonstrated 
and those in which it was not. Next, Section 6.4 revisits the research questions 
presented in Chapter 1, collecting together the relevant evidence applicable to each. 
The chapter then goes on to discuss a number of different possible causes of the lure 
of choice, drawing on both empirical work reported here and the research evidence 
from behavioural decision research, animal research and consumer decision making 
that was introduced and discussed in Chapter 2.
Through an evaluation of both new and existing evidence, two main 
arguments are developed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6: first, the lure of choice stems from 
an evolutionary advantageous decision heuristic that proved functional in the past, 
but that which in the world in which we live now, governed largely by marketers, is 
less beneficial and can in fact sometimes be detrimental to the decisions we make; 
second, there may be specific conditions under which behaviour based on this 
decision heuristic is observed.
Next, Section 6.6 discusses how, taken together, these two arguments can 
help explain some of the contradictions and controversies that exist in the decision 
making literature. In the light of this discussion, the implications of the work for
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marketing, business and policy are outlined in Section 6.7. Section 6.8 indicates how 
this approach could help inform a research agenda for the future and maps out a 
number of possible research avenues. Section 6.9 addresses methodological issues 
concerning the work, in particular outlining what has been learnt about the research 
process during the course of this work. Finally, Section 6.10 offers some concluding 
comments.
A primary aim was to investigate the impact of increased choice on human 
decision making, during the course of which, the lure of choice, a new context effect 
in the field of behavioural decision theory was identified (Bown et al., 2003). The 
idea that the options available might fundamentally alter the decisions people make 
is not new, but this particular phenomenon has not been demonstrated before.
The extensive empirical work amassed provides a coherent body of work that 
has developed logically, yet responsively with respect to developments in the field 
(notably Brenner et al., 1999; Hutchinson, 2005; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Sood et 
al., 2004). At a methodological level it has examined the influence of choice on 
decision behaviour using experimental designs not used before (particularly in the 
first seven studies). The value of the empirical work is twofold -  firstly, the results 
go a long way to answer the research questions posed at the start of the thesis and 
add to our understanding of choice in decision making, and secondly, the 
methodologies employed might be usefully applied in other areas of decision 
research.
The contribution at a theoretical level adds to our knowledge of human 
decision making and the proposed explanations for the lure of choice may also help 
reconcile some theoretical discrepancies between existing approaches in the field. 
Lastly, in practical terms the lure of choice has implications for other areas that 
require an understanding of human decision making, for example consumer decision
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making and marketing, and has the potential to contribute to business and social 
policy. Ultimately, this work can help guide the way future research is developed, 
and has already had an impact in the field (the first article published based on this 
research, Bown et al., 2003, has received 5 citations in published work. Source: 
Social Science Citation Index, December 2006).
6.2. Summary o f the studies
The goal of the first set of studies was to demonstrate whether the presence of 
choice had any effect on the decisions people made. Having demonstrated that it did, 
the focus then shifted to examine how and why it had the effect it did. Whilst 
addressing these questions, a number of different experimental approaches were used 
in ten studies, in various contexts with over 2,400 participants.
6.2.1. Initial demonstrations o f the lure o f choice
A set of exploratory phenomena-led studies in four two-stage gamble 
experiments examined people’s preferences for a sure thing at Stage 1 compared 
with their willingness to gamble to reach either one target option, or their choice of 
options at Stage 1 (target or lure). The studies demonstrated that when people were 
offered the chance to choose an option at Stage 2, they were much more likely to risk 
gambling at Stage 1 to reach that decision point. More importantly, people 
demonstrated these risk seeking preferences even when the additional choice option 
was worse than either the sure thing at Stage 1 or the gamble at Stage 2 common in 
both the choice and no choice experimental conditions. This increase in the 
likelihood of choosing a particular option when presented in a choice pair with an 
inferior option illustrates the lure of choice.
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6.2.2. The lure o f choice in relation to other context effects
The second set of studies developed this theme further. Results from the first 
set of studies suggested that the presence of an additional choice item fundamentally 
changed the preference for the other items available. These findings could have been 
attributable to the asymmetric dominance effect (Huber et al., 1982). Therefore the 
second set of studies investigated the relationship between the lure of choice and the 
asymmetric dominance effect. These studies employed a “floating lure design,” in 
three realistic, yet controllable scenarios, in which the lure option was paired with 
one of two equally preferred target alternatives in two conditions. In nearly every 
condition, it was found that participants preferred the target option that was paired 
with the lure and rarely chose the lure itself. This finding runs contrary to the 
asymmetric dominance effect explanation, which would have predicted a preference 
for the dominating target, regardless of which target the lure was paired with. The 
convincing results suggest that the main effect observed in this set of studies was the 
lure of choice rather than the asymmetric dominance effect. Whereas the asymmetric 
dominance effect is determined by the relationships between the various options in 
terms of their values on two descriptive dimensions, the lure of choice operates on 
the basis of specific pairings of options together in choice sets - the increased choice 
offered by the set is the alluring feature. The floating lure studies demonstrate that 
although related to context effects such as the asymmetric dominance and 
compromise effects, the lure of choice is an independently operating consequence of 
choice.
6.2.3. Following up the lure o f choice
The third set of studies developed the work in two ways. First, they 
demonstrated the lure of choice in domains very different to the preceding decision
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situations. Second, they develop the idea that the lure of choice is a result of a 
decision heuristic based on the principle that it is better to choose from a larger set of 
options than a smaller one.
In Study 8, a variant of the classic the Monty Hall problem, it was found that 
offering people the chance to switch from their initially selected door to their choice 
of one of the remaining doors was motivation enough for them to overcome the 
usually strong reluctance to switch after an initial commitment to a door.
Likewise, Studies 9a, 9b and Study 10 demonstrated the lure of choice in 
situations very different to earlier examples, demonstrating the far reaching breadth 
of the lure of choice. Study 10 tested the observation from the preceding studies and 
extant literature regarding the possible decisional implications of the differences 
between active and passive choice motivations. In this study the lure of choice 
occurred more frequently where there was an “active” orientation towards the 
decision than when the decision was more “passive”. Specifically, Study 10 tested 
whether the comparisons-hurt explanation of a lone item advantage (Brenner et al., 
1999) could be reconciled with the predictions of the lure of choice. In two identical 
decisions, which varied only in terms of the instructions given to participants there 
was a marked difference in the behaviour of respondents. Those who were asked 
simply to express a preference for a lone item or a randomly grouped set (a passive 
choice), showed a preference for the lone item, as predicted by the comparisons-hurt 
explanation. Those instructed to imagine themselves actively making the decisions 
showed much less of a preference for the lone item and favoured the grouped set, as 
predicted by the lure of choice.
This study gives an indication of one of the possible mechanisms behind the 
lure of choice. If the lure of choice is based on a decision heuristic that has 
developed because it is usually better to choose from a larger set than a smaller one,
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it makes sense that this effect is stronger in situations of active choice, since these are 
more closely related to the decisions faced in the real world. This proposition is 
discussed more fully in Section 6.5.
6.3. When and -where did the lure o f choice occur?
Appendix K provides a summary of all the thesis’ hypotheses and indicates 
which were accepted or rejected. There is clear evidence that the lure of choice is a 
robust effect. However, a more fine-grained review of results is required to reveal 
whether the effect was consistently strong in all contexts. This section addresses the 
question of exactly where the lure of choice was demonstrated in the current set of 
empirical studies, and where the effect did not occur, or was less strong.
The majority of lures in these studies were asymmetrically dominated by the 
relevant targets (L I, L2d, L3d, L4hc, L4Ic and L5: see Table 14 for key). A further 
three lures were conflicting with both targets (or target and sure thing), namely L2c, 
L3c and L6, and were also compromise lures (representing a mid point between 
Targeti and Target2). Lastly, L7c was conflicting with both targets, and L7d was 
symmetrically dominated (i.e. was dominated by both targets). The lure of choice 
was demonstrated with nearly all possible relationships between the lure and the 
target options. This demonstrates that the lure of choice operates under a range of 
conditions. However, it is also important to consider of the size of the effects
observed.
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Condition / Critical Effect size Selecting
manipulation statistics lure (%)
Two stage gamble studies
1 Dominated lure LI x \ l )  = 5.43, Cramer’s V = 5
p  < .05f .21*
2 Dominated lure L2d X2(D = 6.91, Cramer’s V = 0
p  < .01 .27*
2 Conflicted lure L2c X20 )  = 4.68, Cramer’s V = 9
p  < .05f .22*
3 Dominated lure L3d X2(l)=  13.06, Cramer’s V 4
< .001t = .37**
3 Conflicted lure L3c X2 (1) = 8.72, Cramer’s V = 25
P < -Olf .32**
4 High contrast L4hc X2 (1) = 4.85, Cramer’s V = 0
dominated lure p  < .05 .20*
4 Low contrast L41c X2 (1) = 6.28, Cramer’s V = 2
dominated lure P < -051 .23*
4 Three choice L4hc, X2 (1) = 2.71, - 0
condition (2 lures) L41c P =
Floating lure studies
5 Asymmetrically L5 v2 (1) = 4.42, Cramer’s V = 11A
dominated lure <.05t .18*
6 Conflicted lure L6 X2 (l) = 4.93, Cramer’s V = 15A
p  < .05f .24*
7 Symmetrically L7d X2 (l) = 1.56, - 3A
dominated lure p  = .46, n.s.f
7 Conflicted lure L7c !*ä N
)
.—
N II Cramer’s V = 17A
P < *oi t .24*
Follow up studies
8 Monty Hall - x2 (1) *  12.93, Cramer’s V = n.a.
choose-a-choice p  < .001 .24*
9a Control - t (148) = 5.72, • n.a.
/?<.001
9a Forced - t (149) = -1.96, - n.a.
comparisons p  = .052
9b Three choice - t (112) = .3.70, n.a.
/X .001
9b Five choice - t (187) = -3.65, - n.a.
p<.001
10 Active versus - F(l,376) = r2 = 8.70 n.a.
passive instructions 2509.07,
p  <.001
f  indicates third way analysis (excluding those selecting lure)
A indicates proportion across whole sample (both presentations in floating lure 
design)
* low to moderate effect size, ** moderate to substantial effect size (de Vaus, 2002)
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The top part of Table 14 describes of each of the lure conditions depicted in 
Studies 1 to 7. There were only two situations where the lure of choice did not 
occur: first, L7d, the only symmetrically dominated lure. This is perhaps surprising, 
as one would expect the asymmetric dominance effect to be less strong in a situation 
where one target is not clearly superior in relation to the lure, hence allowing the lure 
of choice to prevail. The second situation where the lure of choice did not occur was 
in the three-choice condition of Study 4, when two lures and the target were 
available. This may be because the presence of two dominated lures made their 
inferior relationship with target too transparent, and hence participants were less 
prone to the lure of choice.
Other than these two non significant results, Table 14 demonstrates the 
consistent nature of the lure of choice, which was significant in the other ten 
conditions. The effect sizes of the significant results were also remarkably similar 
across conditions, with relevant Cramer’s V ranging from .18 (small) to .37 
(moderate), with the majority being in the range .20 to .27 (low to moderate, 
according to de Vaus, 2002). There is little to suggest that in this set of studies that 
one particular type of lure has a stronger effect than another. Taken together, these 
results offer evidence that the lure of choice is a relatively modest, but consistent 
effect.
6.4. Research questions revisited
Another useful way of combining the findings from this range of 
experimental studies is to work through the research questions first presented in 
Chapter 1, organising and assessing the evidence relating to each one. In general, 
reflecting how this work has developed over time, the earlier studies address the first
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few research questions and later studies focus on the later ones. As some of the 
earlier research questions have already been addressed in the summary of results in 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3, the discussion of these has been kept brief.
6.4.1. Research question i: Does the presence o f choice lead people to act in a way 
they would not otherwise have done?
Overwhelming, according to the evidence from these studies, the answer to 
this fundamental research question is yes - choice was undoubtedly related to 
behaviour that was not demonstrated in the absence of choice. Specifically, in 
studies where it is possible to compare behaviour under choice conditions and those 
where people were not offered so much choice, there are clear differences in the 
options that people finally chose. In Studies 1, 2, 3 and 4 nearly all analyses which 
did not take into consideration those who selected the lure options (the third way 
analyses) indicated clear preference reversals between choice and no choice 
conditions. When people were offered no choice at Stage 2 they were far more likely 
to opt for a sure thing at Stage 1 than to gamble for a riskier option. When 
accompanied by a choice at Stage 2 however, their decisions at Stage 1 were far 
more likely to be to opt for the riskier gamble. Furthermore, in Study 8, the Monty 
Hall study, in a direct comparison people’s behaviour was markedly different when 
offered choice than when offered a restricted choice. Thus, the evidence from these 
studies clearly suggest that behaviour is affected by the presence or absence of an 
element of choice.
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6.4.2. Research question ii: Are people attracted to options that allow them the 
opportunity to choose from a number o f options?
Developing the simple answer for research question i, this question addresses 
specifically how people behave when offered choice. In all studies where significant 
differences occurred between conditions, they were always in a direction that reflects 
a preference for choice. Specifically, in the 2 Stage gambles of Studies 1-4, the 
preference reversals witnessed indicate that people were attracted to Stage 2 far more 
frequently when there were two options to choose from than when there was only 
one. In Studies 5-7, people were significantly more likely to choose a course of 
action (directing a taxi to a certain part of town, going to particular bank or choosing 
a table at which to play a game) when that particular route offered them further 
choice between options, as opposed to no choice. Study 8 also offered evidence to 
suggest that people were more willing to change a commitment when the alternative 
offered choice, but were not willing to do so when the alternative did not afford them 
future choice. Finally, in Studies 9a, 9b and 10, people generally preferred items 
when they were offered as a group than when they were offered as a lone item. 
Overall, the results from these studies demonstrate that people generally act in a way 
that clearly reflects an attraction to choice.
6.4.3. Research question iii: I f  people are attracted to choice, is the effect strong 
enough to lead them to make sub-optimal decisions?
Having concluded that under many circumstances people are attracted to 
choice, this question addresses whether the effect can result in poorer decisions than 
the ones they would have or could have made. There are two types of evidence from 
these studies that address this question. Firstly, in the initial set of studies, 
specifically Studies 3 and 4, people forewent a better sure thing (compared with the
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target and lure in terms of expected value) in order to pursue a course of action that 
offers them further choice between options. Although this comparison is based on 
objective superiority rather than subjective preferences, the fact that preference 
reversals were witnessed suggest that there had also been a revaluation (or possible 
masking) of subjective valuations. This was presumably caused by the additional 
choice, the only feature that differed between the conditions.
The second main piece of evidence to suggest that the lure of choice is strong 
enough to lead people to make poorer decisions is the number of people who actually 
chose the sub-optimal lures. As indicated in Table 14, this occurred in the conflicted 
lure condition of Study 3 (25% of participants in this condition selected the lure), the 
conflicted lure condition of Study 7 (17%), the conflicted lure condition of Study 6 
(15.00%) and to lesser extents in the conflicted lure condition of Study 2 (9%) and 
the asymmetrically dominated lure condition of Study 5 (11%). The majority of 
these occurred when the lure was in conflict with the relative target(s), and hence the 
tradeoffs required were more complex. This may reflect participants’ inability to 
make the required tradeoffs, but might also reflect those who had been lured by 
choice and once finding themselves having forgone their preferred option (either the 
sure thing or the targeti), they selected either at random or what they considered “the 
next best thing”.
Taken together, these two observations show some modest evidence that the 
presence of additional choice is related to a tendency to select suboptimal outcomes.
6.4.4. Research question iv: I f  people are attracted to choice, are there particular 
kinds o f choice that are more attractive than others?
The evidence relating to this research question is limited because the different 
choices available to participants in these studies were restricted. The main types of
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choices that were offered were between targets and either dominated or conflicted 
lures. Study 2 hypothesised that conflicted lures would demonstrate a stronger lure 
of choice than dominated lures because the relative superiority of the target was more 
obscure. Although conflicted lures were more likely to be selected than dominated 
lures (as discussed in relation to the previous research question), their presence was 
not related to a stronger preference reversal than dominated lures. Likewise, in 
Study 3 there was no significant difference between the conflicted and dominated 
lure conditions. These observations suggest that, in line with arguments developed 
in Chapters 4 and 5 (and revisited in Section 6.5 below), the lure of choice has less to 
do with the explicit relationships between the options on descriptive dimensions (or 
type of decision) and more to do with the availability of choice per se.
6.4.5. Research question v: I f  people are attracted to choice, is there a point at 
which too much choice is unattractive, and people are detractedfrom it?
Related to the previous question, a critical aspect of choice is the size of the 
choice set. Previous work with much larger choice sets (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000) described a choice-overload effect, i.e. too much choice was demotivating and 
Desmeules (2002) suggested an inverted U shape function for the relationship 
between the extent of choice and the positiveness of the experience. Early 
hypotheses in this thesis suggested that if increased choice is considered good then 
within reason, greater choice should be considered even better (see for example, the 
three choice condition of Study 4). Even though the increase in the number of 
choices was minimal (the choice set increased from two items to three), no lure of 
choice was demonstrated in the three choice condition (whereas it had been in the 
corresponding two choice conditions). However, it is important to note that in this 
condition, two of the choice set were (clearly inferior) dominated lures. Therefore,
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failure to observe the lure of choice was not necessarily related to too much choice 
being unattractive, but could have been because (as mentioned in Section 6.3) the 
inadequacy of the lures was more transparent (amplified by the fact there were two 
lures). If that was the case, the choice set may not have been considered to be a 
viable choice at all.
Study 9b addressed this question directly. Using options that were not 
inferior or superior to each other, it specifically investigated whether a choice set of 
two items was more likely to demonstrate the lure of choice than one which 
contained four items. It was predicted that items (restaurants) in a group of four 
would be preferred over items presented in a group of two. The larger grouping was 
preferred to the smaller one. To apply this finding to the research question at hand, if 
there is a point at which too much choice is unattractive to people, it was not found 
in these studies.
6.4.6. Research question vi: What are the possible underlying causes o f the lure o f 
choice?
After the initial demonstrations of the lure of choice, the early studies sought 
to clarify possible causes of the lure of choice. In particular, Study 4 manipulated 
decisions in such a way that if people were choosing as if they could have all the 
available options, it would be reflected in a stronger lure of choice effect. This was 
not the case, and therefore it was possible to rule out inappropriate summing of 
options as a possible cause for the lure of choice. Chapter 4 was devoted to testing 
whether the lure of choice is caused by the same mechanisms as the asymmetric 
dominance effect. The use of a floating lure design demonstrated that the lure of 
choice was predicted and demonstrated in conditions where an asymmetric
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dominance explanation would have predicted a different result. Hence, the 
asymmetric dominance effect was also mled out as a cause of the lure of choice.
A consideration of the cumulative results of all studies identify a number of 
possible factors, not necessarily mutually exclusive, which might lead to the lure of 
choice. This section addresses each in turn.
6.4.6.i. Deferring commitment and cognitive effort
First, the lure of choice may reflect a general desire to defer ultimate 
commitment for as long as possible. This may be related to the phenomenon 
previously discussed by Bastardi and Shafir (1998; Shafir et al., 1993) and 
introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6.4), in which people prefer to continue searching 
for information beyond the point where new information is valuable. For instance, to 
use one of Bastardi and Shafir’s examples, a student deciding whether to take a 
course might wait to find out whether the professor has a good or bad reputation, 
even when the knowledge is irrelevant to his or her decision. Bastardi and Shafir’s 
studies suggest that people often put off making a commitment until all possible 
information is available, even when the information is useless. Deferring a decision 
can have negative consequence, not least being the possibility that opportunities will 
be lost as time passes. Bastardi and Shafir (1998) suggested that people can often be 
drawn by new information into making choices that they otherwise would not, and 
should not, have made, for example, learning that a professor has a bad reputation 
may make a student not take a course that is vital to his or her degree. It appears 
from their work that people do not assess options thoroughly, and use the useless 
information that they seek to shape their preferences. The evidence from the 
decisions investigated in this thesis suggests that following a path that offers greater
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choice gives people another way to defer making a final and irrevocable 
commitment, albeit even for a short time18.
Deferring commitment also means deferring cognitive effort. It may be 
easier to choose an option that leads to a further decision than to give full 
consideration to all the options in advance. Payne et al. (1993) have emphasised the 
role of minimising the cognitive effort involved in decision making, and have argued 
that, all things being equal, an easier-to-implement procedure will usually be chosen 
over a more taxing one. One way to simplify decision making is to conduct only a 
superficial examination of available options, and choose based on a heuristic rule 
such as ‘it is better to choose from a larger than a smaller selection.’ For instance, an 
easy way to choose a cinema is to choose the one with the most screens, without 
bothering to consider what is actually showing on those screens. Such a mechanism 
may account for why a relatively high number of participants in Studies 2, 3, 5,6 and 
7 selected the lure item. This result suggests that people did not think through every 
option before making their decisions, but first made the very simple decision of 
choosing on the basis of the presence or absence of choice. Only after they have 
taken the choice path did they give in-depth examination to the options that were 
then available. This suggests that decision making can be driven by a preference for 
choice qua choice and not by the options on offer.
6.4.6. ii. Keeping options open
The lure of choice might reflect the desire to keep options open. Individuals 
may prefer a lager set of alternatives to a small one in order to retain as much
18 It does not eliminate all commitment, of course, since following a route to greater 
choice (in these experiments) did mean the loss of desirable outcomes that were not 
part of the choice set (the sure thing or targeti in Studies 1-7 or the lone option in 
Studies 9a, 9b and 10).
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flexibility as possible at the very moment of deciding (Billot & Thisse, 1999; 
Koopmans, 1964; Kreps, 1979; Peleg & Menahem, 1973; Strotz, 1955). This may of 
course be related to the first cause (deferring commitment and cognitive effort), but 
the similarity would depend on the person’s motivation. Deferring commitment is 
more related to gathering irrelevant information (the pursuit of useless information) 
whereas keeping options open may reflect an explicit (and possibly advantageous) 
decision strategy.
In many circumstances consumers are unsure about their future preferences 
(Kahn & Lehmann, 1991) and it makes sense to retain flexibility. However, in other 
situations this desire for flexibility is unfounded. Gilbert and Ebert (2002) found that 
people preferred changeable outcomes (those that they could either escape or 
reverse) to unchangeable outcomes, despite the fact that they were overall more 
satisfied with the latter. In their studies, photography students were asked to 
relinquish a photograph -  some could change their minds while others made 
unchangeable decisions. Participants did not expect the changeability of the 
selection to have any influence on their liking of the picture, but those that made 
unchangeable decisions were actually more satisfied and liked their prints more. 
Likewise, Botti and Iyengar (2004) found that consumers preferred to choose even 
when items were not desired and ended up less satisfied with the decision outcome 
than people who did not choose. This lack of self awareness in terms of personal 
preferences and anticipated satisfaction might explain why some people in these 
studies opted for the choice route (in order to keep options open) but ended up with a 
poorer option.
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6.4.6. iii. Prolonging the fun
Thirdly, in certain circumstances, the lure of choice might reflect a desire to 
stay “in the game” a little longer. In some of the studies presented here, particularly 
those that were introduced as games (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8) there might have 
been a motivation to prolong the “enjoyment” as long as possible. Chapter 4 
discusses the added utility that some people derive from a delay in resolving a 
decision problem or receiving a choice outcome (an obvious example being the 
anticipation of a weekly lottery over the immediate gratification of a scratch card). 
The pleasure from a (non-winning) weekly lottery ticket is eliminated once the 
numbers are drawn. The pleasure of anticipation and of exploring future possibilities 
is illustrated in other ways, such as the old adage that “it is better to travel in hope 
than to arrive.” Other examples include the preparations for major festivals such as 
Christmas (where many people enjoy the preparations only to find the actual event 
comparatively disappointing) or spending time considering and discussing options on 
restaurant menus. If the participants in these studies (predominately students taking 
part in class time) considered the experiments to be frivolous and fun, this 
explanation is a possibility.
6.4.6. iv. Self determination
As discussed in Section 2.9.5, there is a relationship between perceived 
choice and the subjective experience of being fully autonomous in one’s actions. 
According to the work of Reeve et al. (2003), Cordova and Lepper (1996) and 
Thomas and Oldfather (1997), the intrinsic motivation and appeal of self 
determination are related not simply to perceived choice of alternatives, but also to 
action choice rather than simple option choice. One way of interpreting this 
relationship is that that a decision that allows one to decide on a course of action for
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one’s self from a range of actions is likely to be more appealing than either a course 
of action with no element of self-determined choice, or a decision requiring passive 
judgments of options. This argument is developed further in Section 6.5 below.
6.5. The lure o f choice as a decision heuristic
The sections above discuss four different reasons why people’s motivation 
might be towards a choice-oriented route rather than one that offers no choice. There 
may be additional motivations, but these all point towards the strong possibility that 
in these situations people use the principle “it is better to choose from a larger set 
than a smaller one.” Put simply, the lure of choice results from the use of a decision 
heuristic.
Sections 2.6.3 and 4.7 discussed the emergent value explanation of the 
asymmetric dominance effect (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Wedell & Pettibone, 
1996), whereby people use heuristic-based evaluations of options to help them 
choose (such as basing judgments of an option on their domination of other options 
which makes them easier to justify). In the same way, choosing on the basis of an 
item’s ability to keep one’s options open could be seen as an emergent value which 
adds extra subjective value to that option. It is argued below that this preference for 
choice heuristic has arisen as part of our evolutionary heritage.
Our ancestors would have quickly learned that it is better to hunt in an area 
where there is a choice of prey (both in number and species) than in an area where 
there is little if any choice. Indeed, it is likely that they would not have had to learn 
at all — the research showing that animals prefer choice over no-choice paths 
introduced in Section 2.8 (Catania, 1975, 1980; Catania & Sagvolden, 1980; Ono, 
2000; Suzuki, 1999; Voss & Homzie, 1970), suggests that the preference for choice 
may be a fundamental part of our natural endowment. It is difficult to think of a
- 155-
natural environment in which there would be a zero, or even negative, correlation 
between choice and the value of the ultimate outcome. The evolutionary 
environment in which our preferences were developed would have rewarded 
following the lure of choice with an increased probability of survival and 
reproduction19.
However, we live in a world in which natural selection plays a less important 
role in our survival, or at least the issues around which natural selection operate may 
have changed. We will not perish if we choose an inferior brand of cereal from the 
supermarket. Many of the decisions we face as humans are relatively trivial, and yet 
it is quite possible that we use some of the same heuristics that proved successful in 
our species’ history. It will be the circumstances of the decision that determine 
whether the preference for choice heuristic is an inappropriate strategy or not. The 
problem occurs if people are not sensitive enough to the decision context.
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 some authors (Cordova & Lepper, 
1996; Reeve et al., 2003) have argued that an increase in simple option choice is not 
linked to increased intrinsic motivation, but action choice is (i.e. actually being able 
choose one’s behaviour). This links with the evolutionary advantage of choosing a 
path that leads to choice just noted. Increased options for behaviour rather than 
options per se, seem far more likely to be evolutionary advantageous. For example, 
simply having a number of escape routes available is not enough - you need to 
actually use that choice. Likewise, unless you are going to mate with a member of 
the opposite gender, there is little advantage in having a large lek available to you.
19 There is also some mixed evidence from the animal world. Hutchinson (2005) 
suggests that it if too much choice overwhelms and leads to worse item being 
selected, it could be adaptive to avoid choice and wait for an easier decision 
involving fewer options.
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The results of Study 10 show that people can be responsive to the context of a 
decision. When asked to simply evaluate options, grouping (specifically intra-group 
comparisons) damaged the value attached to those individual items. On the other 
hand, when asked to imagine acting on those groupings/lone option arrangements, 
people preferred the choice offered by the group. This suggests that in this case, 
people recognised that the group allowed them to keep their options as open as 
possible, presumably until the point at which they would have had to make a final 
decision.
However, in many circumstances the differences between option choice and 
action choice are subtle, and therefore may not influence our decision strategy 
appropriately. Keeping our options open is not necessarily the best strategy if it 
means that we forgo the single best option. It is possible to speculate that the 
advantages associated with action choice have “crept” into modem consumer culture, 
and we are now often attracted to choice per se. In other words, the lure of choice is 
a by-product of the over-generalisation and sometimes inappropriate use of a 
preference for choice heuristic.
The next section identifies how conceptualising the lure of choice as a by­
product of an evolutionarily-determined preference for choice heuristic can help 
reconcile some of the mixed findings in the literature regarding preference for choice 
outlined in Chapter 2.
6.6. The “choice is good/choice is bad” debate: Unravelling the paradox o f choice.
As noted in previous chapters, there is a wealth of contradictory evidence 
regarding the value attached to choice by humans, reflecting the fact that people 
seem to want choice at some levels, yet do not always know what to do with it. A
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number of observations drawn from the literature and based on the work presented 
here can help reconcile some of these contradictory findings.
Firstly, as introduced in Section 2.4, it is widely accepted that there is a 
fundamental difference between revealed and constructed preferences (Bettman et 
al., 1998; Fischhoff, 1991; Gregory et al., 1993; Slovic, 1995). The extent to which 
experimental tasks reflect or measure these different preferences is an important 
aspect of how their results should be interpreted. Chemev (2003b) showed that 
people are more likely to choose from a larger set when they have an articulated 
preference set (i.e. one that is readily retrievable or able to be revealed easily) than 
when they do not have a readily available articulated preference.
This point can be illustrated by reference to two studies whose contradicting 
findings influenced the investigation of the lure of choice. In the choice sets used by 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000), discussed in Section 2.9.2.i, the most popular jam 
flavours were screened out to avoid ceiling effects, hence it is possible that the lack 
of motivation to act that was observed was in part due to the fact that participants 
were required to choose from a choice set for which they did not have a readily 
available articulated preference set. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, 
Brenner et al.’s (1999) respondents were not primed to actually choose an individual 
item (if they selected the grouped set) and hence could have been less likely to use an 
articulated preference set for the options available. If Chemev’s (2003b) reasoning is 
correct, this could have been related to their preference for the lone option over the 
choice set.
There is also a parallel between Chemev’s finding and the active/passive 
decision distinction made in Section 6.5 above. When people are expecting to act (or 
at least make an active choice) rather than simply express a preference, it is possible 
they are more likely to have, or develop, an articulated preference between options.
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The articulated preference argument would also therefore predict a preference for 
choice from a larger choice set in an active context than in a passive context.
The second observation that could help in our understanding of seeming 
contradictions in the literature is that the choice process (even for apparently 
straightforward decisions) can be considered a multi-stage process20. As Chemev 
(2006) suggested, consumer decision making amongst assortments is guided by two 
potentially conflicting goals -  first, when choosing an assortment (called a direct 
evaluation in the terminology of Sood et al., 2004), the goal is to maximise decision 
flexibility and hedge bets against future uncertainty. Second, when choosing an 
option from a given assortment (a derived evaluation, Sood et al.), the goal is to 
simplify the decision process and select the best available option. Potential 
confusion can arise between the two different stages, and an over-emphasis on the 
former could lead people to be myopic, focussing too much on immediate direct 
comparisons rather on the later derived evaluations (Sood et al., 2004; see also Hsee, 
Yu, Zhang and Zhang, 2002; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). A failure to successfully 
make the transition from the first stage to the second could account for the choice- 
overload effect (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) whereby the initial tendency towards a 
preference for choice is followed by a demotivation to act on it (see Section 2.9.2.i).
This notion of myopic maximization (Hsee et al., 2002) is also in line with 
the suggestion presented here that the lure of choice has developed as a decision 
heuristic. Blindly following a “choice is better than no choice” heuristic corresponds 
to first-stage short sightedness, and the inadvertent consequences might be an 
outcome that is not what would have been received by opting for the individual item
20 c.f. Huber & Puto’s (1983) multi-stage account of combined context effects, 
Section 2.5.6.
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that most meets one’s needs, achieved by a second-stage comparison and evaluation 
of all options.
The empirical results described in Section 6.5.3 illustrate the dysfunctional 
outcomes associated with following a preference for choice decision rule. For 
example, in Study 7 (the Spinner game), people were attracted in the direction of 
choice even though it was made explicit that only one option was allowed, and the 
possibility of changing one’s mind was not available because the one-off decision 
was finite. This suggests that the lure of choice, as a behavioural heuristic, might be 
used in situations in which it is not the most appropriate strategy.
It is proposed above that the preference for choice heuristic developed 
(perhaps subconsciously) to give us a competitive advantage over our natural rivals 
and became part of our basic human endowment. It is possible that we are now 
starting to recognise (at some level) that this heuristic has crept into many aspects of 
our lives, sometimes inappropriately, and that in the most extreme form, it no longer 
meets our requirements, hence the paradox of choice has emerged. Of course, the 
illustrations of the lure of choice presented here are some way from a situation where 
craving choice might make a person ill, as suggested by some (Schwartz, 2004), but 
if taken to an extreme the behaviour and outcomes it predicts could be uncomfortable 
(not least achieving suboptimal outcomes). The next section considers some more 
implications of the lure of choice in contemporary life.
6.7. Implications o f the lure o f choice
This section addresses research question vii: “If people are attracted to 
choice, what are the implications of this?” There are many situations in which we 
face decisions between choice sets that have been created for us by others who are 
far-from-disinterested. To name but a few, there are the movies at a cinema
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multiplex, the groceries in a supermarket and the dishes on a restaurant menu. There 
is a clear trend in marketing to increase the number and variety of goods on offer 
(Kahn & McAlister, 1997). Often, this is at a cost to the consumer in the form of 
greater distances to travel, increased search costs and possibly higher prices. 
Moreover, in almost all categories relatively few goods take the greatest share of the 
sales, and the goods are often indistinguishable. The needs of most consumers, 
therefore, could be met by offering much less choice than there is. Yet the inherent 
attractiveness of choice, even when it is disconnected from any ultimate benefits, 
leads retailers to offer it and consumers to be lured to it. Below are three 
contemporary examples in different domains where the lure of choice appears to 
have direct relevance.
6.7.1. Health provision
The topic of health provision, especially in the UK, is currently an important 
social and political topic. “Choose and book” is a government initiative which is 
ostensibly designed to offer the patient greater control over their own treatment, but 
which has received extremely mixed reactions from health professional and patients 
(Bate & Robert, 2005; Lewis, 2005). Choose and book is the process whereby a 
patient visiting a general practitioner (GP), selects the location of their specialist 
treatment there and then. Bryant, Bown, Bekker & House (under review) argue that 
the lure of choice might operate under these circumstances. Consider, for example, a 
person visiting a GP for chronic back pain. There are two main treatments available: 
either pain management, drug therapy and monitoring by GP, or corrective surgery 
(both with associated costs and risks). If the surgery is available at a number of 
hospitals, and the choose and book system is in operation, the decision might be 
presented in a format very similar to the experimental context used here that resulted
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in the lure of choice. That is, if the decision presented is either drug therapy at your 
GPs or surgery at your choice of hospital, the lure of choice might make the second 
route more attractive to patients, possibly leading them to a course of treatment that 
is actually less suitable or desirable to them (i.e. surgery). Furthermore, it may not 
only be the patients who demonstrate the lure of choice effect -  doctors, in their 
recommendations or advice may not be immune to its influence. Of course other 
decisional effects (such as framing effects) might also operate in this specific 
domain, but the lure of choice is an undesired consequence that ought to be 
considered.
6.7.2. Eating habits
Another high profile topic in the UK at the moment is the issue of healthy 
eating, particularly in our schools. In a highly publicised campaign, chef Jamie 
Oliver has spear-headed an effort to improve the quality of food served in UK 
schools. On the whole this has received support from government and most parents. 
However, according to the media, many children and some parents have been 
resistant to the changes introduced, with drops in the numbers o f students taking 
school meals (Iggluden, 2006). In extreme cases some mothers from Rotherham 
have been supplying fast food through the school railings at lunchtimes (Stokes, 
2006). Research on the lure of choice suggests ways of making the transition to the 
healthy menu easier. It could be argued that if students first had to choose between a 
single item of food from the “old style” menu and their choice of a number of 
healthier items, the lure of choice would work in favour of the healthier options. 
This measure on its own would be a high risk strategy. Although fairly robust, it is 
unlikely that the lure of choice alone is strong enough to overcome the attraction of
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“turkey twizzlers,” but could perhaps be used in conjunction with a number of other 
approaches.
One could also apply the principles of the lure of choice to our own personal 
eating habits. If one has a weakness for chocolate, all good intentions aside, we 
know that for immediate decisions we are likely to choose the vice over the virtue 
(Read et al., 1999; Read & van Leeuwen, 1998). However, rather than thinking of a 
snack as a choice between a Mars bar and an apple, if we can reconceptualise the 
choice as one between the Mars bar and our choice from a fruit bowl overflowing 
with a variety of different options, the lure of choice suggests that a healthy item 
would stand a better chance of being selected than if it was presented alone.
6.7.3. Insurance purchasing
There is evidence that offering goods as choices (rather than straight forward 
decisions) means that people are more likely to buy them. In a series of studies,' 
Szrek and Baron (in press) have found that people are more willing to buy an 
insurance policy (health, home, travel etc.) when it is presented to them as a choice 
between policy A or an inferior policy B, rather than as a decision (“whether or not 
to buy policy A”). Furthermore, these authors found that people were willing to pay 
more for the same policy when they had chosen it for themselves from a small set of 
options than when it was the only option available. This increased willingness to 
adopt an insurance plan when perceived as a choice rather than as a decision has 
implications for how health and retirement policies that might be offered by 
employers to their staff (Szrek & Baron, 2006).
This example of the marketing implications of the lure of choice is in a 
specific domain, but the same principle could be applied to any marketing context. 
These three examples have shown how the presence or absence of choice, or how a
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range of options is presented, might have an impact on our everyday lives. These 
observations can be important to both those offering goods (the marketers and 
retailers) and those making the decisions (us, the consumers).
6.8. Future directions
The studies presented here provide evidence of a new, robust decision effect. 
However, they should be considered as the foundation for a sustained programme of 
future research rather than a fait accompli. Whilst taken together they provide a 
basis for the conclusions drawn regarding the lure of choice being a by-product of a 
previously unrecognized preference for choice decision heuristic, there are a number 
of other lines of enquiry that would elucidate the causes and mechanism of lure of 
choice more clearly. This section outlines three possible studies that build on the 
existing work; a psychometric study that investigates the subtle relationships 
between lures and targets that may or may not result in the lure of choice, a study 
that differentiates the possible explanations for the lure of choice and a study that 
explicitly investigates the notion that the lure of choice is a decision heuristic.
As discussed in Section 6.3 above, an important question that needs to be 
addressed is under exactly what conditions does the lure appear, and when does it 
not? The discussion of Studies 1-7 earlier in this chapter, supported by Figure 16 
and Table 14, suggest that the lure of choice effect is fairly consistent. However, this 
issue would benefit from further clarification. The explicit purpose of Studies 1-7 
was to demonstrate the effect per se and test other possible explanations for it, not to 
compare the sizes of lure effects with different relationships on descriptive 
dimensions. For this reason, the exact value of targets and sure things and lure was 
not controlled across studies.
- 164-
When the whole range of studies (1-10) is considered, we see that the lure of 
choice was demonstrated in Study 8 (Monty Hall) and Studies 9a, 9b and 10 
(involving choices of foodstuffs), which did not use two dimensional descriptions of 
the options at all. The decisions in later studies were between unitary items (a simple 
global description, not described in terms of values on varying dimensions) rather 
than multi-dimensional ones (described in terms of values on at least two 
dimensions). When options are described fully on two dimensions, their dominance 
or relative superiority should be more transparent than unitary ones, and one might 
speculate that the value (positive or negative) of being part of a choice set would be 
relatively easy to integrate into the subjective evaluations of options. Selections 
made from a range of unitary items rely more heavily on participants’ preferences 
and background knowledge of options, and the lure of choice operates alongside, or 
over and above, such subjective preferences. Although it is argued that the lure of 
choice is less to do with the relative values on such dimensions, and more to do with 
simple choice per se, it is still important to compare preference for choice with 
unitary items versus multi-dimensional options, which would involve a systematic 
parametric investigation of items that vary on least two dimensions (i.e. multi­
attribute).
In the early studies presented here, there were no examples of symmetrically 
dominating and asymmetrically dominating lures and a preponderance of 
asymmetrically dominated lures, with a couple of examples of compromise lures, one 
symmetrically dominated lure and one compromise lure. A systematic investigation 
of the full range of multi-attribute lures would contribute to our understanding of the 
relationship between the lure of choice and other context effects such as the 
asymmetric dominance effect and compromise effect.
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Another interesting avenue to explore would be the extent to which multi­
attribute descriptions (such as those used in the early studies) as opposed to unitary 
descriptions (as used in the later studies) help or hinder the lure of choice. Indeed, it 
may be that the nature of the lure of choice that was demonstrated in these types of 
cases was qualitatively different, with different underlying mechanisms. It could be 
that the former is more akin to a context effect (that has been distilled from an 
original evolutionary advantageous heuristic) and the latter is a more direct 
illustration of this decision heuristic. These possible differences could be teased out 
experimentally, utilising the floating lure design that would compare the 
multidimensional lures described above with equivalent unitary lures to investigate 
more fully the extent to which the lure of choice is caused by dimensional 
relationships or choice per se. Further details of a potential such study are described 
in Appendix L.
The second possible follow up study addresses a number of remaining issues. 
Firstly, is the lure of choice stronger when there are more choices? Evidence 
reviewed in Section 6.4.5 indicate that there was little difference between choice sets 
with two, three of four items. However, this range is quite small compared to the 
range of choice we face as consumers (as illustrated in the examples in Chapter 1), 
and as investigated in previous research (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Jacoby et al., 
1974). A further systematic experiment would resolve this. Using a floating lure 
design, a no choice option could be compared with a number of conditions with 
larger ranges of options (perhaps 2, 6 and 10 options). Although it is possible (and 
perhaps likely) that the marginal impact of adding items to a choice set decreases 
(the biggest impact occurs when moving from 1 to 2 options, the next biggest with 
the move to 3 options, and so on) it is still important to conduct this kind of
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In addition, this study would be able to differentiate possible explanations of 
lure of choice. The preference for choice heuristic explanation for the lure of choice 
should differentiate between conditions on the basis of the number of options. The 
heuristic “it is better to choose from a larger than a smaller array” would predict a 
stronger lure of choice when the target is in a choice set of 6 or 10 items than in a 
choice set of 2 items. However, the “staying in the game” “prolonging the fun” and 
“deferring commitment” explanations (Sections 6.4.6.i-iii) should not differentiate 
between the conditions.
The third proposed future study would be somewhat exploratory, and 
addresses the possibility that the lure of choice is governed by a subconsciously 
applied decision heuristic. In line with other dual process theories (see Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999, for a review) that distinguish between “intuition” and “reason” in 
human thinking, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) identified two sets of cognitive 
operations that underlie human judgement: System 1 and System 2. System 1 
processes are quick, associative and heuristic and System 2 are slow, deliberate and 
rule governed. The authors proposed that the two systems interact in the following 
way: faced with a judgement problem, System 1 quickly proposes an intuitive 
answer. System 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, 
correct or override. If intervention by System 2 is minimal, and the judgement 
represents the initial proposal, it is described as an intuitive judgement. The two 
Systems operate concurrently and compete for the control of overt responses. The 
extent to which the two processes are involved in determining judgements depends 
on a number of factors such as time available (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & 
Johnson, 2000); respondents’ mood (Bless, Schwarz & Kemmelmeier, 1996; Isen,
exhaustive evaluation in order to extend our understanding o f  the parameters o f the
lure o f choice.
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Nygren & Ashby, 1988) intelligence (Stanovich & West, 1998) and exposure to 
statistical thinking (Agnoli, 1991; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & 
Kunda, 1983).
Controlled thinking (processing of abstract concepts) that governs the 
performance of unfamiliar tasks can, and sometimes should, over-ride otherwise 
intuitive operations, as this is how biases caused by heuristics are usually avoided. If 
the lure of choice is caused by a (largely unconscious) heuristic, we would describe it 
as a System 1 operation. If that is the case, we could therefore expect that under 
some circumstances, deliberate, effortful System 2 operations (careful consideration 
of all options to select the best) overcome a decision to simply select choice when it 
does not lead to the subjectively preferred outcome. Furthermore, we could predict 
that under conditions of time pressure or cognitive load, the ability of System 2 
operations will be reduced, and we would witness more acceptance of the initial 
System 1-induced preference for choice. The extent to which the lure of choice 
increases or decreases with time pressure or additional cognitive load could be 
interpreted as the extent to which it is an unconscious decision heuristic.21
This section has introduced three examples of how work on the lure of choice 
could be continued in order to develop the main themes emerging from the 
theoretical discussion of its causes and consequences.
6.9. Methodological reflections
No experimental investigation is without limitations, this is the trade-off that 
one accepts in order to maintain a high degree of control over manipulations
21 We should also be aware, however, that the use of any heuristic can be a deliberate 
action (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Such a strategy 
could be retrievable by asking people to explain their choices.
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One of the main criticisms of this type of research is the use of student 
participants rather than representative samples from the general public. Given the 
large number of participants required for this series of studies (over 2,000 people in 
total) the use of students was to some extent unavoidable. However, in Studies 5 and 
6 (the nightclub and bank floating lure studies) the participants were members of the 
general public. A similar pattern of findings were observed with both samples. 
Hence, the use of a student population as a representative sub-section of the general 
public can be considered justifiable. Related to this point, it should be noted that the 
vast majority of the undergraduates and the general public who took in these studies 
were British. As discussed in Section 2.9.3, there may be some fundamental 
differences between attitudes to choice in Western and Eastern cultures, and the 
results and conclusions of this thesis should be interpreted with this in mind.
A concern regarding all participants’ involvement with this kind of 
experiment which may have had an impact on the results and their interpretation 
involves people’s motivation to take part. As discussed in Section 6.4.6, a 
motivation for behaving or choosing in a particular way might be to “stay in the 
game” or “prolong the fun”. This of course is an acceptable motivation if it reflects 
how people view similar decisions in the real world. However, some of the real 
world decisions which were modelled by these experiments (choosing a meal, 
deciding on a bank and so on) would be far less likely to be treated as a game if acted 
out for real. If some participants saw the exercise as a “game”, with few real 
consequences (other than delaying the start of a class by a few moments) they may 
have been operating with a different kind of motivation than they would under other 
circumstances. In the worst case scenario, there is a chance that some participants,
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003). This section addresses possible
methodological concerns and indicates how these were resolved.
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motivated to “stay in the game”, may have opted for a route leading to choice rather 
than sure thing or a decision that ended the game immediately, thus biasing the 
results in a particular direction. Although this is speculative (and it is also possible 
that there were a number of participants who wanted to end the experience as quickly 
as possible by choosing the lone item), such subtle differences in motivation would 
be an important factor to investigate in future research, perhaps by using real 
decisions with actual consequences. Although not wrong, the motivation “to stay in 
the game” is different to “deferring cognitive effort.” This demonstrates one of the 
potential drawbacks associated with asking hypothetical questions in experiments.
This issue is also related to the drawbacks associated with the use of 
scenarios in experimental research. While it is critical to try to be as realistic as 
possible when modeling the kinds of decisions made in the real world, this work was 
also designed to achieve a balance of gambles (with controllable payoff and 
probabilities), options that were unitary (not described along evaluative dimensions) 
and realistic scenarios. The interpretation of results using this range of approaches is 
consistent.
Finally, this section summarises what had been learnt about the research 
process. As a piece of developmental work, especially one that has been conducted 
over a period of time, it has become clear that is critical to have a clear focus for each 
stage in the research process (in this case for each set of studies), yet at the same time 
to be responsive to both developments in the field and unpredicted results (for 
example, the initial failure to replicate Brenner et al., 1999). In particular, a number 
of important and relevant publications emerged in the field during the course of this 
work, which ultimately guided and informed the design of later studies, interpretation 
of results and conclusions (notably Brenner et al., 1999; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; 
Schwartz, 2004). Furthermore, it is also critical to keep an eye on the “bigger
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picture,” in terms of what the research findings contribute to both our academic and 
theoretical knowledge, but also what it says about the world in which we live.
6.10. Concluding comments
This thesis started by discussing behavioural decision theory as a relatively 
young discipline but one that has developed exponentially in recent years. This 
popularity is no doubt due in large part to BDT’s ability to address numerous issues 
of relevance to almost every aspect of our lives. This thesis was conducted to 
participate in that contribution. Initially inspired by the apparent burgeoning of 
choice faced by the consumer, the aim of the programme of research was to better 
understand how humans react when faced with increased choice. Early in the 
process, a new decision effect, the lure of choice, was demonstrated and the 
remainder of the experimental work revolved around investigating this further.
At an empirical level, this work has contributed a corpus of rigorously 
conducted experiments using a range of methodologies and materials with a large 
number of participants. The majority of these demonstrate the lure of choice, 
indicting that it is a moderate and robust effect. Given that even in the most carefully 
designed and controlled decision experiments a number of different processes might 
be operating, being able to demonstrate a consistent, predictable effect in a range of 
contexts is satisfying.
At a theoretical level, the lure of choice was distinguished from other context 
effects such as the asymmetric dominance effect. Further experiments and 
discussion have contributed the theoretical proposition that the lure of choice is a 
demonstration of a generalised decision heuristic that leads people to favour choice 
over no choice. Whilst this was evolutionarily advantageous to our ancestors, in a 
consumer-oriented world, an over-reliance on it can be inappropriate and even
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dysfunctional. These specific theoretical arguments contribute to our understanding 
of some of the contradictions observed in the behavioural and consumer decision 
making literature.
In addition to these empirical and theoretical contributions, this work has 
made some specific comments about the possible practical implications of a 
(sometimes misguided) preference for choice. In particular, it has outlined how an 
understanding of the lure of choice could have possible uses in marketing, not only 
of consumer good, but also of lifestyle and policy decisions. As a behavioural effect, 
the lure of choice would appear to be making the transition from evolutionarily 
advantageous decision strategy to marketer’s tool, capable of influencing the 
decisions of consumers. The better our understanding of the effect, the more 
effectively we can address this issue.
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Appendix A - Materials for Study 1.
Appendix Ai: Study 1 -  No-choice condition.
A Strategic Dilemma for Cups ‘n’ Sups
Imagine that you own a small company, Cups ‘n’ Sups (employing 7 full-time 
members of staff), which organises hospitality facilities for conferences and concerts 
(e.g. bar and catering facilities). Every August for the past 8 years you have provided 
services at a local pop outdoor concert, Kirkbridge Festival, a relatively small, but 
popular and enjoyable event. The organisers of next year’s festival have offered you 
a guaranteed payment of £20,000 (after costs) and have asked for a firm commitment 
now (with a penalty clause if you pull out after agreeing to provide your services).
However, you are also aware of a call for tenders for a number of hospitality 
providers at next year’s V2000 pop at Temple Newsam Park, Leeds, planned for 
exactly the same weekend next August as Kirkbridge Festival. The call for tenders is 
a two-stage process.
The first round is a general call for tenders from companies for either concert. In 
previous years, 80% of applicants fail to get through this round and only 20% are 
selected to go through to the second round.
In the second round, successful applicants bid for the two concert venue. In 
previous years, 75% of applicants for Temple Newsam were selected; you forecast 
that by working at this site Cups ‘n’ Sups would stand to make £150,000 profit.
The timing of these events and the deadlines for acceptance and tenders means 
that you need to decide now which course of action to pursue. In other words, you 
face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
PTO.
204
Choose between:
A) The Kirkbridge Festival:
with a sure payment of £20,000.
B) The V2000 First Round tender with:
80% chance of being rejected and earning nothing 
20% chance of going through to Round 2.
Stage 1:
Stage 2. If you get to Round 2, you will have:
C) 75% chance of being accepted and earning £ 150,000
25% chance of being rejected and earning nothing
As the owner of Cups ‘n’ Sups, what decision will you make now at Stage I?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Are you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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A Strategic Dilemma for Cups ‘n’ Sups
Imagine that you own a small company, Cups ‘n’ Sups (employing 7 full-time 
members of staff), which organises hospitality facilities for conferences and concerts 
(e.g. bar and catering facilities). Every August for the past 8 years you have provided 
services at a local pop outdoor concert, Kirkbridge Festival, a relatively small, but 
popular and enjoyable event. The organisers of next year’s festival have offered you 
a guaranteed payment of £20,000 (after costs) and have asked for a firm commitment 
now (with a penalty clause if you pull out after agreeing to provide your services).
However, you are also aware of a call for tenders for a number of hospitality 
providers at next year’s V2000 pop concerts. As in previous years, this is a 
simultaneous two-site event (Chelmsford and Temple Newsam Park, Leeds), planned 
for exactly the same weekend next August as Kirkbridge Festival. The call for 
tenders is a two-stage process.
The first round is a general call for tenders from companies for either concert. In 
previous years, 80% of applicants fail to get through this round and only 20% are 
selected to go through to the second round.
In the second round, successful applicants bid for one of the two concert 
venues. In previous years, 75% of applicants for Temple Newsam were selected; you 
forecast that by working at this site Cups ‘n’ Sups would stand to make £ 150,000 
profit. In previous years, 75% of applicants for Chelmsford were selected; you 
forecast that by working there, Cups ‘n’ Sups would stand to make £50,000 profit.
The timing of these events and the deadlines for acceptance and tenders means 
that you need to decide now which course of action to pursue. In other words, you 
face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Appendix Aii: Study 1 -  Choice condition.
PTO.
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Choose between:
A) The Kirkbridge Festival:
with a sure payment of £20,000 (no further decisions need be made).
B) The V2000 First Round tender with:
80% chance of being rejected and earning nothing 
20% chance of going through to Round 2.
Stage 1;
Stage 2. If you get to Round 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) Temple Newsam tender
75% chance of being accepted and earning £150,000 
25% chance of being rejected and earning nothing
D) Chelmsford tender
75% chance of being accepted and earning £50,000 
25% chance of being rejected and earning nothing.
As the owner of Cups ‘n’ Sups, what decision will you make now at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Please do not turn over until you are instructed to do so.
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Assume that you got through to Round 2. 
Round 2
Choose between:
C) Temple Newsam tender
75% chance of being accepted and earning £150,000 
25% chance of being rejected and earning nothing
D) Chelmsford tender
75% chance of being accepted and earning £50,000 
25% chance of being rejected and earning nothing.
Which option would you select at Round 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
Are you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
208
Appendix B - Materials Study 2.
Appendix Bi: Study 2 -  No-choice condition.
The “Two-Stage” Game
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money. 
At the first stage you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a 
chance to move on to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. 
First examine both stages, then indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £20 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
If you get to Stage 2, you will have:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Are you: male / female
Age:
T hank y o u  for you r participation .
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The “Two-Stage” Game 
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between two pairs of gambles.
You face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £20 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
If you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £50 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Appendix Bii: M aterials Study 2 -  dominated-condition.
Please circle your answer: A /B
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Please do not turn over until you are instructed to do so. 
Assume that you got through to Stage 2.
Stage 2:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £50 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
Are you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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The “Two-Stage” Game
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between two pairs of gambles.
You face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £20 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
If you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75 % chance of winning £ 150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 90% chance of winning £50 
10% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage I?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Appendix Biii: M aterials Study 2 -  conflicted-condition.
Please do not turn over until you are instructed to do so.
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Assume that you got through to Stage 2. 
Stage 2
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 90% chance of winning £50 
10% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
Are you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix C- M aterials for Study 3.
Appendix Ci: Study 3 -  No-choice condition.
The “Two-Stage” Game 
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money. 
At the first stage you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a 
chance to move on to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money.
First examine both stages, then indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £30 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here) 
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
IF you get to Stage 2, you will have:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
Which option would you select at Stage 1? 
Please circle your answer: A / B
male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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The “Two-Stage” Game 
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between two pairs of gambles.
You face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £30 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
If  you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £ 150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 70% chance of winning £ 12 0 
30% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Appendix Cii: Study 3 -  Dominated-choice condition.
Please do not turn over until you have answered the question above.
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Assume that you got through to Stage 2. 
Stage 2:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 70% chance of winning £120 
30% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
Are you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
216
The “Two-Stage” Game
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between two pairs of gambles.
You face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £3 0 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
I f  you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £ 150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 90% chance of winning £100
10% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Appendix Ciii: Study 3 -  Conflicted-choice condition.
Please do not turn over until you have answered the question above.
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Assume that you got through to Stage 2. 
Stage 2:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 90% chance of winning £ 100 
10% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
Are you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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The “Two-Stage” Game
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money. 
At the first stage you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a 
chance to move on to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money.
First examine both stages, then indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £30 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
IF you get to Stage 2, you will have:
75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
Appendix D: M aterials for Study 4.
Appendix Di: Study 4 -  No-choice condition.
Which option would you select at Stage 1? 
Please circle your answer: A / B
male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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The “Two-Stage” Game
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between two pairs of gambles.
You face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £30 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
IF you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £50 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Appendix Dii: Study 4 -  H igh-contrast condition.
Please only turn over when you have answered the question above.
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Assume that you got through to Stage 2. 
Stage 2:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £50 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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The “Two-Stage” Game 
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between two pairs of gambles.
You face the following pair of sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £30 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
IF you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £ 140 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Appendix Diii: Study 4 -  Low-contrast condition.
Please only turn over when you have answered the question above.
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Assume that you got through to Stage 2. 
Stage 2
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £ 150 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £ 140
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D
male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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The “Two-Stage” Game 
Please read the instructions below carefully.
You are about to play a two-stage game where you have the chance to win money.
At each stage, you decide between alternative courses of action. At the first stage 
you must decide whether to quit and take your winnings, or take a chance to move on 
to the next stage where you might win a larger amount of money. If you continue, at 
the second you must choose between three gambles.
You face the following sequential decisions. First examine both stages, then 
indicate the option you prefer.
Stage 1:
Choose between:
A) a sure win of £30 (the game ends here)
B) 80% chance of winning nothing (the game ends here)
20% chance of going through to Stage 2.
IF you get to Stage 2, you will:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £140 
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £50 
25% chance of winning nothing
E) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 1?
Please circle your answer: A / B
Please only turn over when you have answered the question above.
Appendix Div: Study 4 -  three-choice condition.
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Assume that you got through to Stage 2.
Stage 2:
Choose between:
C) 75% chance of winning £ 140
25% chance of winning nothing
D) 75% chance of winning £50 
25% chance of winning nothing
E) 75% chance of winning £150 
25% chance of winning nothing.
Which option would you select at Stage 2?
Please circle your answer: C / D / E
male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix E: Materials for Study 5.
Appendix Ei: Study 5: Condition 1 (Club Diesel = TargetL).
It is getting late one Friday night and you are out with a group of friends in the 
centre of your small town. You need to decide where to go next to continue the 
evening’s entertainment. The town has only three nightclubs, two in the north and 
one in the south. All are about a half-hour taxi ride away (see map below).
Club
Cherish
N
* you Taxi Rank 
are here (town centre)
Club Club
Atom Diesel
Club Cherish is in the north of the town - the entrance fee is £4, they do not 
really play your favourite kind of music but you are likely to bump into other friends 
there.
Club Atom is also in the south of the town -  the entrance fee is £15, they play 
your favourite kind of music and you are likely to bump into other friends there.
Club Diesel is in the south of the town -  the entrance fee is £12, they play your 
favourite kind of music and you are likely to bump into other friends there.
You all climb into the taxi and have to decide whether to go North or South. What do 
you ask the taxi driver to do? (please circle choice)
go North / go South
Please only turn over when you have answered the question above.
226
If you chose to go South, which nightclub will you go to? (Please circle your choice)
Club Atom / Club Diesel
About you: male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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It is getting late one Friday night and you are out with a group of friends in the centre 
of your small town. You need to decide where to go next to continue the evening’s 
entertainment. The town has only three nightclubs, two in the north and one in the 
south. All are about a half-hour taxi ride away (see map below).
Appendix Eii: Study 5: Condition 2 (Club Cherish = TargetL).
Club Club
Atom Cherish
*  you 
are here
Taxi Rank 
(town centre)
Club
Diesel
Club Cherish is in the north of the town - the entrance fee is £4, they do not
really play your favourite kind of music but you are likely to bump into other friends 
there.
Club Atom is also in the north of the town -  the entrance fee is £15, they play 
your favourite kind of music and you are likely to bump into other friends there.
Club Diesel is in the south of the town -  the entrance fee is £12, they play your 
favourite kind of music and you are likely to bump into other friends there.
You all climb into the taxi and have to decide whether to go North or South. What do 
you ask the taxi driver to do? (please circle choice)
go North / go South
Please only turn over when you have answered the question above.
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If you chose to go North, which nightclub will you go to? (Please circle your choice)
Club Atom / Club Cherish
About you: Male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix F. Materials for Study 6.
Appendix Fi: Study 6: Condition 1 - Account 1 = TargetL
You have just inherited some money from a distant relative and have decided to save 
£5000 in an individual savings account. You have narrowed your choices down to 
two banks, Bank J and Bank K.
Bank J offers two accounts. The first offers a 6.1% annual interest rate with a 60 
day notice period for withdrawals. The second offers a 6.0% annual interest rate with 
a 45 day notice period for withdrawals.
Bank K offers a 5% annual interest rate with instant access to your money 
should you need it.
These options are depicted below.
£5,000
Bank J Bank K
6.1 % interest 
60 day notice
6 % interest 
45 day notice 5 % interest instant access
Today you are going to go to one of the banks to deposit your money in one of 
the accounts. Which bank will you visit?
Please circle your choice.
Bank J / Bank K
Please do not turn over until you have answered the question above.
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Please circle your answer:
If  you chose to go to Bank J, please indicate the account in which you wish to
deposit your m o n e y .
6.1 % interest, 60 day notice /  6 % interest, 45 day notice
About you: Male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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You have just inherited some money from a distant relative and have decided to save 
£5000 in an individual savings account. You have narrowed your choices down to 
two banks, Bank J and Bank K.
Bank J offers 6.1% annual interest rate with a 60 day notice period for 
withdrawals.
Bank K offers two accounts. The first offers a 5% annual interest rate with 
instant access to your money should you need it. The second offers a 6.0% annual 
interest rate with a 45 day notice period for withdrawals.
These options are depicted below.
£5,000
Appendix Fii: Study 6: Condition 2 - Account 2 =  T arg e t^
Bank J Bank K
6.1 % interest 
60 day notice
5 % interest 6 % interest
instant access 45 day notice
Today you are going to go to one of the banks to deposit your money in one of 
the accounts. Which bank will you visit?
Please circle your choice.
Bank J / Bank K
Please do not turn over until you have answered the question above.
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Please circle your answer:
5 % interest, instant access /  6 % interest, 45 day notice
If you chose to go to Bank K, please indicate the account in which you wish to
deposit your money.
About you: Male / female
Age:
Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix G. Materials for Study 7
Appendix Gi: Study 7 -  Condition 1, Dominated lure (Spinner A = Targets) (1
variation)
Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are two tables offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the table at which you would like to spend your token (please tick the 
relevant box):
Table 1 □  Table 2 □
Table 1 Table 2
P lease  tu rn  over.
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I f  y o u  se le c te d  T a b le  1, p le a se  in d ic a te  b y  c irc l in g  it, th e  s p in n e r  a t w h ic h  y o u  w o u ld
lik e  to  sp e n d  y o u r  to k en :
About you: Male / female
Age:
M any  th an k s  for y o u r partic ip a tio n .
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Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are two tables offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the table at which you would like to spend your token (please tick the 
relevant box):
Appendix Gii: Study 7 -  Condition 2, Dominated lure (Spinner B =
T arge tL) (1 variation)
Table 1 □ Table 2 □
Table 1 Table 2
P lea se  tu rn  over.
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I f  y o u  s e le c te d  T a b le  2 , p le a se  in d ic a te  b y  c irc lin g  it, th e  s p in n e r  a t w h ic h  y o u  w o u ld
lik e  to  s p e n d  y o u r  to k en :
About you: Male / female
Age:
M an y  th an k s fo r y o u r partic ip a tio n .
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Appendix Giii: Study 7 -  Condition 3, Conflicted lure (Spinner A = 
TargetL) (one variation)
Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are two tables offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the table at which you would like to spend your token (please tick the 
relevant box):
Table 1 □  Table 2 □
Table 1 Table 2
P lea se  tu rn  over.
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I f  y o u  se le c te d  T a b le  1, p le a se  in d ic a te  b y  c irc l in g  it, th e  s p in n e r  a t w h ic h  y o u  w o u ld
lik e  to  sp e n d  y o u r  to k en :
About you: Male / female
Age:
M any  thanks for y o u r partic ip a tio n .
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Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are two tables offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the table at which you would like to spend your token (please tick the 
relevant box):
Appendix Giv: Study 7 -  Condition 4, Conflicted lure (Spinner B =
T a rg e ts  (one variation)
Table 1 □ Table 2 □
Table 1 Table 2
P lease  turn  over.
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I f  y o u  s e le c te d  T a b le  2 , p le a se  in d ic a te  b y  c irc lin g  it, th e  s p in n e r  a t w h ic h  y o u  w o u ld
lik e  to  s p e n d  y o u r  to k en :
About you: Male / female
Age:
M any  th an k s fo r y o u r p a rtic ip a tio n .
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Appendix Gv: Study 7 -  Control 1, Dominated lure (Spinner A = 
Target^) (one variation)
Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are three games offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the spinner at which you would like to spend your token (please circle 
the relevant spinner).
About you: Male / female
Age:
M any  th an k s  fo r y o u r p a rtic ip a tio n .
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Appendix Gvi: Study 7 -  Control 2, Dominated lure (Spinner B = 
Target^) (one variation)
Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are three games offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the spinner at which you would like to spend your token (please circle the 
relevant spinner).
About you: Male / female
Age:
M an y  th an k s fo r y o u r partic ip a tio n .
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Appendix Gvii: Study 7 -  Control 3, Conflicted lure (Spinner A = 
Target^ (one variation)
Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are three games offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the spinner at which you would like to spend your token (please circle 
the relevant spinner).
About you: Male / female
Age:
M an y  thanks fo r y o u r p artic ip a tio n .
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Imagine that you are at a casino. You are about to leave and you have one token left. 
Near the exit there are three games offering a chance of winning a prize in exchange 
for your token. You can get one spin of the wheel in exchange for your token, and if 
the pointer ends up in the light section, you win the amount specified. This is what 
you decide to spend your token on.
Choose the spinner at which you would like to spend your token (please circle the 
relevant spinner).
Appendix Gviii Study 7 -  Control 4, Conflicted lure (Spinner B = T a rg e t^  (one
variation).
About you: Male / female
Age:
M any  thanks for y o u r p artic ip a tio n .
245
Appendix II: Materials for Study 8 
Appendix Hi: Monty Hall -  standard three door condition
Thank you for taking part in this research 
All responses will be treated as confidential and 
no-one will be identified in any results which are reported. 
Please do not discuss the task with colleagues, 
we are interested in your response to the task
K
You are a contestant in the game show described. Initially you have chosen box K.
You can now (please tick your choice):
Stick with box K □
Choose Box L q
Some details about you:
Your age: ................
Your gender Male □
Female □
Your degree Programme ....................................
Do you have a professional/vocational qualification? 
Yes □  No □
If yes, please specify:....................................
Have you taken courses which covered 
Corporate finance □
Conditional probability □
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Appendix Hii: Study 8 -  Four door Choose-A-Door Monty Hall condition.
Thank you for taking part in this research 
All responses will be treated as confidential and 
no-one will be identified in any results which are reported. 
Please do not discuss the task with colleagues, 
we are interested in your response to the task
K L M
You are a contestant in the game show described. Initiall 
You can now (please tick your choice):
y you have chosen box
Stick with box K □
Choose Box L □
Choose Box M □
Some details about you:
Your age: ................
Your gender Male □
Female □
Your degree Programme ....................................
Do you have a professional/vocational qualification? 
Yes □  No □
If yes, please specify:....................................
Have you taken courses which covered 
Corporate finance 0
Conditional probability □
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Thank you for taking part in this research 
All responses will be treated as confidential and 
no-one will be identified in any results which are reported.
Please do not discuss the task with colleagues, 
we are interested in your response to the task
Appendix Hiii: Study 8 -  Four door Choose-A-Choice Monty Hall condition.
You are a contestant in the game show described. Initially you have chosen box K.
You can now (please tick your choice):
Stick with box K □
Switch to Either Box L or Box M □
Some details about you:
Your age: ................
Your gender Male □
Female □
Your degree Programme ....................................
Do you have a professional/vocational qualification? 
Yes □  No □
If yes, please specify:............. ......................
Have you taken courses which covered 
Corporate finance □
Conditional probability □
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Appendix I. Materials for Study 9a and 9b.
Appendix Ii: Study 9a & 9b: Version 1
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• An Italian restaurant Q
• Your choice of either a Mexican or a Thai restaurant □
2. You are choosing your meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either ice 
cream, or your choice of either chocolate cake, cheesecake or fruit salad.
Firstly, for each of the following pairs of options, please indicate which one you 
prefer (please tick one in each pair)
2. 1 Option pair 1
• Chocolate cake □
• Cheesecake □
2.2 Option pair 2
• Chocolate cake □
• Fruit salad □
2.3 Option pair 3
• Cheesecake □
• Fruit salad □
2.4 Now indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Ice cream Q
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, cheesecake or fruit salad □
About you: Male / female
Age:
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1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• An Mexican restaurant □
• Your choice of either an Italian or a Thai restaurant □
2. You are choosing your own meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either 
cheesecake, or your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or fruit salad. 
Indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Cheesecake □
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or fruit salad Q
Appendix Iii: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 2
About you: Male / female
Age:
250
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
1. A Thai restaurant □
2. Your choice of either an Italian or a Mexican restaurant □
2. You are choosing your meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either 
cheesecake, or your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or fruit salad.
Firstly, for each of the following pairs of options, please indicate which one you 
prefer (please tick one in each pair)
2. 1 Option pair 1
Appendix Iiii: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 3
• Chocolate cake a
• Ice cream □
2.2 Option pair 2
• Chocolate cake □
• Fruit salad □
2.3 Option pair 3
• Ice cream □
• Fruit salad a
2.4 Now indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Cheesecake O
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or fruit salad □
About you: Male / female
Age:
251
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• An Italian restaurant □
• Your choice of either a Mexican, Thai, Seafood, or Indian restaurant □
2. You are choosing your own meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either ice 
cream, or your choice of either chocolate cake, cheesecake or fruit salad.
Indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Ice cream Q
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, cheesecake or fruit salad □
Appendix Iiv: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 4
About you: Male / female
Age:
252
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• A Mexican restaurant □
• Your choice of either an Italian, Thai, Seafood, or Indian restaurant □
2. You are choosing your own meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either 
chocolate cake, or your choice of either ice cream, cheesecake or fruit salad. Indicate 
which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Chocolate cake □
• Your choice of either ice cream, cheesecake or fruit salad □
Appendix Iv: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 5
About you: Male / female
Age:
253
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• A Thai restaurant □
• Your choice of either an Italian, Mexican, Seafood, or Indian restaurant □
2. You are choosing your meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either 
chocolate cake, or your choice of either ice cream, cheesecake or fruit salad. 
Firstly, for each of the following pairs of options, please indicate which one you 
prefer (please tick one in each pair)
Appendix Ivi: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 6
2. 1 Option pair 1
• Ice cream Q
• Cheesecake □
2.2 Option pair 2
• Ice cream □
• Fruit salad □
2.3 Option pair 3
• Cheesecake Q
• Fruit salad Q
2.4 Now indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Chocolate cake q
• Your choice of either ice cream, cheesecake or fruit salad □
About you: Male / female
Age:
254
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• A Seafood restaurant q
• Your choice of either an Italian, Mexican, Thai, or Indian restaurant □
2. You are choosing your own meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either 
fruit salad, or your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or cheesecake. 
Indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Fruit salad q
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or cheesecake O
Appendix Ivii: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 7
About you: Male / female
Age:
255
1. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• An Indian restaurant Q
• Your choice of either an Italian, Mexican, Thai, or Seafood restaurant □
2. You are choosing your meal for tonight. For dessert, you can have either fruit 
salad, or your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream, or cheesecake.
Firstly, for each of the following pairs of options, please indicate which one you 
prefer (please tick one in each pair)
2. 1 Option pair 1
• Chocolate Cake □
• Ice cream □
2.2 Option pair 2
• Chocolate cake □
• Cheesecake □
2.3 Option pair 3
• Ice cream □
• Cheesecake □
2.4 Now indicate which of the following dessert choices you prefer.
• Fruit salad O
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice cream or cheesecake Q
Appendix Iviii: Studies 9a and 9b -  Version 8
About you: Male / female
Age:
256
Appendix J: Materials for Study 10 
Appendix Ji: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 1.
The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
1.
• Fruit juice q
• Your choice of either cola, coffee or tea □
2.
• A seafood restaurant q
• Your choice of either a Mexican, Italian or Thai restaurant □
3.
• Chicken q
• Your choice of either beef, fish or pasta q
4.
• Chocolate cake q
• Your choice of either ice-cream, cheesecake or fruit salad □
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  than ks fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
1 .
• Your choice of either cola, coffee or tea □
• Fruit juice □
2.
• Your choice of either a Mexican, Italian or Thai restaurant □
• A seafood restaurant q
3.
• Your choice of either beef, fish or pasta □
• Chicken ■ q
4.
• Your choice of either ice-cream, cheesecake or fruit salad □
• Chocolate cake q
Appendix Jii: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 2.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
1 .
• Cola □
• Your choice of either coffee, tea or fruit juice □
2.
• A Mexican restaurant q
• Your choice of either an Italian, Thai or seafood restaurant □
3.
• Beef Q
• Your choice of either fish, pasta or chicken O
4.
• Ice-cream q
• Your choice of either cheesecake, fruit salad or chocolate cake □
Appendix Jiii: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 3.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
Appendix Jiv: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 4.
1.
• Your choice of either coffee, tea or fruit juice □
® Cola q
2.
• Your choice of either an Italian, Thai or seafood restaurant □
• A Mexican restaurant q
• Your choice of either fish, pasta or chicken □
• Beef □
• Your choice of either cheesecake, fruit salad or chocolate cake Q
• Ice-cream □
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
1.
• Coffee q
• Your choice of either tea, fruit juice or cola Q
2.
• An Italian restaurant q
• Your choice of either a Thai, seafood or Mexican restaurant □
3.
• Fish □
• Your choice of either pasta, chicken or beef □
4.
• Cheesecake □
• Your choice of either fruit salad, chocolate cake or ice-cream □
Appendix Jv: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 5.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
Appendix Jvi: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 6.
1.
• Your choice of either tea, fruit juice or cola
• Coffee
2.
• Your choice of either a Thai, seafood or Mexican restaurant
• An Italian restaurant
3.
• Your choice of either pasta, chicken or beef
• Fish
4.
• Your choice of either fruit salad, chocolate cake or ice-cream
• Cheesecake
a
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
1.
• Tea □
• Your choice of either fruit juice, cola or coffee □
2.
• A Thai restaurant q
• Your choice of either a seafood, Mexican or Italian restaurant □
3.
• Pasta □
• Your choice of either chicken, beef or fish □
4.
• Fruit salad □
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice-cream or cheesecake □
Appendix Jvii: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 7.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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The following items have been randomly grouped into a set of three items and a lone 
item. Please indicate your preference for the lone item of your choice or one of the 
three grouped options.
1.
• Your choice of either fruit juice, cola or coffee p
• Tea q
2.
• Your choice of either a seafood, Mexican or Italian restaurant Q
• A Thai restaurant q
3.
• Your choice of either chicken, beef or fish p
• Pasta p
4.
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice-cream or cheesecake Q
• Fruit salad p
Appendix Jviii: Study 10 -  Passive condition, version 8.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Fruit juice Q
• Your choice of either cola, coffee or tea O
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• A seafood restaurant Q
• Your choice of either a Mexican, Italian or Thai restaurant □
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Chicken □
• Your choice of either beef, fish or pasta □
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Chocolate cake O
• Your choice of either ice-cream, cheesecake or fruit salad □
Appendix Jix: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 1.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M an y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either cola, coffee or tea Q
• Fruit juice Q
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either a Mexican, Italian or Thai restaurant □
• A seafood restaurant O
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either beef, fish or pasta □
• Chicken Q
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either ice-cream, cheesecake or fruit salad □
• Chocolate cake □
Appendix Jx: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 2.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Cola □
• Your choice of either coffee, tea or fruit juice O
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• A Mexican restaurant □
• Your choice of either an Italian, Thai or seafood restaurant □
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Beef □
• Your choice of either fish, pasta or chicken Q
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Ice-cream Q
• Your choice of either cheesecake, fruit salad or chocolate cake □
Appendix Jxi: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 3.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either coffee, tea or fruit juice □
• Cola Q
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either an Italian, Thai or seafood restaurant Q
• A Mexican restaurant □
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either fish, pasta or chicken □
• Beef □
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either cheesecake, fruit salad or chocolate cake □
• Ice-cream □
Appendix Jxii: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 4.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s for  y o u r  p artic ip a tion .
268
1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Coffee □
• Your choice of either tea, fruit juice or cola □
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• An Italian restaurant □
• Your choice of either a Thai, seafood or Mexican restaurant □
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Fish □
• Your choice of either pasta, chicken or beef □
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Cheesecake □
• Your choice of either fruit salad, chocolate cake or ice-cream □
Appendix Jxiii: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 5.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th an k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
269
1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either tea, fruit juice or cola □
• Coffee □
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either a Thai, seafood or Mexican restaurant □
• An Italian restaurant Q
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either pasta, chicken or beef □
• Fish □
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either fruit salad, chocolate cake or ice-cream □
• Cheesecake □
Appendix Jxiv: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 6.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th a n k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Tea □
• Your choice of either fruit juice, cola or coffee □
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• A Thai restaurant q
• Your choice of either a seafood, Mexican or Italian restaurant □
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Pasta □
• Your choice of either chicken, beef or fish □
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Fruit salad O
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice-cream or cheesecake □
Appendix Jxv: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 7.
About you: Male / female
Age:
M a n y  th a n k s fo r  y o u r  p a r tic ip a tio n .
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1. Imagine you have stopped for a drink at a local café and you can choose between 
the following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either fruit juice, cola or coffee □
• Tea □
2. Imagine you are planning an outing for tonight, and you can choose between the 
following restaurant options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either a seafood, Mexican or Italian restaurant □
• A Thai restaurant □
3. You are choosing your main course for tonight and can choose between the 
following options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either chicken, beef or fish □
• Pasta □
4. You are choosing your dessert for tonight and can choose between the following 
options. Which would you prefer? (Please tick one).
• Your choice of either chocolate cake, ice-cream or cheesecake □
• Fruit salad □
Appendix Jxvi: Study 10 -  Active condition, version 8.
About you: Male / female
Age:
A ppendix K : Table of thesis hypotheses
Study Hypothesis Accepted/
rejected
1 Hoi (null hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no choice condition will be 
equivalent to the proportion selecting the sure thing in the choice condition.
rejected
1 Hu (effect of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no-choice 
condition will be different to the proportion selecting sure thing in the dominated-choice and conflicted-choice 
conditions.
accepted
1 Hui (lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no- choice 
condition will be greater than the proportion selecting sure thing in the choice condition.
accepted
2 H21 (lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no-choice condition 
will be greater than the proportion selecting sure thing in the dominated-choice and conflicted-choice 
conditions.
accepted
2 H2Ü (conflicted lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the 
dominated-choice condition will be greater than the proportion selecting the sure thing in the conflicted-choice 
condition.
rejected
3 H3i (dominated lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no­
choice condition will be greater than the proportion selecting the sure thing in the dominated-choice condition.
accepted
3 H3ü (conflicted lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no­
choice condition will be greater than the proportion selecting sure thing in the conflicted-choice condition.
accepted
4 HL}j (high-contrast lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no­
choice condition will be greater than the proportion selecting sure thing in the high contrast-choice condition.
accepted
4 H jü (low-contrast lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no­
choice condition will be greater than the proportion selecting sure thing in the low contrast-choice condition.
accepted
4 Hua (three-choice lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing in the no­
choice condition will be greater than the proportion selecting sure thing in the three-choice condition.
rejected
4 Hjjv (contrast-determined lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure thing will rejected
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Study Hypothesis Accepted/
rejected
be less in the high-contrast condition than in the low-contrast condition.
4 Hjv (option summing-determined lure of choice hypotheses): the proportion of participants selecting the sure 
thing will be less in the three-choice condition than the in the low-contrast condition
rejected
4 Htvi (option summing-determined lure of choice hypotheses): the proportion of participants selecting the sure 
thing will be less in the low-contrast choice condition than the in the high-contrast condition.
rejected
4 fLtvii (number of options-generated lure of choice hypothesis): the proportion of participants selecting the sure 
thing in the three-choice condition will be less than in any of the two choice conditions.
rejected
5 H5j (asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis): The presence of Club Atom will correspond with a preference 
for Club Diesel both in Condition 1 and Condition 2.
rejected
5 H5ii (lure of choice hypothesis): The presence of Club Atom will correspond with a preference for Tl (Club 
Diesel in Condition 1, and Club Cherish in Condition 2).
accepted
6 H6i (asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis): The presence of Account 3 will correspond with a preference 
for Account 1, regardless of which target it is paired with.
rejected
6 H6jj (lure o f choice hypothesis): The presence of Account 3 will correspond with a preference for Tl (i.e. 
whichever account it is paired with in that condition).
accepted
7 H7j (dominated lure of choice hypothesis): The presence of Spinner D (dominated lure) will correspond with a 
preference for Tl (i.e. whichever account it is paired with in a given condition).
rejected
7 H7ii (conflicted lure of hypothesis): The presence of Spinner C (conflicted lure) will correspond with a 
preference for Tl (i.e. whichever account it is paired with in a given condition).
accepted
7 H7j„ (asymmetric dominance effect hypothesis): The presence of Spinner C (conflicted lure) will correspond 
with a preference for Spinner A (regardless of which account it is paired with it).
rejected
7 H7w (physical proximity versus explicit pairing hypothesis): The preference reversal known as the lure of 
choice will only be demonstrated when the floating lure (Spinner D or C) is explicitly paired with Tl, and not 
when the physical proximity is the same, but with no explicit pairing (control conditions).
accepted
8 H8i (the Monty hypothesis): The majority of people will stick to Box K in the three-door, CAD and CAC 
conditions.
rejected
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Study Hypothesis Accepted/
rejected
8 H8ii (lure of choice hypothesis): More people will switch in the CAC condition than in the CAD condition. accepted
9a H9i (basic comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for control condition of Study 9a will be > 100%. rejected
9a H9jj (basic lure of choice hypothesis): lone option sum for control condition of Study 9a will be < 100%. accepted
9a H9jii (explicit comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for forced-comparisons condition of Study 9a will 
be > 100%, and greater than lone sum option for control condition of Study 9a.
rejected
9a H9jv (forced-comparisons lure of choice hypothesis): lone option sum for forced-comparisons condition of 
Study 9a will be < 100%.
rejected
9b H9V (weak comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for three-choice and five-choice conditions of Study 
9b will be > 100%.
rejected
9b H9Vi (strong comparisons-hurt hypothesis): lone option sum for five-choice condition of Study 9b will be > 
100% and > lone option sum for five-choice condition of Study 9b.
rejected
9b H9vji (weak lure of choice hypothesis): lone option sum for three-choice and five-choice conditions of Study 9b 
will be < 100%.
accepted
9b H9viii (strong line of choice hypothesis): lone option sum for five-choice condition of Study 9b will be < 100% 
and < lone option sum for three-choice condition of Study 9b.
accepted
10 H10i (passive decision hypothesis): when the options are grouped randomly, the comparisons-hurt explanation 
predicts a lone option sum for the passive condition to be > 100%.
accepted
10 HlOit (active decision hypothesis): when the options are described in terms of a brief scenario, the lure of 
choice explanation predicts a lone option sum for the active condition to be < 100%.
accepted
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Appendix L
Multi-dimensional versus unitary lure potential follow-up study.
In a floating lure study, designed to investigate parametric differences 
between unitary lures and multi-dimensional lures described using the criteria 
detailed in Table 17, there are 28 different possible versions. These vary in terms of 
which target item was paired with the lure, i.e. played the role of targetu (two levels: 
targeti or target2), which type of lure was paired with it (seven levels: unitary lure, 
lurei, lure2, lure3, lure4, lures or lureô) and the order of the choices (two levels: target 
and lure presented first followed by targeti, or targeti followed by target and lure). 
The table below clarifies all choice pairings for one example. Item notation: number 
denotes scenario, letter denotes type of lure and paring of lure, and i/ii denotes 
presentation order.
Presented first Presented second Item
Unitary Lure
Targeti or lure Target2 1 Ai
Target2 Targeti or lure lAii
Target2 or lure Targeti IBi
Targeti Target2 or lure IBii
Multi-attribute Lures
Targeti or lurei Target2 ICi
Target2 Targeti or lurei ICii
Target2 or lurei Target] IDi
Targeti Target2 or lurei IDii
Targeti or lure2 Target2 lEi
Target2 Targeti or lure2 lEii
Target2 or lure2 Targeti lFi
Targeti Target2 or lure2 lFii
Targeti or lure3 Target2 lGi
Target2 Targeti or lures lGii
Target2 or lure3 Targeti lili
Targeti Target2 or lure3 lllii
Targeti or lure4 Target2 llii
Target2 Targeti or lure4 llii
Target2 or lure4 Targeti Ui
Targeti Targets or lure4 Uii
Targeti or lures Target2 IKi
Target2 Target] or lures IKii
Target2 or lures Targeti ILi
Targeti Targets or lures ILii
Targeti or lure6 Targe t2 IMi
Target2 Targeti or lureé IMii
Target2 or lure6 Targeti INi
Target] Targets or lure6 INii
